

CORRUPTION—CONCEPTUALISATION PROBLEMS AND INSTITUTIONALISATION IN NIGERIA : A REVISITATIONAL EXAMINATION

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Introduction

This paper, adopting a revisitational analytical approach, examines the concept of corruption, its problems of conceptualisation, institutionalisation and/or perpetration in Nigeria and, indeed, in the African continent. It attempts the provision of possible and useful solutions to the phenomenon which, to a significant degree could be regarded as a hydra-headed monster in most polities within the global political community even at this current threshold of the next millennium.

The paper is segmented into six parts covering the introduction, definition of the concept of corruption, its problems, features and manifestation and/or institutionalisation in Nigeria; its possible solutions and, conclusion. It should be stated at the onset, that our analytical focus in this paper on corruption and its dysfunctionality to human and national development, is neither a progeny of acquisition or possession of monopoly of morality nor that of desire to prove a holier-than-thou-inclination or, a moral point. Instead, the antecedent rationale is, among other things, a

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socio-political, cultural and economic desire to stress the fact that corruption is a nagging social problem which, can fatally misarticulate and destroy the physiological fibers and the total anatomy of any society.

These factors and others had, in the past attracted intellectual and pedagogical attention relative to its understanding and the problems it poses to the survival of human society. These attentions, among others, included the Annual conference of the Nigerian Anthropological and Sociological Association (NASA) of 1982, which chose as its theme "Nigeria: Corruption in Development", the 1989 United Nations International Conference on Corruption" (Obadan; 1993:18; Yaqub; 1998:105), and, the 1993 Centre for Advance Social Science (CASS) Seminar on Corruption (CASS: 1993). The fact that no concrete government policy outputs in Nigeria and other polities in Africa, had actually been realistically anchored on the recommendations of polities in Africa, had actually been realistically anchored on the recommendations of these various intellectual efforts vis-a-vis the possible elimination of corruption, calls for continued direction of intellectual and analytical attention to it, in such a manner that its conceptualisation, not minding, the plurality of values and the latter's variation across cultures, could be put into a clearer perspective nearer in universal acceptability or definitional unanimity.

Generally, the conceptualisation of the term corruption has long been ideologically, morally, culturally, politically and intellectually elusive to the point of losing sight of its detrimental and parasitic symbiosis with many polities including Nigeria and their citizens all over the world. This tendency tend to have made jockeying for recognition (rather than concrete prescriptive actions) within the academia the core of intellectual concerns of the analysts of this concept hence, its defiance of universal academic 'melting pot' despite the growing sophistication of social sciences in terms of

research capability and provision of solutions to intricate social, economic, cultural and political phenomena.

The concept of corruption has not been amenable to any simplistic partitioning. That is there has been no simple partitioning between various forms of corruption (for example, political and non-political corruption) despite the fact that the academic, ideological, moral, political, cultural and social tendencies for such dichotomy existed and continue to exist.

Corruption is undeniably a socio-political, economic and moral malaise that (may) holistically permeate all the nerves of any polity. It is contagious and malignant to the physiology of any political system. Once it sets into any part, it automatically contaminates all the strata of that system's socio-political hierarchy, in ways symmetrical to the spread of a bush fire. In other words, as Yaqub (Ibid:103) once opined:

corruption (in Africa) is a malignant tumour. That is, it is pervasive; it spreads from a locale (area original to its development) to affect other parts of the (society) body.

Definitions : What is Corruption ?

As a result of the complexity of corruption, its effect on the systemic existence of its victims as does its prevalence through the efforts of its perpetrator, its definition has continued to be shrouded by value preferences and differences. This, has, to some extent, complicated the attainment of a definitional unanimity on the concept within the academia and the practicing world of administration. This being the case, the pace of the intellectual tensions and policy outputs generated in the course of the pursuit of the provision of understanding to the concept and its effects on all races, all nations, all socio-economic systems and, all cases in the society are the subject matter of discussion in this section.

The definition of corruption has been variously attempted by many scholars of repute in order to provide useful understanding to the concept, and describe the type of behaviours that fall within its parameter (Akindele, 1995).

There is no gainsaying the fact, that, this has constituted itself as the core of the conceptual difficulty regarding the analysis of this politically cancerous disease (corruption), which has manifested and continue to manifest itself in most polities of the world. This conceptual difficulty is of two fold. The first concerns the actual conception of the subject-matter per se, while the second revolves around the conception of corruption in practice, or, reality within the socio-political cultures (beliefs, attitudes and values) – of the developing nations. While the latter is rooted in the multiplicity of variables (for example, Kinshiptions, family expectations, favouritism and nepotism) the demand understanding within the polities of the third world, the former raises moralistic and objective questions:

under what circumstances are actions called corrupt.. who established the standards according to which the behaviour breaks the rule.... The moralist had his own idea of what the rule should be. The actors in the situation concerned have theirs. It may be the same as the moralist or quite different. They may regard themselves as behaving honourably according to their standards, or they may be men of two words, partly adhering to two standards which are incomparable and ending up exasperated and indifferent. (They may recognize no particular moral implications of the acts in question at all- this is fairly obviously quite common) (Leys; 1956;221).

This, among other factors, is why the achievement of consensus as to what corruption or corrupt behaviours are, to say the least, has been very minimal. Hence. one can argued that the term corruption has no fixed meaning, and that its meaning can be better explained proverbially "beauty is in the eye of the beholder". In other words, its definition is at best contextual, because, as Okoosi (1993: 110) once opined the definition of corruption depends often times on

which side the definer is, and, how it is to be examined and for what purpose. This tends to suggest as Heindenheimer points out, the various meanings the term corruption has been given since English became a language (Heindenheimer, 1978:2). It equally suggests his identification of the three variants of corruption as inclusive of "public office-centred, market-centred and public interest-centred" and the claim that the adoption of any of them is usually dependent on the objective of the corruptions.

This conceptual difficulty is also attributable to many factors (Odekunle, 1986; Akindele, 1995; Yaqub op.cit. 1998: 103) ranging from the lack of universal values with regards to different behaviours and activities (nepotism, gift-giving, patronage, party-financing) which many writers and analysts have identified as corruption, fertility of certain political environments for corruption due to inequality brought about by exploitations; expansion of governmental functions to many aspect of human existence; to, the amenability of primordial attachment of strong cultural and emotional loyalties to corrupt tendencies.

In addition to this, the equivocality of the concept of corruption complicates the attainment of a universalistic criterion for dealing with it and, for its analysis. Thus, it may be analysed and viewed from many perspectives each with its own methods or techniques of analysis and provision of answers to its own questions.

These divergent views and multiplicity of perspectives cut' across disciplines, moral, social lines and, across cultures hence, the elusiveness of the indispensable universal consensus regarding activities, behaviours and other aspects of human beings existence that could be defined as corruption. The only way to avoid subjective analysis while doing acceptable intellectual or academic justice to the concept of corruption is for the analysts to avoid the embracement of normative narrowing while duly considering the principles of cultural relativism according to which:

all people should be judged in terms of their own cultures and, various customs and practices that some group or culture (the developed nations) would avoid (as either primitive or barbaric) may be appropriate in the context of the culture (for example developing nations) that follow them. (Stewart and Glynn, 1971: 37).

Simply put, when generalizing actions and behaviours that constitute corruption, the concept of cultural relativism must not be ignored. This is necessary in order to avoid ideological or analytical fallacies and, accusation of imperialistic or genocidal scholarship. The rationale for this, finds solace in the fact that traditional values for example, family and kinship ties on the one hand, and economic needs, poverty and dependential syndromes facing the income earners or bread winners on the other hand, in the developing nations are realistically in disharmony with the imperatives of modern government or rational bureaucracy which had long spilled over into many parts of the world from their bases where such syndromes rarely exist.

In spite of these difficulties many scholars and analysts of repute have made the definitions of corruption explicit in varying degrees of specificity. But then, certain ideological and moralistic problems still exist with little indication of disappearance pending the evolution of a complete universal "melting-pot" of societal values (Stewart and Glynn; op. Cit: 1971; Dressler and Willis, 1975).

Fatalism apart, these problems suggest the need for tolerance and extensive research with regards to global multiplicity of behaviours most of which have been entangled within the cluster of various cultures. Moreover, as earlier stated, the relativity of certain behaviours to various environment must be considered if the concept of corruption is to have any universally embraced meaning. The need for this finds solace in the cores of various definitions already given by the writers on and, analysts of this concept.

Definitions of corruption have ranged from its typification as using of public or official positions in ways that forsake public interest; deviant behaviours that encourage private gains at public expense; maladjusted behaviours that flagrantly violate the acceptable and legitimized norms of societal expectations; to its conceptualisation as spoiled, unethically polluted, and rotten behaviours that diverge from the formal and expected role which the society demands of everybody.

To begin with, McMullan (1969: 183-184) in his article entitled "A theory of Corruption" defines corruption in the following way: a public official is corrupt if he accepts money or money's worth for doing something that he is under a duty to do anyway, that he is under a duty not to do, or exercise a legitimate discretion for improper reasons. And, as for Leff (1970: 510) Corruption is:

an extra-legal institution used by individuals or groups to gain influence over the actions of the bureaucracy. As such, the existence of corruption per se indicates only that these groups participate in the decision-making process to a greater extent that would otherwise be the case.

According to Otite (1986:12) corruption means:

the perversion of (the) integrity or state of affairs through bribery, favour; or moral depravity... corruption involves the injection of additional but improper transactions aimed at changing the moral course of events and altering judgements and position of trust. It consists of the doers (givers) and receivers' use of informal, extra-legal or illegal acts to facilitate matters. It is in this sense that one sees corruption as a lubricator of the social system, a means by which to overcome economic obstacles and bureaucratic red-tapism. Hence, the ambivalence and inconsistency in the theory and practice of corruption, although, it is generally regarded as a debasement of integrity, it may also serve as a nerve in social development.

This definition, has, to some extent, been re-emphasised by Yaqub (op cit:106) who once argued that "corruption involves the

resort to illegality" and that it is "the use of informal, extra-legal or illegal acts to get transaction through."

In his article "Corruption as a feature of Governmental Organization", Banfield (1975:387), used a conceptual schematization for his definition of this concept. He starts by emphasizing that the "frame of reference" (with regards to corruption) is one in which an agent (an employee) who has accepted the obligation (an employment contract) to act on behalf of his principal, (a person or organization), serves or fails to serve the interest of the principal. He also stresses that in acting on behalf of his principal an agent must exercise some discretion. From this analogy, Banfield explains the concept of corruption thus:

An agent is personally corrupt if he unknowingly sacrifices his principal's interest to his own, that is, if he betrays his trust. He is officially corrupt if, in serving his principal's interest, he knowingly violates a rule; that is, acts illegally or unethically albeit, in his principal's interest.

While Dwivedi (1967:245) sees corruption as including "nepotism, favouritism, bribery, graft and other unfair means adopted by government employees and the public alike to extract some socially and legally prohibited favours" to Scott (1972:3), corruption "involves a deviation from certain acceptable standards of behaviours" And, according to Thorndike-Barnhart (World Book Dictionary), "corruption is the act of making, or the process of becoming evil or wicked (it involves) bribery, dishonesty. It is synonymous with rot, and decay" and, putridity. This explains while Nye (1970:587) defined corruption as

(any) behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private regarding gains. This includes such behaviours as bribery, nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationships rather than merit).

In his book, *The Pathology of Politics*, Carl Friedrich (1972: 122-128) in defining corruption, argues in the following manner:

The pattern of corruption may be said to exist whenever a power holder who is charged with doing certain things, that is a responsible functionary or office holder, is by monetary or other rewards, such as the expectation of a job in the future, induced to take actions which favour whoever provides the reward and thereby damages the group or organization to which the functionary belongs (more specifically, the government and, other socio-economic institutions).

In his own contribution, Gibbons (1976:5), defined corruption in two distinct but implicitly connected ways. His first definition goes thus:

(political) corruption is the use of a public office in a way that forsakes the public interest, measured in terms of mass opinion, elite opinion or both, in order that some form of personal advantage may be achieved at the expense of that public interest.

In the second definition, Gibbons (ibid: 232), modifying the earlier works of Friedrich (1972), emphasized that corruption in a broader sense means:

...any behaviour pattern where a power holder is induced by some reward to take actions which favour the individual offering the reward and thus conflict with the public interest; or; any behaviour pattern where a power holder seeks to maintain or extend his personal advantage by inducing individuals with some reward to assist him in neglecting the public interest.

The foregoing definitions put together, poses some problems vis-à-vis a universal and definitive conceptualisation of the subject-matter of corruption. These problems and possible ways out of them, for a better appraisal of the nagging consequences of corruption form the core of the discussion in the section below:

The Resultant Analytical Problems

Going through the above definitions and their analytical perusal, it could be reasonably argued that none is without

problems which have long been plaguing the conceptualisation of corruption as does the combating of its prevalence - (i.e., its institutionalised exchange mechanisms) – within various polities of the world including Nigeria. It should be noted however, that these problems vary in the contents and scope each of them covers. For example, the following writers: McMullan, Leff, Otite, Yaqub, Banfield, Scott and Nye tend to tie the core and scope of their definitions to public officials in government institutions as the main target of corruption. They tend to overlook the possibility of corruption involving people or institutions other than those connected with the government. This, in our view, constitutes a serious shortcoming with regards to a problem-free analysis of the concept. Specifically, the implied functionalism of corruption as defined by Otite is deprecatory. This is a serious shortcoming relative to a proper understanding of this socio-political and economic malaise. And, as Yaqub (op. Cit: 106) once opined:

Such functional and/or utilitarian value of corruption simply fails to see that in a socially stratified (class) society, not everyone shall have access to or control the instrument to ensure that a corrupt practice would serve their purpose. Thus, a functional corrupt practice is only practicable to the extent that those who want the rules bent for their benefit can exercise such an influence, A functional or thriving corruption merely worsens the situation of the less privileged and/or the down-trodden in any society.

The establishment of the "code of conduct bureau in Nigeria through the 1979 constitution" (ibid:106) further lend credence to the depreciation of the functionalism of corruption in any country. If it has been functional at least, in Nigeria, there wouldn't have been any need for the setting up of this type of body which, even though, has largely remained a "toothless bull-dog" (ibid).

Even though, Dwivedi's definition seems to prevail over this shortcoming, it too, suffers from ambiguity and bias. This is identifiable from its inclusion of behaviours like nepotism,

favouritism which may be culturally excusable in some cultures despite the antagonism of rational bureaucracy (Akindele, 1987) which makes people in these cultures victims of marginality, thereby open to accusation of corruption. Given this, the work "socially" in his definition needs clarification. As it appears, it limits the generalization with regards to the explanation of behaviours in other social contexts. Nye's definition tends to demonstrate similar short-comings regarding the condemnation of culturally defined family ties. Even, his condemnation of patronage which he thinks is only based on ascriptive criteria is misleading. His basing of patronage on ascriptive relationships is defective, and, it also demonstrates a bias towards certain characteristics of certain societies. This can be understood if one looks at the circumstances surrounding the issue of political patronage in the developed world.

Since political patronage in the developed world does not have to be based on ascriptive relationships but, mostly, on political contributions, either in the past, or, future (potential) to the person making the appointment, or, granting the benefits, Nye's emphasis on ascriptive criteria pre-judges the morality of other cultures where ascription plays a dominant role. This needs reconsideration if his definition is to be useful in understanding the concept of corruption, and, the detriments of its institutionalisation in the developing polities of Africa.

While Carl Friedrich's definition is less value-laden compared to some of its' type, it nevertheless suffers similar shortcomings characteristic of other definitions in one major respect – (the treatment of corruption as a "One-way" Process). Even though, Gibbons made the same mistake in his first definition, he later rectified it in his second definition by ways of including the concept of reciprocity and, removing its restriction of to political corruption. Through the concept of reciprocity, Gibbons typified corruption as a "two-way" process. This makes the application of his definition

within any political system possible. For example, most of the corruptions taking place in Nigeria are actually initiated by the office holders with few imitations by non-office holders. Generally, such office holders may, by virtue of the symbolism of their office or official duties sometimes use delaying tactics in inducing their clients into offering bribes before performing their duties. These tactics, among others, for example, in Nigeria, now include phrases (in Yoruba Language) like "Kosi iwe" meaning, "no working paper", "Kosi oga nile" meaning, "the boss is not in"; "a kole fi ofo inu se ise" meaning "we cannot work with empty stomach (i.e. work without eating)", "oju lasan ko se nfi se aisun" meaning "nothing goes for nothing"; and, "Eyin nikan ko lo ye ki o ma dan oga" meaning "you should not monopolise your wealth"

These tactics which have their counter-parts in other Nigerian (ethnic) languages and among other ethnic groups in Nigeria and Africa are euphemisms for luring the(usually unsuspecting initial)-clients into giving bribes or kick-backs in Nigeria. However, with time, this development seemed to have become understandable to Nigerians and, Africans depending on the issue or issues at stake to the extent that, any time such phrases are mentioned by the corruptor, the corruptee automatically knows what to do. The danger of this, is that, eventhough, the corruptees have the legitimate rights for the benefits at stake (i.e, what they want) from the (public) official, they are manacled into offering bribe in one way or the other to the officials before the later would respond. Even, in most cases the victims are not successful in getting the desired benefits after such unreceipted transactions. Eventhough, the policemen are mostly notorious for this in Nigeria, because of the enormous discretion of enforcement of laws given to them, it has spread like the bush fire into various ,sectors of the Nation's political landscape. For example, the issuance of Nigerian Passport, import licences. Vehicle licences, submission of contract tenders, contract awards, application for employment and so many other things or benefits that should be normally obtained without

tensions and nightmarish experiences, have fallen and continue to fall victims to these retrogressive, anti-development, and, corrupt tactics. It is mostly disturbing in that, to the perpetrators, nothing seems to be wrong with this, since to them and, a preponderant majority of the ignorant populace, it is getting their "eto", "obi", "colanut" meaning "right" or "dues" in the course of performing their duties in total defiance from the fact that they are actually paid for doing the job in the first place.

This tends to put into perspective McMullan's (1961, 191-192) analysis of the relationship between the African police and the African farmer in which the latter will always try to seek (due to ignorance of the duties of the police) the former's favour by offering a bribe, or conversely, in which the police will use his position to scare the farmer into bribing him, a situation which is reinforced by the fact that:

Law enforcement agents (in Nigeria and indeed Africa) in particular the police, immigration and custom officers, are the guilty ones in this genre (of corruption). They can individually stoop so low to accept bribes of less than five Naira (which is less than half of an American cent) from each commercial vehicle plying the intra-urban routes. Victims of this (corrupt) official high-handedness could be foreign nationals, refugees from the Great Lake States wlich have (recently)been plunged into wars, crises of dislocation, destabilization, ethnic cleansing and so on.

McMullan's definition implicitly emphasizes that, the role of the corruptor or the corruptee can, and do usually change. This means that either the political administrative or any other official or, the clients can initiate corruption.

Gibbon's definition eliminates the problems of shortsightedness or limitation of scope with regards to those who could be accused of corruption. The fact that this second definition tends to prevail over this problem which many definitions have (either consciously or unconsciously) overlooked, makes it further appealing with

various sectors of the society where corruption takes place. It further puts into a clearer perspective that corruption takes place in other institutions or organizations outside the government or political arena.

Even though, other factors like extended family problems, inadequate salaries, and, lateness in the payment of salaries to workers as at when due, that usually affect the performance of many public and private officials, and, institutions in the developing nations were not touched by this definition, the mere fact that it does not condemn them like Dwivedi's definition, show how applicable and value neutral it is. It should be emphasized however, that the applicability of this definition within the context of Africa or other developing nations may be hindered by the complexity involved in measuring public opinion (Akindele, Obiyan, Owoeye 1998). Even, this, according Ibbons, is a problem within Canadian society (Gibbons, op cit: 232). And, in developing nations the problem is further compounded by the high rate of illiteracy as well as cultural or ethnic loyalties which, experience had shown to have caused distortion in the ways people respond to questionnaires (Akindele, Ajila, Ademola Ajila, Ademola, 1995) on any issue (be it corruption or otherwise) concerning their kith and kins. As a result of this, I had, in an earlier study (Akindele, 1995) defined corruption:

as any form of reciprocal behaviour or transaction where both the power/office holder can respectively initiate the inducement of each other by some reward to grant (illegal) preferential treatment or favour against the principles and interest of specific organizations (or public) within the society.

This definition is deliberately worded to eliminate the problems associated with definitions like those of Dwivedi and Nye, which condemned certain acceptable behaviours within the context of the cultures of the developing nations, without considering the environmental factors of these nations. By putting the work

"illegal" in the bracket it gives room for addressing the issue of nepotism and other favours granted on the basis of family ties as opposed to corruption motivated by self-centralism or covetousness of the corruptor and the corruptee. Also, there are two reasons for putting the word "public" in bracket in my definition of corruption. The first is that, within the cluster of different cultures in the developing nations, it is difficult to define what actually constitutes public interest partly due to the problems already addressed. Secondly, it allows the argument that public interest may be present (at least in a minor, if not a major sense) in the principles of the organizations or the government. Eventhough, this definition does not completely remove, as Gibboins (*op.cit*) puts it, the impressionistic ways of defining public, private, or any other interests or opinions in the society, but, as Vasliner, (1996: 131) once noted :

it indicates how the complementarity of social roles-different in their power over one another can lead to social relations that are conveniently labelled corruption.

It equally, according to him, shows how the "psychological mechanisms-build up of expectation for special treatment by purposeful delay tactics can (be used) to initiate the client's bribing effort, in conter-action (ibid:131). In addition to this, it would, with further research, coupled with tolerance about most of the behaviours it implicitly addressed, contribute to further understanding of corruption within various polities that constitute the physiology of the global political community thus bringing it into a clearer and acceptable perspective, instead of the present intellectual topsyturvy surrounding its actual meaning and terminal effects on mankind.

Features and Manifestation/Institutionalisation of Corruption in Nigeria

It is decipherable from the preceeding arguments and analyses in this paper that, corruption as a social, political, economic and

cultural malaise had long been incubated and fertilized in most polities of the world. This has been due, among other things, to the problems the concept has generated at theoretical, intellectual and practical levels. As a result of this, and , the continuous elusiveness of a universal criterion for its conceptualisation and for dealing with its perpetrators it has become the features of many polities in the world and particularly in Nigeria and, indeed, in Africa. In the process, it has continuously manifested itself and, had been institutionalised by its protagonists or perpetrators to the disadvantage and detriment of the micro and macro components of most societies.

These features, their manifestations and institutionalisation in Nigeria are discussed in this section citing concrete examples from Nigeria and other African countries. To begin with, the struggle for power (Khan, Mackown, and McNiven 1971, Apter, 1972, Akindele and Ajila, 1995, Akindele, Obiyan, and Owoeye 1998)- (whether political, economic, cultural, social or others)-by those who lack it on the one hand, and, the efforts of those who have into consolidate their positions of the other hand, is one of the breeding factors of corruption in any polity.

In short, many societies (including the developed and the developing ones)- are ordered on the bedrock and the contagious base of corruption and, once the latter (corruption) matures its progenies become the core of the citizens orientation. This vividly explains the characteristics of many developing nations' political experience particularly that of Nigeria- (during the first, second and third republics and, to a larger extent under the past military regimes, the spillover effects of which nearly mar the fourth republic at commencement through the Buharigate³ in the house of Representatives arm of the Nigerian national Assemble in 1999)

These characteristics include among others: Corrupt ascendancy to political leadership through election rigging,

annulment of election, son of the soil philosophy, politics of expediency, doctrine of tenpercenters, judicial fractionalization of human beings, political self-aggrandizement, political Hitlerism (that is, rule by force) as a safety-valve for retention of power, replacement of "we-feeling" by "Me-feeling", contractor-controlled political machinery, uncurtailed lust for wealth, giving and receiving of kick-backs for government contracts (done or undone), police insistence on taking bribes as a precondition for performing their duties and, bureaucrats indulgence in the act of falsifying accounts, false declaration of assets, false declaration of age, falsification and forgery of certificate, perjurious inclination, violation of oaths of office, payment of money for governments' job not done, politically motivated assassinations of opponents, deliberate poison of political figures and opponents, and manipulation of transition programme, gerry-mandering/tinkering with constituencies, avoidance of taxes, entrenchment of black-market syndromes, manipulation of foreign exchange, import licence frauds, pen robbery or looting of the public treasury, creation of "ghost-workers" and so on. For instance, the issue of "ghost" workers and forgery of documents (Odulami, 1999: 15) had assumed a dangerous dimension in Nigeria (Gidado; 1999:21) because, as Ogunmakin (1999:1-2) once claimed:

A startling revelation has been made in Sokoto State, where dead workers and those who left the civil service years ago make-up the over 3,000 "ghost" workers in the state's 16,000 workforce... the perpetrators of the gigantic frauds in Accounts Sections of Ministries, departments and parastatals were well connected in the society. The clerks and accountants involved in the frauds were found to be relations or children of traditional rulers, religious leaders while others were related to both permanent secretaries, commissioners and their wives. (For example)... Rinin Radio, the State Broadcasting house had 15 ghost workers, among who was the former director of News, who died last year, and a former security man... Advertisement money was... shared by the former general manager who was said to be taking 50%, while the finance director cornered 30% and the company auditor; the rest 20%.

As for the issue of forgery of documents one of the discoveries of which led to the Buharigate in Nigeria, it, too, has taken on a dangerous dimension in Nigeria. Specacly, as Odunlami (1999: 1.5) once opined:

In Nigeria, the ease at which forger?, is practised and the magnitude of its operation readily submit its operators to the candidacy of the Guinness championslips. If only the Book's researchers would truly skirt the world, the third Reich and Hamanaka would simply pale into the amnesiac nothingness of the bygone to which they now belong. In Nigeria, forgery, large scale forgery, is the here and now; it is the prevalent fad of currency rather than the wizened yesterday of history. The beauty of this business is its macroscomic application in our national psyche. Anything that has to do with a document will be forged. A birth or death certificate, a drivers's licence, batik papers, a will, anything. Tepid performance in our civil service allows for a recourse to illegal, but quicker results. When the volume of documents that are therefore forged annually is computed, the sheer weight of it all will deservedly scream for a place in the reverred Guinness Book. Here the accumulated dirt in the system has engendered forgery acculturation. Here, forgery is wholly incorporated.

Infact, the issue of forgery, is no serious in Nigeria to the extent that:

.....official documents were procured without questions or eyebrows raised by government officials. Indeed, documents were procured in the name of a dead man (Ogunijinni, 1999:16)

A combination of the foregoing explains why accountable performance (Soremekun and Ayeni, 1988, kawonishe, 1992) in most African nations and, particularly, Nigeria, had always been ruthlessly exterminated. And, commenting on this trend, Kawonishe (1992) relying on the earlier works of Joseph (1987) and Lemarchand (1988) opined that:

accountability (as) the institutional mechanism by which the government makes the government both responsive and responsible (has lost its essence in Africa arid indeed in

Nigeria). The reality is that political leaders are rarely held accountable for their misdeeds... In (most part of) Africa, particularly after independence (and since then), state offices are desperately competed for with the major goal of (corruptly) cornering state resources for self-aggrandizement of office holders and their immediate reference groups.

This, coupled with poverty of leadership partly explainable in moral depravity, and the pervasive socio-political and economic poverty of a greater majority of Nigerians and, indeed, African people has increasingly fertilized the prevalence of corruption in Nigeria and, in the continent of Africa as a whole. In other words, "corruption flourishes whenever the citizenry is politically (and economically) powerless and unorganised (Okoosi *op.cit.*: 112), due to, among other things, the one-arm banditry of imperialism, thus, as once argued:

The prevalence of corruption is closely related to the nature of socio-economic differentiation (property relations) and the structure of social justice (power relations). Since all human organisations are characterized by some form of power and property relations, some measure of corruption will characterize their daily behaviour. High socio-economic differentiation and imbalance structures of social justice are more likely to be associated with high incidence of corruption than conditions of relative equality, and vice-versa (Mensah, 1986:56).

There is no doubt, that, this has since continued to fertilize the elusiveness of rational policy process (Akindele and Olaopa 1997a) and non-fictive democracy (Akindele, 1994a, Ojo, 1991) in Nigeria. This tendency and what Lemarchand (1992:98) called "the paucity of civic virtue" according to Olowe (1993:6) "paved the way for institutionalised political and bureaucratic corruption" as well as netherworld⁴ of public (personnel) administration in Nigeria in that, as Kawonishe (op cit 1992) ably observe:

Because the theft of state property invariably benefits some members of the civil society (though the effort; of their corrupt military and civilian extensions), who at any rate expect

generosity from political leaders, those who so benefit and those who expect their benefits at another time when the political equation changes stand in a weak position to demand accountability from political leaders.

Infact, the existence of this trend in Nigeria which has changed "Government as an instrument of the State" (Nyerere 1999:3) to an instrument of corruption and Personal rulership, prompted the startling revelation of how Nigeria's oil wealth was squandered during the Second Republic by way of the then questionable annual "one-line votes called contingencies" (Awojobi: 1982 V). It equally prompted, Cook's (1997:32) statement that:

Nigeria could be one of the most prosperous nations. But instead it has squandered oil and mineral wealth, generated horrendously, unfair income distribution and has become notorious as one of the world's most corrupt countries.

This development actually re-echoed in the corrupt mismanagement of the Nation's gains, from oil sales during the Gulf-war. Infact, these gains, according to David-West (1998:6), "went to the servicing of (Babangida's) personal profligacy". This among other things was made possible through the "so-called dedicated account". And, commenting on this account, David-West (Ibid) stated that:

(The dedicated Account and its kind of arrangement), made Babangida the Alpha and Omega without checks and balances. (Through it), he liberalised crude oil so that you could buy it the way you buy palm oil in the market. Through it, he could give oil contracts to family friends, girl friends and relatives because the rule had been broken.

On the same note, many of the developed countries would equally emerge with remarkably pure records if they are to be rated according to the proclivities for shabby political goings on. This, among other things has generated the argument that:

The phenomenon of corruption is as old as the history of man. It is not correct to see corruption as something peculiar to a

particular place. It is in order in Africa to bemoan and even condemn the level (or prevalence) of corruption, but it is not only in this continent that it exists... Indeed the dynamics of corruption keep changing from one society to another and from one time-frame to another (Yaqub, op cit, 106-107).

The globally celebrated American Watergate (scandal) affairs that finally cemented the then political future of Ex-American President Nixon provides a good and pertinent example in this respect.

Commenting further on the consistently changing nature of human values across international borders, according to which, things that are corrupt in one period may not be regarded as such in another period, Ley (1965:227), using Britain as a unit of analysis, claims that:

(Britain) did not... pass from a corrupt condition to a very pure one; rather it passed from one set of standards to another; through a period in which behaviour patterns which were acceptable by the old standards came to be regarded as corrupt from the stand point of the new standards⁵.

This was equally buttressed by mensah (*op. cit*:56), who once argued that:

*Corruption may be regarded as a quality that inheres in all human organisations, but with some distinctive characteristics... its content and mode of expression are culture specific and vary with time. Not all that a society regards or condemns as corrupt today **was** corrupt in the past or will remain so in future. And what is corrupt for that society and the specific behaviour through which it is given expression must not be the same for other societies.*

Corruption in whatever form is a negation of ethical behaviour or societal ethics which, Ogbuehi (1998:10), defined as "the code of moral principles that sets standards of good or bad, or right and wrong in one's conduct and thereby guides the behaviour". Thus, it

is inimical to the development of any society because it usually perforates the building of a socio-politically feasible and, economically solvent nation through the selfish orientations and non-challance (of those involved) to the nation's survival. And, to a greater extent, political stability and militarization of political administration of many polities are progenies and progenitors of corruption. For instance, few of the military interventions and Guerrilla insurrections (from outside or within), in the developing countries particularly in Africa have been justified by those who struck on any other ground than that of corruption and, determination to stamp it out (see tables I and II).

A good example is Nigeria where a retrospective analysis of its military experience from 1966 to date (Momoh and Ajetumobi, 1999), actually, in the real sense of it exonerates none of those who had struck one time or the other from the citation of corruption of the ousted leaders or regimes as the catalyst for their intervention.

Thus, according to Yaqub (*op. cit.*: 104)

the incidence of corruption has not only been deeply entrenched in Nigeria, but has become the basis for which one military putschism is organised to succeed another:

On a concrete note, the excuse for the first military incursion into direct governance in Nigeria clearly puts among other things, the citation of corruption as the causal factor of military take over of governance into perspective of our analysis at this point of the paper. This is clearly discernible from the press statement or broadcast of Major Chukwuemeka Kaduna Nzeogwu which include(d) inter-alia:

The aim of the Revolutionary Council is to establish a strong, united and prosperous nation, free from corruption and internal strife...our enemies are the political profiteers the swindlers, the men in high and low places that seek bribes and demand ten percent: those that seek to keep the country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as minister or VIPs (Very Important Personalities), (of waste), at

least. the tribalists, the nepotists, those that have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian calendar back by their words and deeds (Quoted from Ademoyega: 1981; 87-89)

The foregoing notwithstanding, the military themselves had, in most cases, later become blindly corrupt and uncontrollably rapacious in governance through fiscal indiscipline and recklessness to the detriment of the countries over which they had presided, (Williams; 1980). This was in fact put into a more clearer perspective when Amagu (1999: 13) opined that:

It will require a band of perhaps, 200 tested researchers drawn from multi-disciplinary back-grounds to establish the real face and value of the legacy of corruption left or Nigeria by the military.... the military had struck claiming that civilians took 10 per cent kick back on contracts but by the time General Abacha died on top of two Indian harlots 30 years later; the military were snatching 100 per cent of funds meant for projects execution. The military alleged that the nation's external debt was escalating but by the time General Babangida stepped aside, the country was owing over \$30 billion dollars, 20 times higher than what civilians owed foreigners. The military complained that civilians were burning public buildings to cover records of corrupt practices but a military head of state, General Abacha was indicted for the torching of the Defence Headquarters, one of the most impressive and important edifices in the country. Indeed, the military era witnessed a revolution of arsons clearly targeted to cover corruption. The military built whole clans of wooden-headed soldiers and civilians whose bond of unity is corruption. The evidence of this development is found in the vast and superfluous assets, holdings, cash and lifestyles of these heroes of corruption.

This, in itself, points to the "patiently self-serving rationalisations and posturing" of the (military) "for staging the average coup d'état in Nigeria" and, indeed, in Africa "by the motley military regimes" (Yaqub; *op cit*: 105-106). In fact, as Yaqub (*ibid*: 104) once claimed:

an appraisal of the performance of the Nigerian Military in its self-imposed responsibility would show that the institution has failed to establish a nation state which is free from corruption.

The bastardization of Nigeria's polity through the institutionalisation of corruption by the military, their citation of corruption as the catalyst for take-over of civil governance notwithstanding, has once been analysed thus:

Corruption was not unknown in pre-1966 Nigeria. What has made the difference between those seemingly golden years of Nigerian Independence (1960-1966) and the present moment is the quantum leap which corruption has made in our daily life since the incursion of the military into the Nigerian Politics in January 1966. Before the 1966 coup d'etat, save for political skirmishes here and there, there was relative peace in the land... only Nigerians who were old enough in the mid-60s to know what the country was in terms of development can truly appreciate the magnitude of the disaster which the military's intrusion into our politics in January 1966 has brought on this once-a-great country... The result has been monumental leakage and fraud at the federal level government. A system that allowed a Head of State to siphon billions of dollars out of public coffers for his own personal use while the country he presided over was virtually bankrupt needs urgent redress... (The military is) a system that has rendered Nigeria prostrate (Babalola; 1999:61)

In the process, and, to some extent, some public officials who were found to be corrupt in office at one time or the other, had in the past, been retributed in Nigeria. Akindede, 1995 eventhough, they were later (corruptly or unethically), freed or pardoned of their convictions. Examples of these retributions¹ punishments for corruption existed during the General Murtala/Obasajo (1975-1979) and general Buhari/Idiagbon (1983-1985) Regimes while those (examples) of corrupt and unethical Commutal and Pardon of corrupt public officials existed during the Regimes of General Babangida and General Abacha whose tenures in office remained unequalled vis-à-vis the proclivity for shabby political brinkmanship and corruption in the history of Nigeria. Infact,

General Babangida and Abacha, who as a combination of destructionists in power (1985-1993), corruptly dashed the democratic hopes of the Nigerian masses through the annulment of the June 12 1993 presidential election for political expediency and ethocratic interests. Infact, they to use Onogie's (1993) analysis, really manipulated the etho-cultural cleavages in Nigeria and related to the people as colonial forces of corruption during this period. In the process, this destructive duo, continued to rationlize their ignoble annulment of the election up to their respective exits from power-(one, (Babangida) through disgrace and, the other, (Abacha) through natural expiration in the course sexual escapade with foreign harlots).

They continued with this rationalization in defiance of international condemnation of their corrupt acts in government. The notoriety of Babangida and his mindless and corrupt disarticulation of the Nigerian economy are reflected, as once argued (Ofeimun, 1993: 18), by his years in power.

Babangida years in power were notorious for the progressive decimation of national resources as a result of improper accounting, sheer profligacy and systematic looting of the treasury by executive fiat. They were years in which salvage operations in the future were fore-closed.through the creation of parallel, call tram "plague", structures and the promotion of many incongruous personnel to strategic niches in the political economy.

This something, goes for the General Sanni Abacha years in office as Ani (1999: 3) once noted:

in Nigeria, General Abacha his wife, children and brothers were the official contractors, with the crumbs going to other aides and cronies... Nigeria, as a country, existed within tze confines of the Abacha family, either in Aso Rock or Gidan Abaclza, the official and private residence, respectively, of tze late HOS. Abacha's style followed a common pattern. His children did not have to know anything about the contractsfor which they bided. All they had to do was choose the ones they

wanted and, pronto, they would be paid in full, and told not to bother their execution. From petroleum to solid minerals, aluminium, construction, air lift of passengers, printing, supply of aircraft, it was Abacha, and Abacha's alone. His children large hearted kids they were-also extended this generosity to their friends... Many a young man and woman became millionaires by the mere fact of being a friend to an Abacha son or daughter. There was even a comic angle to the "familiarisation" of governance by the Late HOS. While his predecessor, General Babagida, was content to create an official position for his wife as First Lady and Chairperson of the Better Life Programme, Abacha not only created an office for his wife as First Lady and Chairperson of the Family support programme, he also created one for his daughter office of the First Daughter to the HOS... If Abacha had not died, along the line, we would have had an Office of the First Brother to the HOS, Office of the First Uncle to the Hos, etc. And this would have been in the line with his philosophy of governance as family business.

As a result of things like this, the issue of corruption has been so rampant in Nigeria, to the extent that she is now tagged as "a country in a state of manageress stasis" (Ofeimun: 1993: 18). The reason for this is not farfetched in that, among other things, it was discovered in 1993 that:

of the ₦ 2,000 billion (at the current prices than) in public sector investments between 1970 and 1990, up to 40 percent went into the service of the corruption industry (ibid).

The foregoing is supported by the revelation that:

by the 1970s Nigerian officials were already stealing oil, the source of more than 90 percent of the country's revenue. loading it "onto tankers with no bill of lading issued, making it possible to sell the cargo abroad and pocket the entire proceeds. (Mbachu; 1993: 12)

It is equally supported by the fact that:

In 1990, accounts for the proceeds from petroleum exports showed that 1.5 billion dollars (over ₦ 60 billion) had disappeared. In the same year, about ₦ 5 billion in oil revenue recorded by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) did not go into the Federation Account as required by the revenue distribution mechanism... by 1991, one billion dollars had been spent for undocumented purposes" out of two billion dollars Nigeria realised from the sale of its equity in joint venture with shell (*ibid*).

Rather than relent, the intensity of this Kleptocratic tendency in Nigeria has continued to increase in vitality to the extent that at a particular time:

the size of the money kept by individual Nigerians in foreign bank accounts (as once) estimated (was) not parity with the national debt and some billions above 33 billion dollars owed by the country to International Finance institutions (Ofeimun 1993: op cit: 18)

This had once been equally put into perspective thus:

It is a well-known fact that corruption has become a way of public officers life in Nigeria, to the extent that it is now an unwritten directive principle of state policy. It is a matter of fact that the culprits, the perpetrators of these highly placed corrupt practices... are so few, yet so powerful. They control well over 85 percent of the nation's wealth,... they could purchase the nation's silence and acceptance and if that fails, could raise a private army to take on the nation (Adeniyi; 1999:8).

The fact that the Rulers and Government officials had stolen public money in the past and, are still corruptly enriching themselves at the expense of the State in Nigeria is confirmed by the report that "11 Looters forfeit N87 Billion to Federal Government" (Banga; 1999: 1-3) and "discoveries of the Assets of the Nation's (alleged) Treasury Looters" (Body and soul: 1999: 14) (see Tables VI and VII)

These developments fit perfectly into Ake's (1996: 42) submission that:

the state in Africa is not a public force but tends to be privatised in the sense that it is appropriated to the service of private interests by the dominant faction of the elite.

The seriousness of this corrupt practice and its danger to the economic survival and development of the Nigerian Nation, has not, in the least, deter the Kleptocrats who had served in government at one time or the other. This is so, in that, as Udonsi (1999: 1) reported:

14 top Nigerian looters stole 11 trillion naira". According to this report "eight of the (fourteen) names (of the treasury looters) belong to retired military officers while six are names of former civilian office holders or relations of past leaders "(ibid: 8).

The level of this looting is horrifying looking at the fact that

The topmost looter. . has 6.25 billion pounds, 7.41 billion Swiss Francs, 2 billion US dollars and 9 billion Deutschmarks while the least has 120 million pounds sterling and 30 million US dollars to his credit (ibid:8).

The seriousness and danger of this public official Kleptocratic trend to Nigeria and her economy has attracted the sympathy and willing efforts of the international community (Banga: 1999:3). For instance, as Udonsi (ibid: 8) equally noted:

According to the financial Times apart from the formal request some individuals in Nigeria and some banks in Australia and New Zealand are due to appear before a court in an attempt to recover more than \$25 Million (about N 25.3 substantial sums in the overseas account of Alhaji Ali Abacha, General Abacha's brother, Chief Anthom/Ani, Maryam Abacha, General Abacha's wife and that of her son Mohammed... Swiss authorities too. which have reported an increase in the number of cases of suspected money laundering, declared more than 100 of such bank accounts with questionable deposit... (in line) with a new law in the country which sought to remove the secret surrounding swiss bank accounts.

The foregoing, which is a reflection of "public expenditure management in Nigeria is one of mindless plunder of National Wealth" (Mbachu, 1998 op. cit: 12). It tends to justify the depiction of Nigeria as "a country where the robbery of state fund is flagrantly institutionalised" (Ofeimun, op. cit: 19).

Specifically, General Murtala and his then Deputy, General Obasanjo, dealt with the military kleptocrats who presided over various states in Nigeria as Governors during General Yakubu Gowon's Regime (1966-1975). Their properties were confiscated by the state and, some of them were de-ranked and dismissed retroactively from public service. In spite of the sudden or premature assassination of General Murtala in 1976, the anti-corruption philosophy of the Regime was ably continued by General Obasanjo and General Yaradua between 1976 and 1979 when the Regime voluntarily handed over power to the democratically elected government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari on October 1st, 1979 marking the commencement of the Second Republic which as Olarinoye (1999:20) noted was equally a complete failure in that:

the Second Republic did not offer the succour anticipated by Nigerians because of corruption, inefficiency and extravagant spending. Other vices include unproductive expensive-overseas tours, ostentatious life-style, uncontrolled external borrowing, and gross financial mismanagement at Federal and State Levels.

Ironically, the corrupt public officials of the pre-second democratic Republic period and, those who were found guilty of corruption and kick-backs by the Buhari/Idiagbon regime (1983-1985) (during the Alhaji Shehu Shagari led Second Republic 1979-1983), were granted state pardon by the corrupt and dictatorial Regime of general Ibrahim Babangida [1985-1993], which foisted on Nigeria and Nigerians. socio-politically and ethnoculturally parasitic and retrogressive culture of settlement from which Nigeria is still unable to free herself and her people (see tables I, II).

Specifically, Babangida "sold Nigeria to the devil and pocketed the profit" (Olumhense, 1999: 39). He further encouraged corruption when he:

Promulgated various decrees returning various properties earlier seized from some past officials, including dead ones, who had property in excess of their legitimate earnings. Some of the Decrees include No.49 of 1991, No. 70 of 1992. No. 24 of 1993 and, No. 54 of 1993 (which was promulgated few days to his demise or step-aside decision) (Okoosi, op. cit; 116, African concord 1994: 29).

The corrupt antecedent of these decrees was rightly identified by Okoosi (ibid) when he claimed that: "the promulgation of these decrees was in a bid to get some of the beneficiaries (semi-gods in their various Regions) to canvass for public support for the Administration (of Babangida) to extent its tenure".

The immediate foregoing tend to show, as Okoosi (1993; 110) once claimed, that "it is a truism that government which is supposed to fight and defeat corruption is the kernel of the problem in Nigeria" Infact, in Nigeria, through the unethical supportive role of government, corruption has been so trite. It is "the deal in vogue, being carried out with fanfare and pomposity": (Okoosi, 1992: 9). This was succinctly put into perspective in 1993 by the Centre for Advance Social Science (CASS) when it stated that:


The problem is that the government which is needed to defeat corruption is the core of the problem in Nigeria. It is government that has contributed mostly to lowering the moral tone of society in Nigeria. It is in government that corruption thrives most, wasting resources we need, defeating all prospects of democracy and development, all sense of patriotism and turning all of us into hardened cynics with no concern for public good, no faiths in public morality or even in its possibility (CASS, 1993).

Infact, *this laissez faire* or non-chalant attitude to, or, handling of the issue of corruption in Nigeria has constantly dovetailed from

one administration into another to the extent that successive Regimes in Nigeria (prior to the commencement of the fourth Republic on May 29, 1999) had found it difficult if not totally impossible to hold the bull by the horn in tackling the problems of corruption and its malignancy. Specifically, no military Regime in Nigeria since the ouster of Buhari/Idiagbon in 1985, could be actually exonerated from the accusation and actual perpetration of corrupt practices while in office.

On a contemporary note, the proclivity of late Dictator, General Sani Abacha and his men, for kleptocracy, and, ruination of the Nation's economy through pen robbery and looting of the National treasury is unequalled in the annals of Nigeria's history. The fact that, the Abacha regime perpetrated corruption inspite of its outward commitment to war against indiscipline and corruption (WAIC) which, to them, was embarked upon to improve on the war against indiscipline (WAI) programme introduced and made part of the existential syndromes of Nigeria and Nigerians by the Regime of Buhari/Idiagbon, reveals the hypocracy of the Abacha Regime and, its plastering of the wounds of thievery through its cosmetic 'battle' against corruption. Infact, the totality of these, as Kolawole (1998:1) once claimed shows that, the "military has long been destructive to the essence of the Nigerian nation".

This is particularly evident from the fact that the Abacha Regime's promulgation of failed-bank decree and its institutionalisation of the failed banks tribunals (within various zones in the country) were nothing but diabolical attacks motivated by dictatorial and totalitarian values and, vendetta against some people by the Regime within the Nigerian body politic. Otherwise, how can one explain the fact that General Abacha himself, while prosecuting these groups of people was busy looting the nation's treasury and hurling her money and other resources in trillions of dollars and other foreign currencies into foreign countries.



It is against this backdrop that one could understand the commitment of the Obasanjo Government (during his second coming into power)- to the eradication of corruption in the Nigerian society as could be seen from the government's initial policy outputs on ascension into power. The Obasanjo's government's anti-corruption bill and crusade to revamp the Nigerian Nation once again, speak volume about the malignant effects of corruption and what the latter has done to the moral fibres of Nigeria and Nigerians. Eventhough, it could be argued that, the eventual handling of the forgery and falsification of age by the former speaker" (Alhaji Ibrahim Salisu Buhari)- of the house of Representative in Nigeria, by the house of representative itself, the senate and; the insistence of the executive branch of government under president Obasanjo that the law of the land should take its course are indications of the anti-corruption philosophy and its crusade for moral uprightness in Nigeria, the initial attitudinal philosophy of the house of Representatives in particular towards the case was nothing but a disaster. Infact, it tended to show the house in its entirety as a corrupt institutional sympathizer and sustainer of corruption and corrupt officials because:

Nothing, however, showed a substantial section of the membership of the lower house in poorlight as their (initial) handling of the crisis that ensued in the wake of revelations that the nation had actually been sold a perjurious dummy in the person of the disgrace speaker. Rather than handle the issue with the seriousness expected of them by concerned citizens, many of the legislators had given Alhaji Buharia standing ovation as he put up an initial brave face of defiance as the drama picked up (Don-Pedro, 1999:19).

Nwokoh (1999:9) equally noted the retrogressive and corrupt *esprit de corp* of the members of the House of Representatives with former speaker thus:

when Ibrahim "Toronto" Buhari, the disgraced former speaker of the House of Representatives, was "ousted" as a cheat and a felon, the legislators were reluctant to make him pay the price for his crimes. They gave the cheat not only a two

minutes standing ovation but passed a motion urging the executive arm of government not to prosecute Buhari for forger:\:

The foregoing, and, the belated, though, appropriate handling of the Buhari issue by the National Assembly (i.e., both the lower and upper houses)- through their committees notwithstanding, the extent to which they could continue to sustain the crusade against corruption and issues that border on same, in the fourth Republic would, in our view, dictate the acceptability or otherwise of Nigeria and Nigerians within the comity of Nations as a morally upright nation or group of people. In other words, as Igiebor, (1999: 15), rightly opined, "it would determine whether the president's (i.e. Obasanjo) promise to tackle problems of pervasive corruption in government should be taken seriously". It would equally determine whether this same determination or crusade to combat corruption is not just a moralizing and patronizing approach to give the impression that something is been done about this socio-political, economic and cultural tumour that has affected all the strata of Nigerian society.

This is particularly so in that, the challenges ahead are enormous, looking at the fact that the erstwhile-speaker had to be factually depicted among other efforts, with phrases like "the face of a liar" (The News, 1999, Tell, 1999: 15) before he actually contemplated resignation from office and the Nation Assembly. Infact, the enormosity of these challenges equally lies in the fact that, due to the Buharigate and other of its types yet to be detected, and, which may not be detected, the Nigeria's democracy is endangered because as Olajuyigbe (1999:6) once opined "a democracy where law makers applaud a law breaker like Buhari with a standing ovation is endangered".

The seriousness of the Buharigate (The News Vol. 13, No. 4:9) to the Nation's image was not taken for granted. This could be

reasonably argued as the possible catalyst for the speedy arrest of the former speaker by the police force-(which, too, could have been accused of complicity if it had footdragged a little more longer) immediately he left office as the speaker. His speedy and summary conviction by an Abuja Magistrate Court for the Offence¹⁴ was equally a manifestation of the urgency required to rescue the Nigerian Nation and its young fourth democratic Republic from embarrassment and its further spread caused by the dare-devilry of the erstwhile speaker.

This same seriousness could be cited as the reason for the sentencing of the former speaker within a week after his summary conviction. However, the ridiculousness of the twelve months duration of the sentence and its option of a fine of – (N2000)- two thousand Naira, and amount less than (\$20) twenty American dollars, speak volume about the languid attitudes in Nigeria on the **issue** of corruption.

The ridiculousness of the Judge's verdict which woefully failed to match punishment with the gravity of the offence can be really appreciated against the contents of the excuse(s) he advanced thus:

A confession of guilt is normally in favour of the accused, and is a factor which has properly been taken into consideration in determining the quantum and the nature of the sentence... public opinion, whether we like it or not, is very paramount and affects the decision of the court... There is excessive use of punishment as penal sanction... sending the convict to jail will serve no purpose. Sending the convict to prison without an option of fine will not serve the purpose of this case, I note that the convict is a first offender. The fact of being a first offender, and show of remorse over the act of which he was convicted worked in his favour (Dacosta; 1999: 1-2)

Eventhough, the excuse of the Chief Magistrate for the ridiculous judgement was anchored on the suppose plea for mitigation from some citizens, and the house of Representatives over which the former speaker once presided as well as the former speaker's resignation from the speakership, and the house perse, and, his plea for forgiveness, the ridiculousness of the judgement is

detrimental to the moral physiology of the Nigerian Nation and a bad omen for President Olusegun Obasanjo's anti-corruption crusade. The judgement appears to be a *fait-accompli* for the future handling of similar case or cases particularly at a time when the National Assembly could be said to be afflicted with the "corrupt speakership virus".

This judgement which, according to Duncan (1999:7) shows that, "the judiciary is yet to catch up with the call for honesty and the rule of law", was variously characterized with phrases like "tragically comedic", "ridiculous and laughing stock of the judiciary" to "a mockery of the judiciary" in view of a similar accusation of corruption against the speaker of the upper house (Senate) (Guardian 3/8; pp 1-2; 6, Tell August,) who was later absolved of accusations of misdeeds; charges of lies and deceit by the upper house inspite of obvious contradictions, and evidence of his culpability (Olagunju 1999:23, guardian 1999 1218, tribune, 1999 1218, Canguard, 1999 1218 Daily Monitor, 1999 12/8P. 1-2 and other Nigerian newspapers).

In short, the Senate's handling of the Evan(s) Enwerem's Saga has, to say the least been disastrous. And, as Akinkuotu (a999: 16) rightly opined:

The Senate may have shot itself in the foot by hurriedly absolving. Evan Enwerem, its president, of any wrong doings without allowing the security agencies to do a thorough Job... The senate acquittal of Evan(s) Enwerem was precipitate as the police and the SSS were yet to conclude their investigations.

This is particularly so, in view of the fact that, the Senate's Report in question, as noted by Akinkuotu (*ibid*: 27) "favored those members of the National Assembly who are fighting a rear-guard battle" using the case of the "man (Evan(s) Enwerem) who started existing only when he turned 21" (*ibicl*: 27) as the "bullet-proof".

Without doubt, there are so many grey areas corruptly left by the senate in the rear-guard battle to absolve its president (Enwerem). Their Grey areas depicted the senate president and his past, among other things thus:

- *Deliberately silent about his life before 1959 in his bio-data*
- *Lied that Johnson was not a co-owner of Oilfield.*
- *Described as dishonest by the Supreme Court.*
- *Imo Election tribunal found him a compulsive liar, February 1992.*
- *Denied ever running for the House of Representatives.*
- *Lied about his pedigree. His biological father was not Enwerem but Ukonmadu (executed in his village, Ogada, Ikeduru for misdemeanour).*
- *On oath, denied being a member of any political party in 1992.*
- *Claimed he attended CMS Grammar School, Lagos 1954-55. Christ High School, Aroloya, which he now claims to have attended, never existed according to Ministry of Education official records.*
- *Denied ever using his position as governor to secure government property for personal use.*
- *Claimed he was born in 1932 somewhere and 1935 elsewhere.*
- *Never supplied his secondary school certificate and records to INEC (ibid: 27).*

The Senate verdict if final would permanently be injurious to the moral probity of Nigeria. As Olagunju (1999: 26) once opined:

The future of the much vaunted transparency and probity in Nigeria nascent democracy seems bleak if the verdict of the investigating committees set up by the senate on the allegations levied against its president, Chief Evan Enwerem, is final.

The foregoing, which shows the ridiculous, unethical and politically corrupt handling of the Senate Speaker's case, can be equally and easily deduced from Nwòkoh's (1999:39) Summation that:

the senate refused to allot the House of Representatives "out do" it in esprit d'corp. The senators took turns to give Chief Evan (Evans) Enwerem, the senate president, a clean bill of health over allegations by Tell magazine that the senate president falsified his age and is an ex-convict. According to senator Isa Mohammed, the allegations should fail even on the ground that Tell had refused to respond to summons by the Senate. Senator Olatunji Ajayi pooh-pooed the allegations as "Market-side gossips and diversionary". After their outrage the senate passed Mohammed's notion that the magazine story be dismissed and Enwerem be allowed to retain his esteemed seat. Granted that the Tell Story was sloppy, but, what the investigating committees of Senate-(ethics, intelligence and judicial) – found out did not call for Halleluyah chorus of the senators. The lynch mob that the senate turned itself into was uncalled for given that its committees did not all together exonerate Enwerem of all the charges that have been directed at the senate president... It is indubitable that Enwerem is being economical with the truth about his "CMS" problem... What is obvious from the outbursts of the Senators' is that they are offering a protective shield to other legislators with questionable integrity.

These disturbing developments in Nigeria could, among other factors, be tied to the crescendo of corruption which had earlier reached its high-noon in Africa in the sixties and dovetailed into the eighties and nineties. Within these periods, the emergence and consolidation of personal rulership and sit-tightisin gained increasing momentum. And, at various points within these periods, as Yaqub (1998: 112) rightly opines, the continent of Africa was:

blessed with the likes of Banda, Houphouët-Boigny, Kaunda, Toure, Amin, Bokassa, Kenyatta, Mobutu etc., who were not only content to be dictators for-a-while, but dictators – (presidents) – for life, consequent upon this travesty of rulership, the state and its resources became "private estates" that should be used as the leader deemed fit.

Yusuf (1990: 13) eruditely articulated the notoriety of these corrupt leaders in Africa and, the absurdity of their behaviours in

power. This, according to him are exemplified by Mobutu, who, through personal rulership of Zaire devoured for himself over 40% of the Gross Domestic Product of his country. It is equally shown by Amin, who, elevated himself to the rank of Field Marshall in the Uganda Army in addition to making himself the Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor of Makerere University and; Bokkasa who emptied the national treasury of Central Africa Republic in the process of crowning himself as an emperor over a non-existing Empire. And, who, as a result of ruthlessness in power, had no second-in-command or vice-president. And, as noted by Yusuf (*ibid*) during the period, Bokasa was in power, he was:

the commander-in chief of the Army and the Police, and... he (held) six ministerial portfolios-foreign Affairs, Defence, Justice, Agriculture, Works and Supply and Home Affairs. (He)... used: this enormous power to his own personal advantage. He (was) not just the Alpha and Omega in public life, but in private business as well. He own (ed) vast tea, coffee and tobacco estates... (and) the best land in the central Africa Republic.

This shows that corruption has become the conduit pipe for draining the public funds and fostering irrational acts that are constantly asymmetrical to societal probity and norms of decency in Nigeria and, Africa. Given this, it is appropriate to state that, it needs to be combated. In other words, the putridity of corruption and its continuous holocaust effects on the socio-political, economic, cultural and psychological nerves of the Nigerian polity call for combative attacks. What to do in this respect and, how to go about doing it form the core of the analysis in the next section of this paper.

Combating Corruption in Nigeria : What Do We Do?

From the foregoing analysis, it is undoubtedly clear that corruption is detrimentally prevalent in Nigeria. It is innocuous to her national pride. to argue that, corruption as a socio-political,

economic and cultural tumor in Nigeria has long remained a hydra-headed monster which has been defiant of structural, institutional or human-based solutions regardless of how combative the efforts to attain such solutions had been.

Given this, the question that needs to be asked is that; what can be done to free the nerves of Nigeria from the crippling manacle or shackles of corruption? Many schools of thought have attempted the provision of solutions to the problems of corruption. In the process, various approaches ranging from Religious, military, moral, patronizing, minimalist to the materialist have been respectively identified as appropriate mechanisms for combating corruption in Nigeria and, indeed, in Africa. For instance, corruption, from the perspective of scholars of the materialist persuasion, is a criterion variable (Akindele and Olaopa: 1997b:31) of the productive forces which among, other things include "the process of dealing with the multinationals, (Moody-Stuart, 1997). In other words, it gains vitality, and triumphs in a capitalist system eventhough, its demise too, also lies in the inherent internal contradictions of capitalism. Thus, Kungwai (1986: 300) once argued that :

The way out of the problems of corruption for Nigeria and other capitalist countries does not lie in so-called ethical revolution (whose ethics? The contractors? The monopolies or monopolists? Or, the Workers?) – but, in the liberation of society from the control and domination of imperialism and capitalism. Only such liberation's, and the purposeful and scientific organisation of society on socialist principles can lead to the elimination of vices, including corruption.

In addition to this, it has equly been stated that the "right thing, whatever economic ideology one may uphold, is to "principally tackle corruption" (Olumhense 1999: 39) and confront its devil locked in the engine of development" (Ofeimun: 1993:20). On the same token, it was equally argued that :

whatever it is possible to ascertain malfeasance, a programme of recovery should be designed to take back what has been lost. Not to do this and to give the usual impression that no one gets punished for swindling the nation, is to give the wrong signals to those who are yet to enter the high echelon of executive robbers (ibicl. 18).

Given the above, and, the almost permanent elusiveness of appropriate mechanism's for combating corruption other than prescriptions that are yet to be really practically effected in Nigeria and, in Africa, it has been argued that "what is required in Nigeria and Africa to deal with the hydra-headedness of corruption is a development paradigm (Martin: 1999:4) coupled with a democratic system of government based on good and accountable leadership that would be hardworking, responsive, responsible and unimpeachable (Akindele & Obiyan, 1996; yaqub; op cit: 117-118). And, that this may be attained through the embracement and imbibing of the multi-dimensiona syndromes of ethics ranging from that of honesty, hardwork, service, knowledge to decorum in Nigeria. According to Awosika (1999:41) corruption could be fatally challenged through this in that :

*The ethics of honesty will forbid us from stealing, so people will be encouraged to create more wealth, and the multiplier effect will positively touch everybody. The ethics of hardwork will make people realise, as Abraham Lincoln wrote in a letter to his son's teacher, that "a dollar earned is far more valued than five dollars found" or stolen. The ethics of service will make leaders work to better the lot of the disadvantaged and, the very rich to strive to add value to the life of the very poor: The ethics of knowledge will steer. (people) along the path of hardwork and achievenment. The ethics of decorum will enhance the peoples sense of right and wrong (and this will have **positive** impacts by ways of control) on the spread of corruption)--(this emphasis is mine).*

Not only this, the battle against corruption in Nigeria and Africa may achieve positive result, through, the cessation of seeing the "state as a primary source of private wealth" (Iseike-Jonah, 1995: 6); visionary; accountable; and reconciliatory philosophy;

encouragement of free expression; non-dissembled or feigned democracy; committed actions against autocracy and injustice; honesty of political actions; followership's resistance of corruption and/or its temptations by learning to say no to corrupt leadership. Infact, the latter, that is, resistance to corruption and corrupt leadership has been succinctly articulated by Osundare (1999:39) thus:

It is...the people, the perennial victims of political predators, who must refuse co-optation and corruption and insist on justice-in (the) homes, communities, local government areas, states, schools, colleges, universities, work places, etc. (the people must refuse to be carried away by the coated tongue or grease palm, and reject (the) perpetual assault on our common will and dignity as human beings and citizens of Nigeria. If we do not force those who rule us to tread the path of accountability and respect for the rule of law, we would continue in our present misery and sign a pact with eternal underdevelopment. Our fate is too precious to abandon to the whims of the (corrupt) politicians. Our rulers wasted the 20th century for Nigeria. We must not stagger into the next millenium with the same sissyphean burden.

The simplicity of the immediate foregoing notwithstanding, it should be emphasized that, it would be a mere delusion to assume or; try to assume that corruption can be simply combated or fought without committed spirit and multi-dimensional attacks. The danger of this delusion, had once attracted an appropriate warning from the World Bank (1997: 105) when it stated that :

corruption cannot be effective!/: attacker1 in isolation from other problems. It is a symptom of problems at the intersection of the public and the private sectors and needs to be combated through a multipronged strategy... one part of the strategy (would have to) focus on...creating a rule-based bureaucracy with a pay structure that rewards civil servants for honest efforts, a merit-based recruitment and promotion system to shield the civil service from political patronage, and credible financial controls to prevent the arbitrary rise of public resources.

A Summation of the arguments in this section of our paper reveals that the battle against corruption in any society and, particularly in Naigeria and Africa as a whole, is onerous, tasking and futuristically challenging.

Conclusion

The issue of corruption, its problems of conceptualisation, institutionalisation and/or, perpetration and, possible solutions to it, through combative attacks by both the leaders and the led in Nigeria, and, indeed, in Africa have been analytically examined in this paper. In the process, concrete examples within the Nigerian body politic and other African Nations were given as does the usual tactics and phrases of deceit or baiting people into corruption which had gained increasing fertility in Nigeria. The various definitional efforts on this concept were perused and analysed. This notwithstanding, it has been established that the attainment of a definitional unanimity on this concept continue to be elusive. This, in our view, calls for further research on the concept in line with the ever-increasing complexity of our society and its culture. This, to us, would help to reduce the malignancy of corruption to national development and aid the attainment of a rational policy process devoid of bureau pathologies in the management and authoritative allocation of the scarce societal values for the people in Nigeria, Africa. and mankind in general.

NOTES

1. The meaning of the word “Problems” as used in the title of this article is dichotomous in nature. In the first place it refers to the difficulty often encountered in analytically conceptualising the term “corruption” and, the continuous elusiveness of the attainment of a definitional unanimity or consensus on the concept. And, secondly, it refers to the malignancy of corruption to rational political and administrative process. In other words, it is used to highlight the detrimental effects of the institutionalisation of corruption to a healthy systemic existence of a polity like Nigeria and her people as well as its continuous danger to the physiology of the nation in all ramifications.
2. Normative narrowing is a sociological term used for explaining the decreasing range of acceptable behaviours as two or more cultures continue to collide. Normative narrowing explains how the culturally acceptable behaviours of one set of people may be typified as inferior or inimical to the values of another group. Usually the dominant group will always redefine the value of the less dominant group in this way. The reduction of this may contribute to the understanding of corruption in the Developing nations.
3. Buharigate is the terminology used to characterise the Buhari Saga. That is, perjurious behaviour and falsification of age declaration, and B.Sc degree certificate of the University of Toronto in Canada, national Youth Service Corps certificate by Alhaji Ibrahim Salisu Buhari to run for election into the House of Representatives, the speaker of which he became at the commencement of the Nigeria's fourth Republic before he was forced by irrefutable facts to resign from the post of speaker and as a member of the house of Representatives. Thus, he fell with a meteoric rate from grace to grass.

He was subsequently charged to a magistrate court by the police and found guilty and summarily convicted on the 28th of July, 1999 (NTA Network News 9'0 clock, 28/7/99). See also all the issues of The News magazines for the month of July and August 1999). He was subsequently on the 3rd of August, 1999, sentenced to Twelve Months imprisonment with an option of a fine of two thousand naira (N2000.00) an amount less than (\$20) twenty American dollars (Guardian, August 4, 1999 1-2) by Chief Magistrate Mohammed Kolo in a magistrate court in Abuja.

4. Netherworld of public (Personnel) Administration is not a physical thing but a concept used in discussing a set of activities. Newherworld is an informal structure. It is a sort of invisible power or black market by which most of the criteria of Administration are circumvented. In other words, Netherworld is the informal process through which administrators fulfil their expectations, needs or mandates which could have been otherwise impossible through compliance with the rules and regulation of Public (Persome) administration criteria and personal goals (or values) of the administrators-see Shafritz. J. M.; Hyde. A. C.; Rosenbloom, D. H. (1981). *Personnel Management in Government? Politics and Process* (2nd Edition New York: Marcell Dekker Inc. Netherworld as a black market syndrome is very well known in Africa. According to yaqub (op cit. 119) relying on sandbrook's (1985) earlier analysis, it is called Managendo in East Africa, while in West Africa. particularly in Ghana, it is referred to as kalubule among other things. "The black market thrives on hoarding, the creation of artificial scarcities, smuggling and with the collusion of public officials. It also manifests itself in tax evasion and other indulgencies. For a more proper and indepth understanding of the black market version of netherworld, see Sandbrook, R(1985) *The Politics of Africa's Economic*

Stagnation, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press. For Netherworld, see Akindele, S. T. (1994b) Public Administration: A critical Revisitation Analysis of the Paradigm of politics Administration dichotomy and its challenge" Philippines Journal of Public Administration Vol. Xxxviii No 4 (October) PP 295-312.

5. Yaqub, (1998) placed a pertinent emphasis on this definition in his article entitled "the prevalence of corruption in Africa" published in the Nnamdi Azikiwe Journal of Political Science Vol. I No I (see PP 103-119 of this issue).
6. Certain/Specific (alleged) military coups (items 7, 10 and 11) in Nigeria were made-up/cooked-up by the incumbent military Dictators. The circumstances surrounding such coups, the arrest and trials of the 'Coups suspects or suspected leaders, were not clear. The suspects have been shown by developments in Nigeria to have been set-up and implicated by the military leaders- (General Ibrahim Babangida in 1985 against General Maman Vatsa; and late General Sani Abacha in 1995 against General Olusegun Obasanjo, colonel Gwadabe and others, and, in 1997 against Generals Oladipo Diya, Olanrewaju, Adisa and others)- to settle political scores and pave way for their sit-tightism in office and continuation of political and administrative corruption and, its accompanying culture of settlement and political decay. It should be noted that, eventhough, some of these coups were (allegedly) foiled, such developments (foiling of coups) rather than showing the efficacy or acceptability of the military in power, show their ruthlessness in hanging to power and continuation of their corrupt governance to the detriment of the Nation and the entire citizenry.
7. Items 1, 5, 8 and 11 (four periods out of 11 periods) which, combined covers less than eleven (11) years out of thirty-nine

years of Nigeria's independence, could only be said to reflect those periods during which civilians/democratic governments existed in Nigeria since her independence in 1960. Infact. To some extent, item 8 could still be identified as falling within the parameters of military rulership, eventhough, the segmented, and gradual disengagement of Babangida Regime through its roller-coastal and mechanistic transition programme tend to show the period and certain time before it- (though the existence of civilian governors and chairmen at the state and local governmentlevels)- as that of the third Republic. This period 100, could be tagged as the dark days of democracy in Nigeria its annulment of June 12, 1993 presidential elections which was clearly won by late Basorun M. K. O. Abiola of the social Democratic party (see table v) and the institutionalisation of a puppet interim National Government under Chief Earnest Shonekan.

8. Some/all of these convicts were later released and granted state pardon by the corrupt Regime of General Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1998) and his surrogate, Dictator General Sani Abacha (1993-1998) despite having been found guilty and convicted by their military predecessors in office and, their (Babangida and Abacha) continuation of the War Against Indiscipline put in place by the Buhari/ Idiagbon Regime.
9. This man (Bakin Zuwo) was severally jailed for various corrupt attitudes/actions.
10. Eventhough this table may omit certain cases/developments of this nature- (which, if so, would be minimal or very few in our view)-, it clearly shows in chronological order the citation of corruption, accusation of it, or, behaviours in government nearer to it as the major reasons for taking over government or attempting to take it over from the incumbent leaders in Nigeria and other African countries. The fact that somecertain of these coups were (supposedly) foiled reveals the diabolism

of the military in power and their determination to hang on to it no matter the cost irrespective of whether or not the governed are served satisfactorily. The “made-up” coups by these leaders in some countries are indices of sit-tightism and diabolical approach usually employed to deceive the International community that they are still popular and also in control or accepted by the citizens.

11. The result of the June 12 1993 presidential election (see table v) was not officially released- (on the order of Babangida and his fellow destructionists in power)- by the then professor Humphrey Nwosu led-National Electoral Commission. Its announcement was stopped midway when it was clear to Babangida and his cohorts in corruption that the Late Basorun M.K.O. Abiola was on the path or threshold of victory. Babangida corruptly saw the victory from the perspective of ethnocracy. He knew that if allowed to go unannulled, the Abiola victory would change the power equation in Nigeria as well as put an end to his desire to remain in power even after the August 27, 1993 the terminal date he had cosmetically and deceitfully set to end his mechanistic transition programme. The questionable annulment of the election notwithstanding, Babangida's action, through his heavily funded Federal Ministry of Information, was defended against the obvious claim that, he annulled the election to prevent a southerner (i.e, late MKO Abiola) from taking over power from the North. The defence among others goes thus :

The annulment of June 12 election of 1993 has nothing to do with the result of the June 12 election Perse... The question of whether Chief Abiola is a Southerner and a Yoruba, is completely immaterial to the issues at stake... In November 1992. Presidential primary elections were held in this country involving 23 aspirants from the SDP won his party ticket nation wide defeating strong candidates like Chief Olu Falae in

Ibadan, and Chief Lateef Jakande in Lagos. Similarly, Mallam Adamu ciroma and alhaji Umaru Shinkafi tied as winners. All three were "Northerners". If president Babangida wanted to keep the presidential power in the north, as has been alleged by his detractors, he would not have cancelled the primaries and banned all the 23 aspirants of that election because that primary had produced three northern candidates for the election because that primary had produced three northerner would have emerged president (see June 12 and The future of Nigerian Democracy (undated) issued by the Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos (page7).

The corrupt and myopic nature of this defence is identifiable from the fact that Babangida, apart from the interest of fostering and continuing with the Northern political hegemony at the expense of the Southerners, had his own political calculations aimed at perpetuating himself in office. He could not achieve this directly because he had to "step aside" on the 27th of August, 1993 when the heat of the challenge and opposition to his corrupt and unjust annulment of the June 12, 1993 election (results), which to date remains the freest and fairest in the (political) history of Nigeria, was too much for him to withstand. It should be stated however, that he achieved his aim through his institutionalisation of a puppet Interim national Government (ING) headed by Chief Earnest Shonekan, with (Late) General Abacha as the military henchman and protector of Babangida's (political) interests. Abacha, in turn, as expected terminated the life of the ING after 84 days or so in office on the 17th of November 1993 through a military coup, which, he and other military apologists unsuccessfully tried to make Nigerians believe was a resignation by the head (Earnest Shonekan) of the Interim National Government.

12. Eventhough, this table – (which contain 21 looters instead of 14 widely reported) – does not carry the names of the looters,

all of whom had, at one time or the other, (between 1985-1993; 1993-1998; 1998-1999 May 29) ruled or participated (in the capacity) in the rulership of Nigeria, it depicts the level of (corrupt)political savagery, Kleptacracy of Nigeria's past Leaders and actors in government. It equally shows the extent of their ruination of the Nigerian Economy and Nageria's and Nigerians' image among the Community of Nations. The level of speculation of this looting has been so high to the extent that as Undonsi, (1999:1) reported: "according Tribune of July 31 President Olusegun Obasanjo had sent the names of the suspects to British Prime Minister, Tony Blair and President Bill Clinton of the United States of America for help in tracking down the Looters. Even, looking at the contents of Table VI which immediately preceded this, one can hardly refer to these reports as speculations or rumours see Weekend News Flash vol. 1, No 26, Monday August 9, 1999 Pages, 3 & 5.

13. This corrupt and unethical behaviour now tagges as "Buharigat", by the Nigerian (former) Nembes four citizen in his 'quest' to 'serve' the Nation in the fourth Republic was published by the News Magazine in its monthly premiere issue for July, 1999 and, it attracted the editorial attention of the magazine throughout July dovetailing into August 1999 (see The News Vol. 13, No. 4, August 2nd 1999). Other Newspapers and Magazines in Nigeria gave prominence to the Buhari saga or Buharigate by ways of proper documentation (For example, See Tell Magazine No. 31 August, 1999 and Tell Magazine, No. 32; August 9, 1999.
14. It was reported on the NTA Network News at 9'o clock on the 28/07/99 that an Abuja Magistrate court in its sitting of 28/07/99 found the former speaker guilty of false declaration of age, perjury falsification of BSC degree of the University of Toronto, Canada; and falsification of National Youth Service Corps certificate.

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Table I

Military Coups (and "made-up coups") in Nigeria since 1966 and Reasons for their Emergence

S/N	DATE	EVENT	COUNTRY	REASON	OUTCOME	GOVERNMENT REPLACED
1	15/1/1966	Military Coup	Nigeria	Corruption of incumbent government, political vendetta, nepotism and ethnicity etc.	Successful	Civilian (1st Republic)
2	27/7/1966	Military Coup	Nigeria	Counter Coup-caused by unwillingness of the leaders to be led that is, political megalomania and self aggrandizement, alleged corruption.	Successful	Military
3	29/7/1975	Military Coup	Nigeria	Power drunkenness, unwillingness to relinquish power-1976 unrealistic corruption.	Successful	Military
4	13/2/1976	Military Coup	Nigeria	Political megalomania and the unpatriotic vision of reinstating a discredited and corrupt ex-leaders by the plotters.	Foiled	None
5	31/12/1983	Military Coup	Nigeria	Corruption of incumbent leaders, politics of expediency, looting of National Treasury.	Successful	Civilian (Presidential system-2nd Republic)
6	27/8/1985	Military Coup	Nigeria	Drift towards political intolerance by the incumbent leader and unresolvable economic crisis, socio-political corruption.	Successful	Military

APPENDICES

Table I

Military Coups (and "made-up coups") in Nigeria since 1966 and Reasons for their Emergence

S/N	DATE	EVENT	COUNTRY	REASON	OUTCOME	GOVERNMENT REPLACED
7	17 & 19th Nov. 1985	"Made up" Coup	Nigeria	Megalomania syndrome/self aggrandizement	Foiled	None
8	22/4/1990	Military Coup	Nigeria	Dissatisfaction with the incumbent (ING) government. Drift towards a state of complete anarchy following the annulment of the June 12 1993 Presidential election so far adjudged the best in the history of Nigeria.	Foiled	None
9	17/11/1993	Military Coup	Nigeria	The suspected coup leaders were accused by the government of trying to overthrow the government for self-aggrandizement.	Successful	The Military backed-ING which came into existence (for 82 days) when Babangida deshed the democratic aspirations and hoped of Nigerians by "stepping aside.
10	1995	"Made up" Coup	Nigeria	The suspected coup leaders were accused by the government of trying to overthrow the government for self-aggrandizement.	Supposedly Foiled	None
11	20/12/97	"Made up" Coup	Nigeria	The suspected coup leaders were accused by the government of trying to overthrow the government for self-aggrandizement.	Supposedly Foiled	None

Source = Various documents, Nigerian newspapers/magazines and archival records on Nigerian History. Politics, Economics, Culture and Development. Also, see Akindele, S.T (1995) *Corruption; An analytical focus on the problems of its*

APPENDICES (contd)

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S.T. Akindele

Table II

Life Spans of Governments in Nigeria (both **Military** and **Civilian(1960-1999)**)

S/N	TYPE OF ADMINISTRATION	HEARD/RULER	PERIOD	REASONS OR CASUAL FACTORS OF THE CHANGE
1	Civilian (Parliamentary System)	Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Baiewa	1/10/1960-15/1/1966	Political and administrative corruption, arson, confusion etc.
2	Military	Major General J. T.U. Aguyi-ironsi	15/1/1966-27/7/1966	Counter-coup due to political megalomania or self aggrandizement of the predecessor and his people.
3	Military	General Yakubu Gowon (dismissed)& (later reinstared)	19/7/1966-29/7/1979	Unwillingness to had off power, its 1976 unrealistic posture and corruption.
4	Military	General Murtala Ramat Mohammed (July 29th 1975- 13th Feb. 1976) General Olusegun Obasanjo (13th Feb. 1976- 1st October 1979)	29/7/1975-1/10/1979	Voluntary abdication or Military disengagement from politics and restoration of civil rule and the abandonment of Westminster system
5	Civilian (Presidential System)	Altaji Aliyu Shehu shagari	11/10/1979-31/11/1983	Corruption. Hitlerism, looting of the Public/National Treasury, Drift towards intolerance.
6	Military	Major-General Mohammadu Buhari	31/12/1983-27/8/1985	Nations Economy's defiance of Economic prescription that is, fiscal crisis.
7	Military	Major-General (later a General) Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida	27/8/1985-27/8/1993	- Fiscal indiscipline, stifling of democratic aspiration Annulment of a free & fair presidential election, disrespect for human rights and fundamental freedom. - Inauguration of a puppet and illegal ING

APPENDICES (Contd)

Table II

Life spans of Governments in Nigeria (both Military and Civilian)(1960-1999)

S/N	TYPE OF ADMINISTRATION	HEARD/RULER	PERIOD	REASONS OR CASUAL FACTORS OF THE CHANGE
8	Interim National Government (a combination of civilian and military government)	Chief Earnes Shoneka	271811993-1711111993	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - could not successfully placate the democratic aspirations of Nigerians. - Illegal in nature and was pronounced so by a Lagos High court.
9	Military	General Sanni Abacha	1711111993-81611998	Replaced the ING., The Leader died in office.
10	Military	General Abudsalam	08/06/98-29/5/99 Alhaji Abubakar	Voluntary Military handing-over of power to democratically elected executive civilian president. This is the second, in the (39 years old) history of Nigeria.
11	Civilian	Chief Olusegun Obasanjo	29/5/99.....?	Took over from the Military Head of State after a successful democratic election as an Executive president; what next?

Source : Various documents, Nigerian newspapers/magazines and archival records on Nigerian History. Politics, Economics, Culture and Development. Also, see Akindele, S.T (1995) Corruption;

An analytical focus on the problems of its conceptualisation *Ife Psv'chologla: An International Journal*. (pp.91-101).

Table III

Convictions/Incarceration Of Public Officials In Nigeria For Corruption

NAME	STATE	OFFICE	YEAR	OFFENCE	JUDGEMENT	DATE	LENGTH OF INCARCERATION
SANIGULE	KANO	COMMIS SIONER		KICK BACK	GUILTY	21/6/84	22 YRS
JIM NWOBODO	ANAMBRA	GOVERNOR	79-83	“		21/6/84	44 YRS
ALHAHI WADA	KANO ABUBAKAR	DEPUTY GOVERNOR	83-83	KICK BACK		28/6/84	63 YRS
ALHAJI GARBA	KANO SADAR	PERMANENT SECRETARY	79-83	KICK BACK		28/6/84	63 YRS
AMBROSE ALLI (PROFESOR)	BENDEL	GOVERNOR	79-83	KICK BACK		18/6/84	66 YRS
CHIEF BISI	OGUN ONABANJO	GOVERNOR OF U.P.N	79-83	ENRICHM ENT		31/5/84	22 YRS
SOLOMON LAR	PLATEAU	GOVERNOR	79-83	CORRUPT ENRICHM ENT		24/6/84	88 YRS
BAKIN ZUWO9	KANO	GOVERNOR	79-83	“		28/6/84	69 YRS
OKITIPI JOSEPH	KANO	INTERNAL AUDITO (KBC)	79-83	KICK BACK		28/6/84	63 YRS

NAME	STATE	OFFICE	YEAR	OFFENCE	JUDGEMENT	DATE	LENGTH OF INCARCERATION
MALAM UMARU BALA	KANO	ENGINEER (K.B.C)	79-83	KICK RACK		28/6/84	63 YRS
BAGUDU BIDA	KANO	GENERAL MANAGER (KBC)	79-83	KICK BACK		28/6/84	63 YRS
ALHAJI	OYO	COMMISSIONER FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT	79-83	KICK BACK		24/6/84	63 YRS
FOLORUNSO KILA	OGUN	N. Y. S. OFFICIAL	79-53	KICK BACK		1984	LIFE IMPRISONMENT.
OLAWOLE IDRIS	LAGOS	COMMISSIONER	79-83	KICK BACK		1985	
ALLI YUSUF	“	N. Y. S. C OFFICIAL	79-83	KICK BACK		1985	
COLONELP. OBASA	“	N. Y. S. C DIRECTOR	79-83	KICK BACK	-	1984	105 YRS

SOURCES: *Daily Sketch* June 21, 1984 P1, *National Concord* June 22, 1984 P1, *National Concord* June 29, 1984 P1. *Sunday Concord* June 24th, 1984 P1; *Daily Sketch* June 29th, 1984 P1; *National Concord* June 19 1984 P1. *National Concord* June 21, 1984 P1; *Nigerian Tribune* June 1, 1984 P1; *Daily Times* March 9th, 1985 Pp 1 & 23, and other News papers and Magazines.

APPENDICES (Contd)

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Table IV

Military Change(S) Of Government And Military/Guerrilla Insurrections In Nigeria And Other (Developing) African Nations On Account Of Established Cases/Accusation Of Corruption Since 1959.

S. T. Akande

S/N	DATE	EVENT	LEADERS	COUNTRY	OUTCOME
1	1/1/59	Military Coup	Abdel Nasser	Egypt	Successful
2	14/9/60	Military Coup	Gen. Moburu Seko	Zaire	Successful
3	13/12/60	Military Coup	Brig. Gen. Mengtsu Neway	Ethiopia	Successful
4	1/8/62	Military Coup	K. A Busia	Ghana	Foiled
5	13/1/63	Military Coup	Nicholas Grunintzky	Togo	Successful
6	15/8/63	Military Coup	Alponse Massembadebat	Congo (Brazaville)	Successful
7	28/10/63	Military Coup	Christophe Soglo	Dahomey	Successful
8	2/1/64	Military Coup	Sheik Karume	Zanzibar	Successful
9	18/2/64	Military Coup	Jean Aubame	Gabon	Successful for 2 days
10	19/6/65	Military Coup	Col. Boumedienne	Algeria	Successful
11	22/12/65	Military Coup	Col. Soglo	Dahomey	Successful
12	24/11/65	Military Coup	Gen. Moburu Sese Seko	Zaire	Successful
13	1/1/66	Military Coup	Lt. Col. Jean Bedel Bokassa	Central African Republic	Successful
14	03/1/66	Military Coup	Lt. Col. Sangouie Lami Zana	Upper Volta	Successful
15	15/1/66	Military Coup	Major Chukwuemeka Nzeogwu	Nigeria	Successful
16	24/2/66	Military Coup	Lt. Gen. Ernmanuel Koloka	Ghana	
17	30/5/66	Military Coup	Kasarubu	Congo	

S/N	DATE	EVENT	LEADERS	COUNTRY	OUTCOME
18	26/10/66	Military Coup	Mobutu	Congo	Successful
19	8/7/66	Military Coup	Crown Prince Ndizeye	Burundi	Successful
20	29/7/66	Military Coup	Gen. Yakubu Gowon	Nigeria	Successful
21	28/11/66	Military Coup	Capt. Michael	Burundi	Successful
22	13/1/67	Military Coup	Lt. Col. Gnassingbe Enyadema	Togo	Successful
23	5/3/67	Military Coup	Atanasio Ndongo	Equatorial Guinea	Aborted
24	3/67	Military Coup	Col. Alexander Banza	Central African Republic	Aborted
25	23/3/67	Military Coup	Lt. Col. Juxon-smith	Sierra-Leone	Aborted
26	17/4/67	Military Coup	Lt. Arthur	Ghana	Aborted
27	21/4/67	Military Coup	Col. Jafar Al-Nimeri	Republic of Sudan	Successful
28	18/4/67	Military Coup	The "Sergeants"	Sierra-Leone	Successful
29	5/8/67	Military Coup	Col. Marian Ngonbi	Congo (Brazaville)	Successful
30	19/11/67	Military Coup	Lt. Moussa Traore	Mali	Successful
31	1/12/67	Military Coup	Col. Taharzbiri	Algeria	Aborted
32	17/12/67	Military Coup	Major maurice Kouandete	Dahomey	Successful
33	25/5/67	Military Coup	Col. Ghaddafi	Libya	Successful
34	01/09/67	Military Coup	Gen. Saheed Barre	Somalia	Successful
35	25/1/71	Military Coup	Gen. Idi Amin	Uganda	Successful
36	13/1/72	Military Coup	Lt. Col. Kutu Acheampong	Ghana	Successful
37	23/2/72	Military Coup	Major Matthew Kerekou	Dohomey	Successful
38	5/7/73	Military Coup	Lt. Gen. habiyarimana	Rwanda	Successful

S/N	DATE	EVENT	LEADERS	COUNTRY	OUTCOME
39	15/4/74	Military Coup	Lt. Col Seyni. Kountche	Niger Republic	Successful
40	13/4/75	Military Coup	Gen. Felix Malloum	Chad	Successful
41	29/7/75	Military Coup	Brigadier Gen. Murtala Ramat Mohammed	Nigeria	Successful
42	13/2/76	Military Coup	Lt. Buka Suka Dimka	Nigeria	Aborted
43	15/3/76	Military Coup	Major Bayere	Niger	Aborted
44	10/2/77	Military Coup	Lt. Col. Megistu Haile Mariam	Ethiopia	Successful
45	5/6/77	Military Coup	Albert Renc	Seycheles Islan	Successful
46	15/7/78	Military Coup	Fulk Akuffo	Ghana	Successful
47	4/6/79	Military Coup	Flt. Lt. J. T. Rawlings	Ghana	Successful
48	12/4/80	Military Coup	Master Sgt. Doe	Liberia	Successful
49	14/11/80	Military Coup	Joao Bernado Viera	Guinea Bissau	Successful
50	25/11/80	Military Coup	Col. Zerbo	Upper Volta	Successful
51	30/7/81	Military Coup	Senegalese troupes	Gambia	Successful
52	1/9/81	Military Coup	Gen. Golingba	Central African Republic	Successful
53	10/8/81	Military Coup	WehSyen	Liberia	Successful
54	6/9/81	Military Coup	Muslim Extremists	Egypt	Aborted
55	31/12/81	Military Coup	Fit. Lt. J. T. Rawlings	Ghana	Successful
56	4/7/83	Military Coup	Capt. Thomas Sankara	Upper Volta	Successful
57	31/12/83	Military Coup	Sgt. Malik and Corporal Giwa	Ghana	Aborted
58	31/12/83	Military Coup	Major Gen. Muhammad Buhari	Nigeria	Successful
59	6/8/84	Military Coup	Col. Saleh	Cameroun	Aborted

S/N	DATE	EVENT	LEADERS	COUNTRY	OUTCOME
60	12/12/84	Military Coup	Lt. Col. Taya	Mauritania	Successful
61	6/4/85	Military Coup	Gen. Al-Dahab	Sudan	Successful
62	27/7/85	Military Coup	Brig. Okello	Uganda	Successful
63	27/8/85	Military Coup	Major Gen. Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida	Nigeria	Successful
64	12/11/85	Military Coup	Thomas Quiwokpa	Liberia	Aborted
65	17 & 19/11/85	Military Coup	Nigeria	Foiled	
66	20/12/85	"Made-up" Military Coup	Major Gen. Mamman Vatsa	Nigeria	Foiled
67	20/1/86	Military Coup	Major Gen. Lekhanya	Lesotho	Successful
68	24/9/87	Military Coup	Bantu Holomisa	Transkel	Successful
69	15/10/87	Military Coup	Capt. Blaise Campaore	Burkina Faso	Successful
70	22/4/90	Military Coup	Major. Gideon Okar	Nigeria	Foiled
71	01/12/90	Military Coup	Gen. Idris Deby	Chad	
72	29/3/91	Military Coup	Lt. Col. Amadou	Mali	Successful
73	17/11/93	Military Coup	General Sanni Ahacha	Nigeria	Successful
74	1995	"Made-up" Military Coup	Col. Giwadabe * others	Nigeria	Foiled
75	1994	Military Coup	Captain Valentine Stase-Bare Maiwa Ssara	Sierra Leone	Successful overthrow of General Momoh

S/N	DATE	EVENT	LEADERS	COUNTRY	OUTCOME
76	24/1/1994	Military Coup	Bare-maiwa Ssara	Niger	Successful
77	1996	Military/Guerrilla Coup	Lawrence Kabila	Zaire	Overthrow of mobutu sese seko
78	1996	Military Coup		Sierra Leone	Successful overthrow of Captain Valentine Strasser
79	25/5/97	Military Coup	Paul Koroma	Sierra Leone	Successful
80	20/12/97	"Madeup" Military Coup	Generals Diya, Olarewaju, Adisa and others	Nigeria	Allegedly foiled
81	1998	Military/Guerrilla Coup	Former Army Leaders	Congo Brassaveille	Successful overthrow of the Civilian Leader by former military leader who had initially handed over power to him
82	1998	Military Coup	Army Leaders	Guinea Bissau	Successful (Bernado Vierra Removed)
83	1998	Military Coup	Dauda Mallam Wanke	Niger	Successful

SOURCE:- Various Newspapers/Magazines and Archival records on African History, Politics, Culture and Development.

APPENDICES (Contd)

Table V

**Table Showing Presidential Elections Results Of June 12, 1993
(On States By State Basis)**

	STATE	SDP SCORE	SDP %	NRC SCORE	NRC %	TOTAL SCORE
1	Abia	105,273	41.04	151,227	58.96	256,500
2	Adamawa	140,875	45.72	167,239	54.28	308,114
3	Akwa Ibom	214,787	51.86	199,342	48.14	414,129
4	Anambra	212,024	57.11	159,258	42.89	371,282
5	Bauchi	339,339	39.27	524,836	60.73	864,175
6	Benue	246,830	56.94	186,302	43.06	433,132
7	Borno	153,496	54.40	128,684	45.60	282,180
8	C/River	189,303	55.23	153,452	44.77	342,755
9	Delta	327,277	69.30	145,001	30.70	472,278
10	Edo	205,407	66.48	103,572	33.52	308,979
11	Enugu	263,101	48.09	284,050	51.91	547,151
12	Imo	159,350	44.86	195,836	55.14	355,186
13	Jigawa	138,552	60.67	89,836	39.33	228,388
14	Kaduna	389,713	52.20	356,860	47.80	746,573
15	Kano	169,619	52.28	154,809	47.72	324,428

	STATE	SDP SCORE	SDP %	NRC SCORE	NRC %	TOTAL SCORE
16	Katsina	171,162	38.70	271,077	61.30	442,239
17	Kebbi	70,219	32.66	144,808	67.34	215,027
18	Kogi	222,760	45.60	265,732	54.40	488,492
19	Kwara	272,270	77.24	80,209	22.78	352,479
20	Lagos	883,965	85.54	149,432	14.46	1,033,397
21	Niger	136,350	38.10	221,437	61.90	357,787
22	Ogun	425,725	87.78	59,246	12.22	484,971
23	Ondo	883,024	84.42	162,994	15.58	1,046,018
24	Osun	365,266	83.52	72,068	16.48	437,334
25	Oyo	536,011	83.52	105,788	16.48	641,799
26	Plateau	417,565	61.68	259,394	38.32	676,959
27	Rivers	370,578	36.63	640,973	63.37	1,011,551
28	Sokoto	97,726	20.79	372,250	79.21	469,976
29	Taraba	101,887	61.42	64,001	38.58	165,888
30	Yobe	111,887	63.59	64,061	38.41	175,948
31	Fct Abuja	19,968	52.16	18,313	47.84	38,281
	TOTAL	8,341,309	58.36	5,952,087	41.64	14,293,396

SOURCE: The News, June 28, 1993 page 24 as lended by the Campaign for Democracy (CD) in a Lagos court in the process of the struggle to actualise the mandale of the people and, legally force a deannulment of the election.

APPENDICES (Contd)

Table VI

Table showing the forfeiture (of Landed Property and Stolen Money Worth N87 Billion) by 11 Looters to the Nigeria Federal Government

NAME	ALLEDGED	AMOUNT RETURNED	PROPERTY ALREADY CONFISCATED
NREMAH USENI	67.5 BILLION	2.1 BILLION	3 EDIFICES IN ABUJA
BASHIR DALHATU	3.9 BILLION	250 MILLION	OIL PROSPECTING LICENSE SEIZED
MOHAMMED ABACHA	9.3 BILLION	5 BILLION	OIL PROSPECTING LICENSE SEIZED
ABOUKARI ABACHA	7.5 BILLION	200 MILLION	OIL PROSPECTING LICESSE SEIZED
TOM IKIMI	3.7 BILLION	300 MILLION	
DON ETIEBET	12.7 BILLION	2.7 BILLION	A BUILDING IN ABUJA
ISHAYA BAMAIYI	14.7 BILLION	1 MILLION	
ISMAILA GWARZO	6.8 BILLION	500 MILLION	
DAN ETETE	1.8 BILLION	700 MILLION	A MANSION IN LAGOS
ARISEKOLA ALAO	9.8 BILLION	100 MILLION	
ANTHONY ANI	6.7 BILLION	40 MILLION	LANDED PROPERTY IN ABUJA

Source : *Weekend Newsflash* Vol. 1. 26 August 9, 1999 FRONT PAGE :
Ikeja, Lagos : Publish by SCNL, (P. O. Box 3564 Agege. Lagos, Nigeria)

Table VII
The Discoveries So Far Made of The Asset Of The Nation's
Alleged Treasury Looters

GENERAL IBRAHIM BABANGIDA

1. Owns a Multi-million dollars property in Germany France and Britain.
2. Controls W200 million share in Aluminum Smelter project in Akwa Ibom.
3. Owns Tripple heritage Communication.
4. Owns 4 private jets, one a gift from Julius Berger.
5. Got allocation of 100,000 barrels of the nations crude oil per day (between 1986-92). Made N30 million monthly.
6. Share in Wrist watch factory in Switzerland
7. Agricultural project in Egypt.

LATE GENERAL SANI ABACHA

1. Owns Silicon Aluminum Smelting company
2. Swelcon Airlines
3. Swelcon Travels.
4. SKI Construction Company, Kano
5. FK Construction Company, Kano
6. Madras Limited, Kano

7. FK Industries (Synthetic Mats & Plastics)
8. Arab Limited, Kano (Polythene bags allied product
9. Arewa Containers
10. Durbar Hotel, Kano and Kaduna
11. Kano cashino
12. Sava Malt
13. Aqua Minerals, kano (bottling
14. Pioneer Biscuits & Confectionery
15. Poly Plastics
16. Ideal Flour Mills, Kaduna
17. Shares in Port Harcourt Flour Mill
18. Shares in Angle Flour Mills, Ibadam
19. Shares in Universal Trust Bank
20. Own Asada Farms
21. Pat owner Dentate & Sawoe Limited
22. Shares in Delta Prosperous Ltd.
23. H. Oil (Petroleum)
24. Glencore (Petroleum)
25. Mountfield
26. Havens Petroleum
27. Wintershell (Petroleum)

28. Sina Cola Company
29. Clamout Resource Limited
Total Worth: ₦1.7 Trillion.

GENERAL ABDUSALAMI ABUBAKAR

1. W680 billion reported missing in his era
2. W78 billion recovered from Abacha
3. \$3.4 billion with drawn from foreign
4. Rescrve W20 billion spent on Nigeria '99
5. His Minna Mansioned other billions of dollar worth of properties
6. Has shares worth billion of dollar in Amni Int. an oil exploring and prospecting company owned by him.

LT. GENERAL OLADIPUPODIYA

1. A mansion in Victoria Island, Lagos
2. An edifice at GRA Ikeja Lagos
3. Three building in Ogun State
4. Shares in three merchant banks and two commercial banks
5. Used over ₦130 million to settle Royal fathers to support; Abacha's government
6. Over W700 million found in his house during investigation of 1997 phantom coup
7. 4 porch cars
Total Worth: N3.2 billion

MAJOR GENERAL ABDULKAREEM ADISA

1. Owns Afonja Community Bank, Horin
2. A mansion each in Lagos,
3. Two petrol filling station
4. \$12 million contract unaccounted for
5. Numerous housing contracts barely executed
Total Worth: ₦4.3 billion

MRS. MARYAM BABANGIDA

1. Owns El-Amin International School, Minna
2. A fleet of Toyota Hiace buses used for transportation
3. Owns two foreign accounts at Switzerland and Saudi Arabia
4. Has a fixed deposit of \$450 million in Egypt
5. Share in three merchant banks
Total Worth; W9.3 billion

IBRAHIM ABACHA

1. Chains if slooky cars
2. Housing estate in Suez Crescent, building Abuja Sheraton & Towers
3. A mansion in Kano
4. Two oil servicing companies
5. Shares in 12 national companies
6. Six buildings in Niger Republic Total Worth: ₦9.3 billion

ZAINAB ABACHA

1. Owns two buildings in Kano
2. Paid ₦100 million to print ENCON voters card unexecuted
3. Shares in three big companies
4. Owns 16 buses for transportation
5. Got W52 million for supply of stationery unimplemented Total Worth : ₦431 million

ALHAJI ISMAILIA GWARZO

1. \$4.3 million deposit in Swiss Bank
2. Withdraw \$2.8 million from Central Bank of Nigeria in 1997
3. Transferred \$2.6 million to private account money meant for security
4. Landed properties in Abuja
Total Worth: ₦6.8 billion

BRIGADIER-GENERAL RAJI RASAKI

1. Mansion in Ibadan worth more than N500 million
2. Landed properties at Maraca
3. 2 Petrol filling stations along Mile 2, Apapa Expressway, Lagos
4. A building at CRA, Ikegai
5. Built a mighty building for his brother at Oko-Oha, Agege

6. Owns 5 expensive cars
Total Worth: ₦4.7 billion

ALHAJA UMARU DIKKO

1. Mansion in London (Bayswater) worth millions of pound sterling
2. House in South Wood men of London and Newcastle
3. Owns 17 different companies
4. Two fat accounts in London, Abuja and Lagos
Total Worth: ₦4.5 billion

LT. GENERAL JEREMIAH USENI

1. 150 million naira worth of shares in Plateau State owns Lion Bank
2. Tim –tali transport Services with a fleet of about 20 civilian buses
3. Tim industries production of office stationery
4. Tim-Tali Motels
5. Tim-Doors production of steel doors
6. Two petrol stations in the FCT
7. Plateau bus terminus, Jo
8. UTC building, Jos
9. Nigerian Amy workshop building Jos worth N450 million
10. Over 12 houses in Jos, Benin, Langtang and Abuja
11. Former Dizeng on Dogon Karge, Jos worth ₦350 million

SAM EWANG

12. Two shopping malls in Abuja
13. Nearly 40 lock-up shops in Garki and Wuse
14. About 70 virgin plots in Abuja
15. Two mini-housing estate in Abuja
16. Over 43 different personal cars
17. A specially-built vault in his Jos home
18. Tim industries Limited worth ₦650 million

Total Worth: ₦67.5 billion

ALHAJI UMARU AHMED

1. Owns a building at Calabar
2. Two buildings at Kaduna
3. Signed \$ 16 million contract when he was about moving to Kaduna
4. Two fat bank accounts in foreign countries

Total Worth: ₦1.8 billion

DANIEL KANU

1. Twelve salary cars each not less ₦7 million
2. A mansion in Abuja
3. Two oil prospecting companies
4. Three petrol filling stations
5. A building in Enugu
6. W26 million deposit in Amsterdam Bank
7. \$9 million in Swiss Bank
8. Chains of companies

9. Paid N800 million to organise 2 million Abuja match

Total Worth: ₦1.8 billion

BABA ADAMU IYAM

1. Owns 3 expensive cars and other 24 vehicles
2. Used W2.6 million to refurbish his private house
3. Bought a duplex at Marwa Gardens at ₦7.5 million
4. Landed property at Victoria Island, Lagos
5. Owns timber concessions factory at Enugu
6. Operates three accounts running to billions in total deposit
7. An edifice (mighty building at Abuja Total Worth: W1.45 billion

ALHAJI BASHIR DALHATU

1. An estate at Jigsaw State
2. 4 Posch cars
3. An edifice at Abuja
4. Four duplexes in Lagos
5. \$ 2 billion Ajaokuta Steel Deal
6. Gave ₦30 million to his brother during the defunct UNCP government primaries

Total Worth: ₦3.9 billion

MRS. MARIAM ABACHA

1. Business empire in Saudi Arabia
2. Owns more than 200 lorries for transportation

3. Three buildings in Kano
 4. A mansion in Abuja
 5. ₦250 million siphoned from family Support Programme deposited in Libya
 6. ₦300 million worth of buildings in Niger Republic
- Total Worth: ₦17.8 billion*

JOIN BEN-KALO

1. Sold a tractor each to all the local government at million each
 2. ₦500 million contract badly implemented
 3. Two buildings one at Abuja and one in Lagos
- Total Worth: ₦12 billion*

BRIGADIER-GENERAL HALILU AKILU

1. A building at Abuja
 2. Estate in Kano worth more than 2 billion
 3. Shares in two national companies
 4. Owns two posh cars
- Total Worth: ₦4.7 billion*

SAM EWANG

1. Owns 3 expensive cars and other 24 vehicles
3. Bought a duplex at Marwa Gal-den at **W7.5** million
4. Land property at Bictoria Island, Lagos

5. Owns timber factory at Enugu
 6. Operates three bank accounts running to billion to total deposit
 7. An edifice (might building) at Abuja
- Total Worth: ₦3.8 billion*

DAVID MARK

1. Mansion at oturkpo and Makudi in Benue State
 2. 2 Buildings at Abuja
 3. Sprawling Golf Course in Ireland
 4. Partnership with three oil prospector companies
 5. Shares in two merchant banks
- Total Worth: ₦2.5 billion*

APPENDICES (Contd)

Table VIII¹²

Table Showing the amount of money illegally kept in Overseas Banks by Nigerian Government Officials (1985-May 29, 1999)

(A)

Evii Ni Awon Owo Ti O Wa Ni Ipamo Ni Banki Ili Okeere Meaning: "Money Illegally kept in Overseas Banks by Nigerian government Officials (1985-May 29, 1999)" (See the Breakdown into Naira in (B))

S/N	NAMES OF DEPOSITORS	LONDON	SWISS	USA	GERMANY
1	2	3	4	5	6
1	Gen. Ibrahim Babangida	£6.26 Billion	\$7.41 Billion	\$2.00 Billion	DM 9.00 Billion
2	Gen. Abubakar	£1.31 Billion	\$2.33 Billion	\$8.00 Billion	-
3	Rear A. Mike Akhigbe	£1.24 Billion	\$2.42 Billion	\$671 Billion	DM 1.00 Billion
4	Gen. Jerry useni	£3.04 Billion	\$2.01 Billion	\$1.01 Billion	DM 900 Million
5	Alhaji Ismaila Gwarzo	£1.03 Billion	\$2.00 Billion	1.30 Billion	DM 700 Million
6	Alhaji Umaru Dikko	£4.5 Million	\$1.4 Billion	\$700 Million	DM 345 Million
7	Paul Oguwuma	£300 Million	\$1.14 Billion	\$200 Million	DM 500 Million
8	Gen. Sani Abacha	£5.01 Billion	\$4.09 Billion	\$800 Million	DM 3.01 Billion
9	Mohammed Abacha	£300 Million	\$1.2 Billion	\$150 Million	DM 535 Million
10	Abdukadir Abacha	£700 Million	\$1.21 Billion	\$900 Million	DM 361 Million
11	Alhaji Wada Nas	£600 Million	\$1.32 Billion	\$-	DM 300 Million
12	Tom Ikimi	£400 Million	\$1.39 Billion	\$153 Billion	DM 361 Billion
13	Dan etete	£1.12 Billion	\$1.03 Billion	\$400 Million	DM 1.27 Billion
14	Don Etebet	£2.5 Billion	\$1.06 Billion	\$700 Million	DM 361 Million
15	Maj. Al-Mustapha	£600 Million	\$1.01 Billion	\$-	DM 210 Million
16	Anthony ani	£2.9 Billion	\$1.09 Billion	\$360 Million	DM 1.66 Billion
17	Bashiru dalhatu	£2.3 Billion	\$1.01 Billion	\$161 Million	DM 1.43 Billion
18	Gen. Wushishi	£700 Million	\$1.30 Billion	\$-	-
19	Alhaji Hassan Adamu	£300 Million	\$200 Million	\$700 Million	-
20	T. Y. Danjuma	£1.36 Billion	\$1.02 Billion	\$300 Million	DM 190 Million
21	Gen. Ishaja Bamaiyi	£120 Million	\$800 Million	-	-

Source: Oriekoro Iwe Irovin Youta Page; Peoples News Page; Body & Soul, August 3, 1999 Vol. 1 No 6 Pt.3. The amount and the names reflected in this table as contained in these sources had been variously published in, and written about by various Nigerian Newspapers citing the Friday 23rd of July, 1999 issue of The Financial London Times. See The Weekend News Flash, Monday, August 9, 1999 vol. 1 No. 26 Pages 3, and 5; Tribune on Sunday August 1, 1999 Nigerian Tribune, August 7, 1999.

(B)

Breakdown of the Amount in (A) Into Naira

1	2	3
1	Gen. Ibrahim Babangida	₦2,462.5 Billion
2	Gen. Abubakar	₦493.85 Billion
3	Rear A. Mike Akhigbe	₦549.65 Billion
4	Gen. Jerry useni	₦805.90 Billion
5	Alhaji Ismaila Gwarzo	₦517.0 Billion
6	Alhaji Umaru Dikko	₦894.65 Billion
7	Paul Oguwuma	₦35.00 Billion
8	Gen. Sani Abacha	₦1,218.14 Billion
9	Mohammed Abacha	₦210.7 Billion
10	Abdukadir Abacha	₦338.42 Billion
11	Alhaji Wada Nas	₦237.4 Billion
12	Tom Ikimi	₦252.55 Billion
13	Dan etete	₦327.43 Billion
14	Don Etebet	₦567.47 Billion
15	Maj. Al-Mustapha	₦199.8 Billion
16	Anthony ani	₦688.95 Billion
17	Bashiru dalhatu	₦555.49 Billion
18	Gen. Wushishi	₦228.70 Billion
19	Alhaji Hassan Adamu	₦130.5 Billion
20	T. Y. Danjuma	₦342.7 Billion
21	Gen. Ishaja Bamaiyi	₦94.0 Billion

(Total = ₦11,150.3 Trillion)
AKIYESI (Key)

1. Million kan Je Egberun keta (One Million) is equal to 1,000 x 1,000 = 1 Million
2. Billion kan je Milliri keta Egberun. One Billion is equal to 1 Million x 1,000 = 1 Billion
3. Trillion kan je Billiri keta Egberun. (One Trillion is equal to 1 Billion x 1,000 = 1 Trillion)