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CONTENTS

Trends of Income Distribution in Bangladesh and Relationship with Growth – Theories and Evidences

M A Salam[1]

Abstract: *Income distribution is very substantial for economic and social advancement. It affects the structure of the society, limits the level of poverty for any specified average per capita income and poverty puts pressure on growth. Different Household Expenditure Survey data of 2000, 2005 and 2010 are used to review the trends of income distribution in Bangladesh. The Decile techniques and Gini coefficient measures are used to explain the recent trends. In addition, the shares of income of the uppermost and lowermost deciles are also used to show the income dispersal in Bangladesh. It is revealed that Bangladesh has exposed visible economic growth but income disparity has increased rapidly over time. The study is also measured the affiliation between economic growth and income disparities, using a new practical form that fits the data well. Most of the upshots suggest that inequality has a substantial positive influence on economic growth. It reapproves the Kuznets' hypothesis that at an initial stage of progress, disparity of income rises and it decreases again. Although, it provides empirical evidence that the distribution could have a positive effect on economic growth in low-income countries rather than the growth effects on distribution. The positive relationship is a contrary result to the recent empirical findings but indicates that more research is indispensable to fully understand the composite affiliation between income distribution and economic growth.*

1.0   Introduction

Literally, growth is the percentage change in mean welfare level (e.g. income or consumption) in the household survey and distribution means how equally or unequally income or assets etc. are distributed among the population. In economics, growth is what level of GDP enlarges over time and income distribution is how a nation's total GDP is distributed amongst its population. Income distribution is tremendously important for economic, social and other development. Haque (2007) states, "income variation influences the cohesion of society, determines the extent of poverty for any given average per capita income and the poverty reducing the effects of growth". Hence the sharing of income amongst its citizens of a nation is very significant to maintain peace and harmony. In fact, it is a critical job for any country to preserve fairness rather than competence and that's why the current finding is to measure income inequality. It demonstrates the income distribution is deteriorating in Bangladesh since its independence and society as a whole obviously fail to provide an egalitarian society.

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Bangladesh sensibly sustained a slow-moving income distribution in between 1970-80s and possibly because maximum individuals were very poor at that period. But in the course of time, pecuniary advancement happened as we have realized earlier and during the early phases of economic growth, the wealthier take chances to develop big business and other development actions to avoid more capital at a higher rate rivaled to the respite of the populace. Furthermore, industrialization and the growth of urban areas create an affluent middle class, comprising of wholesalers, business professionals, academics and civilians apposite to the economy concerning money. But, the mass of the country-dwellers has almost remained outside market economy. Consequently, the society became more uneven in income distribution. The current study gives a contemporary analysis of the income distribution and the magnitude of income trends in Bangladesh.

The purpose of this paper is to reviews and explains recent trend of income distribution and to assess the relationship between inequality and economic growth in Bangladesh. It also provides additional empirical evidence of the relationship between income inequalities in developing countries. After its independence, Bangladesh has perceived growth in per capita real GDP, in volume and value of trade and also an increase in income inequality (Ahmed and Zaidi 2004). A substantial literature has reviewed to evaluate the relationship between income inequality and economic growth. Besides, several approaches are commenced to enlighten the relationship.

The paper comprises three sections. The first section is concerned with the data source and methods, section two reviews the recent trends of income distribution in Bangladesh and section three explores the relationship of growth and income distribution of developing countries based on theoretical and empirical evidences.

2.0 Data Source and Methods

Nearly all of the discussions in this document based on secondary data on *Household Income and Expenditure Survey* (HIES) carried out by Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) on the distribution of income and consumption expenditure in Bangladesh. Data on income shares of different decile groups, Gini coefficients and GNP have been collected and edited from different publications of Statistical Yearbook, recognized journals, UNDP reports and its websites for writing this article. The analyses are based on data presented in tabular forms and graphical presentations to find the nature of growing income inequality in Bangladesh.

The Lorenz Curve is meticulously connected with measures of income inequality. To review and explain recent trends in income distribution in Bangladesh Decile groups and Gini Coefficient measures are used. The most common measure of income distribution is decile (Handcock and Morris 1999), the ratio of the segment of households in the baseline year to the part of households in the assessment year in every decile of the income distribution. Alternative indicator of the degree of inequality is the Gini Coefficient. It is the distinct number that can vary from zero (a perfectly equal distribution) and one (a perfectly unequal distribution).

The analysis of the relationship between growth and income distribution is one of the contemporary methods that have been obeyed to analysis the evolution of distribution. To

evaluate the long-standing correlation between inequality and growth in Bangladesh with a methodology of Kuznets pattern inverted U hypothesis (Kuznet 1955). This analysis has not only revived old issues such as the Kuznets' hypothesis, but has also contributed to recent discussions like the pattern of income distribution or inequality. The article also analyzed additional empirical evidence of the connection between income inequalities in developing countries.

3.0 Recent Trends of Income Distribution

Decile techniques, Gini Coefficient measures are used to explain recent trends in income distribution in Bangladesh. The commitment of this section of the report is to postulate an overview of how the distribution of income in Bangladesh changed between 2000 and 2010. Income distribution has assessed with the change of time by households, residential areas, occupational groups and religious groups using the most recent and appropriate data from Household Income and Expenditure Survey Report-2005, 2010 (BBS 2008 and 2012).

3.1 Income Distribution by Households

Deciles Distribution: Figure-1 below offers the graphical exposition of the decile distribution of household income for the years 2000, 2005 and 2010 at national level. It is apparent from Table-1 that the gap between the poorest (bottom 5%) and the richest (top 5%) is exceptionally extreme. For example, according to the HIES 2010 Report, the income was 24.61% of the top 5% households, while, the income for the bottom 5% household was only 0.78%. In 2005, income ensuing 26.93% for the top 5 percent of the households, it was 0.77% for the bottom 5%. It then marginally swelled from 0.77% to 0.78% in 2010. On the contrary, the portion of income of the top 5% declined from 26.93% to 24.61% over the constant period, demonstrating redistribution of income in support of the mid-level.

Table-1: Income distribution of households in Bangladesh (BBS, 2012)

Year	Income share of lower 10%	Income share of higher 10%	Income share ratio	Income share gap
2000	2.41	38.01	15.77	35.60
2005	2.00	37.64	18.82	35.64
2010	2.00	35.84	17.92	33.84

Table-1 clearly shows that income shared by the lower 10% population is only 2.41%, while the top 10% shared about 38.01% in 2000. It is actually a huge gap (35.60) between rich and poor. It was indeed a rapidly worsening situation in 2005, but the situation has improved in 2010. This is definitely a big uneven distribution of income in a society within only 10 years. In Figure-2 below, with the contrast of line of equality Lorenz Curves drawn for 2005 and 2010 of household income distribution. Here, the shown household income distribution was higher up to the decil-7 from decil-1 and lower from decil-8 to decil-10 in 2010 compared to 2005. The income distribution changed its pattern and moved for increase income of poorer.

Figure-2: Income Lorenz curve for 2005 and 2010 [Prepared by authors based on BBS data]

Gini Coefficient: Figure-3 itemized the Gini indices for Bangladesh from 1974 to 2010 on trends of income distribution, but only considered figures from 2000 to 2010 for analysis. The Gini Coefficient of income decreased to 0.458 in 2010 from 0.467 in 2005 and slightly increased from 0.451 in 2000 (Table-2). But, the national figure was always upward direction starts from 0.36 in 1972. This decline of the Gini Coefficient endures the substantiation that, income portion of upper class declined in 2010 in relation to 2005. In rural areas, the Gini Coefficient has increased while decreasing in urban areas. The income inequality was wider in rural areas and slighter in urban area that indicated income differentials between the rich and poor classes widen more in rural areas than urban ones. Haque (2007) figured out the upward trend just after independence that starts from 0.35 and 0.37 in rural and urban areas in 1974.

Figure-3: Gini indices for Bangladesh: 1974-2010 [Prepared by authors based on Osmani and Sen, 2011]

Table-2: Income distribution of households by Gini-coefficient (BBS, 2012)

Year	National	Rural	Urban
2000	0.451	0.393	0.497
2005	0.467	0.428	0.497
2010	0.458	0.431	0.452
Changes in Gini index	Mixed	Increased	Decreased

3.2 Income Distribution by Resident Areas

Table-3 below shows the national level of income was higher in rural but lower in urban areas. This figure was Tk.11479 for national while Tk.9648 and Tk.16477 for rural and urban, respectively in 2010. Year-wise monthly household income was mounted in all cases like national, rural and urban residence. This was Tk.7203 and Tk.5842 in 2005 and 2000 respectively. At the national level, the monthly household income increased by 9.65% per year. In case of rural areas, it was 10.03% (faintly higher than national) and in urban residence it was 6.68% (fairly slighter than national) in the year of 2010 compared to 2000. Table-4 illustrates the trends of rural and urban household income. It is shown the analogous changing pattern of decile distribution of income for decil-1 but it was shown dissimilar trends in case of rural and urban residence. In addition, there were similar pattern of income distribution of lower 5% and higher 5% households for both the rural and urban residents.

Table-3: Monthly household nominal income by residence (BBS, 2008 2012)

Residence	Year-wise monthly household income			% Changes per year
	2000	*2005*	*2010*	
National	5842	7203	11479	*+ 9.65%*
Rural	4816	6096	9648	+ 10.03%
Urban	9878	10463	16477	+ 6.68%

Table-4: Trends in income of rural/urban households by deciles (BBS, 2008 2012)

Deciles	Rural			Urban		
	2000	*2010*	*Trends*	*2000*	*2010*	*Trends*
Decil-1	2.80	2.00	Decreasing	2.02	0.98	Decreasing
Decil-2	4.31	3.53	Decreasing	3.07	3.09	Increasing
Decil-3	5.25	4.49	Decreasing	3.84	3.95	Increasing
Decil-4	5.95	5.43	Decreasing	4.68	5.01	Increasing
Decil-5	6.84	6.43	Decreasing	5.60	6.31	Increasing
Decil-6	7.88	7.65	Decreasing	6.74	7.64	Increasing
Decil-7	9.09	9.31	Increasing	8.24	9.30	Increasing
Decil-8	10.97	11.50	Increasing	10.46	11.87	Increasing
Decil-9	14.09	15.54	Increasing	14.04	16.08	Increasing
Decil-10	32.81	33.89	Increasing	41.32	34.77	Decreasing

3.3 Income Distribution by Occupational Groups

Table-5 exhibits the proportion of income of households by key ranges of income with rural and urban breakdown. The portion of agriculture as a basis of income of the households at the national level augmented to 20.44% in 2010 from 20.00% in 2005.

Table-5: Income distribution by occupational groups from 2000 to 2010 [BBS, 2008 2012]

Area	Year	Agri.	Bus & Com.	Wages & Salary	House Serv.	Gifts & Rem.	Others
National	2010	20.44	19.16	35.55	7.27	13.62	3.93
	2005	20.00	23.10	31.30	6.70	9.80	8.70
	2000	18.00	25.90	29.40	7.80	10.90	8.00
Rural	2010	29.73	15.05	29.57	5.18	17.28	3.16
	2005	28.70	17.30	28.10	5.10	12.00	8.70
	2000	25.50	22.40	27.70	5.00	11.00	8.40
Urban	2010	5.56	25.75	45.14	10.63	7.75	5.15
	2005	5.80	33.10	36.90	9.50	5.90	8.70
	2000	3.70	32.40	32.60	13.10	10.60	7.50

As source of income, the share of agriculture was 29.73% and 5.56% in the rural and urban areas respectively in 2010. The segment of business and commerce remained 19.16% at national level; its portion was 15.05% for rural and 25.75% for urban areas. The maximum portion of household income resulted from specialized wages and salary was noted 35.55% at national level, 29.57% in rural areas and 45.14% in urban areas. The household income by gift and remittance groups is valued 10.62% at national level whereas 17.28% and 7.75% in rural and urban areas respectively in 2010. At the same time, the agriculture sector was a prominent sector of income in rural areas while professional wages and salaries were major portion of urban income.

In finale, poverty is the definite most critical socioeconomic policy challenge for Bangladesh. It has been stressed for a long time to diminish the prevalence of poverty and to progress the living standards of its millions of disadvantaged people. Bangladesh has made significant improvement in reducing poverty despite the vast progress made over the past two decades; the fact is a large number of households still live below the poverty line. On the whole, income inequality is a grave drawback in Bangladesh and retrogressive the trend in a justifiable manner will be a major encounter for the Seventh Five Year Plan. It appears subsistence of a situation of growth-inequality-poverty trade-off. The sources of the uprising inequality are linked with the irregular spread of economic and social opportunities, growing disparity between rural and urban areas besides between developed and underdeveloped expanses. Henceforth, these apprehensions need to be focused for adopting inclusive and participatory growth.

4.0 Relationship of Growth and Income Distribution
The connection amongst economic growth and income distribution of a nation has long been premeditated since Kuznets' (1955) groundbreaking work, which reveals that income difference rises in initial stage of development. Subsequently, mostly n the last span of years a vast number of revisions have been inscribed on the matter. Various works on the affiliation amid to income variation and economic growth has its root and the "Inverted-U" hypothesis. However, much evidence has been accrued against this hypothesis. Deininger and Squire (1996) found no validation of the inverted-U Kuznets curve, but rather a substantial affiliation within primary income disparity and ensuing economic growth

4.1 Theoretical Approaches
Economists recognize two-way connection between growth and income distribution: growth affects distribution and distribution affects growth. Both the lines of causation are discussed here. The empirical evidence starts by probing the conservative perception vis-à-vis the result of income variation on economic growth. Up until, predictable thought appealed that disparity is growth attractive. To depict the relationship between income difference and economic growth many economists took innumerable approaches. **Classical Approach** imitates the conventional view that triumphed till now. A higher assumed peripheral tendency to save among the richer than the meager infers that an advanced level of primary income difference will produce higher cumulative savings, capital accruals and lead to economic growth (Kaldor 1956). **Modern Approaches** reviews the mechanisms that have been anticipated in the current studies relating to advanced initial income disparity with minor

growth and contrary wise. Some routes in modern approach are - the influence of income variation on inspiring rent-seeking actions that diminish the security of property privileges (Benhabib and Russtichini 1991); social pressures and political volatility that upsurge uncertainty and dampen investment (Alesina and Perotti 1996); high disparity is expected to imitated in a comparatively meagre median, typical constituent who will pursue restructuring overtax policy that, in turn, will carry about additional falsifications in economy (Bertola 1993); and a more identical primary income dispersal suggests a better income share ensuing to the intermediate part that is expected to decrease productiveness and growth of population (Perotti, 1996). **Unified Model** gives the essence of classical approach that embraces at low income stages but not at advanced phases of development (Galor 2000).

4.2 Empirical Evidences
Although industrial strategies attempt to direct resource allocations in ways that exploit growth, income distribution actions seek to endorse greater equality. Factually, the development procedure has been considered by noticeable growths in inequality. The economic growth adjusts the grid of the economy and therefore may hypothetically distress the dispersion of income and wellbeing. But is there any regular form in that evolution? Does the early stage of inequality disturb the rate of economic growth in an efficient way? If so, would progressive restructuring strategies expected to rush or delay growth? The lessons from literature on these queries, and in this context, what scenario exists in Bangladesh and other developing countries are briefly abridged in next sub-sections.

The conventional knowledge advocates that inequality is growth attractive till now. The key cause of the presumption is the rich have a high tendency to exclude than the poor. The higher disparity would therefore consequence in more collective savings and investment and here after would prime to fast capital accrual and growth. Various numbers of previous experiential literature grounded on household micro-data support this conservative understanding on constructive association between inequality and individual savings (Houthakker 1961; Kelly and Williamson 1968). On the contrary, based on cross-country cumulative data, findings on the outcome of disparity on collective saving is more diverse. Cook (1995) found inequality has a positive effect by means of 49 less developed countries data. According to the empirical study by Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (2000) suggests that there is no decisive evidence that income inequality care for high aggregate savings by means of both cross-sectional data as well as panel data. In fact, most of the current experimental indication regarding the result of inequality on growth denies the conventional insight. Benabou (1996) studied for the effects of inequality, he concluded that primary disparity is undesirably linked up with long-run progress and the extent of the outcome is that a one standard deviation lessening in inequality increases the yearly progress rate of per capita by 0.5-0.8%. In contrast, Barro (1999) used a three-stage least squares estimator that indulgences the country-specific relations as random, and found that the inequality consequence on development is adverse in underprivileged countries.

4.3 Empirical Analysis: Bangladesh Perspective
In Bangladesh, what scenario has existed in the case of economic growth and inequality? Here, we discuss to answer the question to find out the relationship. The per capita regular

income was measured as Tk. 2553 in 2010 which was Tk. 1485 and Tk 1128 in 2005, 2000 respectively. The monthly income enlarged by Tk 1068 (71.92%) in 2010 related to 2005 and enlarged by Tk 1723 (207.59%) compared to 1995-96. It is noteworthy that in 2010, rural income increased at a greater rate than that of urban income (BBS, 2012). In 2010, rural income enlarged by 58.29%, while urban income has increased by 57.45%. This upsurge of income in both rural and urban is enhanced in the course of poverty reduction.

Figure-4: Relation per capita income and income inequality in Bangladesh [BBS, 2012]

The Figure-4 above has been plotted with the per capita (daily) income and income difference (Gini indices at 100). Here it shows both the trends were in upward direction that indicates a positive relation, but after a certain period in the year of 2010 the inequality appears to descend again. The results propose that income inequality has a substantial encouraging consequence on economic growth. It strengthens the Kuznets' theory that at initial stage of growth the discrimination of income rises and inequality declines again as compared with per capita growth. But, due to data constraints of post 2010, it is quite impractical to conclude about the relationship of growth and inequality and ultimately it necessitates further study in future.

4.4 Empirical Analysis: Developing Countries
Understanding the relationship between growth and income inequality is crucial since more income inequality is habitually instituted in less developed nations. If there is a vibrant knowledge about the connection between income disparity and the degree of economic growth, specific economic plans could be working in the less developed states in the suitable method to deal with inequality and boost economic growth.

Figure-5: Per capita income against inequality in developing countries [Source: UNDP, 1994]

Figure-5 shows the mixed type of relationship between per capita GNP growth and inequality in some selected countries. While the Kenya was shown the high per capita with high inequality, Sri Lanka shows high per capita with less inequality. Again, in the case of Costa Rica and Brazil is shown with positive figure both the per capita income as well as inequality. From above two cases: first case proved that varied relations between per capita income and inequality, while the second case proved as positive relationship.

Table-6: GDP and income inequality of developing countries: 2004-2011

Country	*Gross Domestic Products Growth by Year*									Income Inequality
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Avr.	
Bangladesh	6.1	6.3	6.5	6.3	6.0	6.0	5.9	6.4	**6.19**	**31.8**
Haiti	-3.5	1.8	2.2	3.3	0.8	2.9	-5.4	5.6	**0.96**	**59.2**
Nepal	4.7	3.5	3.4	3.4	6.1	4.4	4.6	3.5	**4.20**	**47.2**
Paraguay	4.1	2.9	4.3	6.8	5.8	-3.8	15	3.8	**4.86**	**57.8**
Bolivia	2.7	6.8	2.8	5.3	6.1	3.4	4.1	5.1	**4.54**	**60.1**
India	7.6	9.0	9.5	10	6.2	6.6	10.6	7.2	**8.34**	**32.5**
Indonesia	5.0	5.7	5.5	6.3	6.0	4.6	6.2	6.5	**5.73**	**34.3**
Pakistan	7.5	9	5.8	6.8	3.7	1.7	3.8	2.4	**5.09**	**30.6**
Sri Lanka	5.4	6.2	7.7	6.8	6.0	3.5	8.0	8.2	**6.48**	**33.2**
Egypt	4.1	4.5	6.8	7.1	7.2	4.7	5.1	1.8	**5.16**	**34.4**

In Table-6 above and Figure-6 (below) shows the GDP growth and income inequality of developing countries. The average GDP growth was higher (8.34%) in India, but it gave a poorer figure in income inequality, proving a mixed relationship. Similarly, in Haiti carried lowest average in GDP growth and second highest in income inequality that indicates negative relationship. In case of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka it shows the positive relationship with sensible income growth and modest income inequality. In cross-country studies, the underlying hypotheses are that as income grows, equal distribution may affect the growth. Therefore, the proper tests should be made on time-series data. From the data from 2000 to 2010 for Bangladesh, it supports the Kuznets curve that at an initial stage of growth the

inequality of income rises and inequality decreases again at 2010. But, further study is necessary to fully comprehend the composite connection between income disparity and economic growth.

Figure-6: Pattern of GDP growth and income inequality of developing countries

5.0 Conclusion

The paper considers the patterns of income distribution that have appeared in Bangladesh from 2000 to 2010. It also analyzed the relationship between growth and income distribution with special reference to developing countries. With the Gini indices, shares of income of the uppermost and lowermost deciles are also used to measure income inequalities and to show the patterns of income distribution in Bangladesh. It is revealed that Bangladesh has made noticeable economic growth, but income discrimination has augmented at a quick pace over time. It also examines the connection amongst economic growth and income disparities, using a new functional form that fits the data well. Most of the upshots recommend that inequality has a noteworthy positive impact on economic growth rather than the growth effect on distribution. According to Kuznets' hypothesis, in primary stage of economic development - the variation of income rises and it decreases again after certain stage of development. Although, it provides empirical indication that income inequality could have a positive effect on economic growth in less developed nations. The positive relationship is a contrary result to the current empirical results, but directs that more investigation is required to fully comprehend the composite relationship between income distribution and economic growth

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**Quest for Improving Performance and Quality of Bangladesh Civil Service:
Contemporary Practices and Recommendations**

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Abstract: Civil Service has a task to secure, support and improve the nation it serves. All over the world, each and every public and civil servant plays a vital role in fulfilling this task and so improving the lives of their corresponding citizens. Over the generations civil service has helped successive governments to overcome exclusive and complex challenges. Hence, performance and quality of civil service is very important. Improving performance quality of civil service is a public personnel management process by which the public organizations determine how effectively the employees are performing the job and improve performance to achieve the ultimate goals. Public sector organizations are playing an increasingly important role towards development of Bangladesh by providing a range of services. Bangladesh started promoting quality of civil service under the rubric of the 'Structural Adjustment' in the era of New Public Management. This paper attempts to analyze the present state and limitations of performance management and provide some suggestions to promote quality of civil service in order to improve the overall performance of the Government of Bangladesh.

1. Introduction

Performance management in civil service can increase management control over public work and results. It can also increase management ability of public agencies to identify public problems and necessities. Incorporating quality management tries to link objectives and functions of public personnel to overall objectives of government. Performance management in civil service can create a sense of contribution for the public personnel. It motivates them by rising sense of belongingness and ownership in order to accomplish objectives and standards of performance. It develops a clear understanding of management expectations about results. It supports by laws remedial action or disciplinary action according to a breach of public performance standards which are defined objectively and in a measurable way (Boyne 1999). In civil service, a centralized record of performance for each public personnel is developed and kept in the personnel agency office. Quality management in civil service provides a system where feedback can be given to public personnel on a more objective basis

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instead of management's subjective criterion. It provides objective criteria that personnel administration can use to make decisions regarding pay scale and promotion. Performance and quality of civil service in Bangladesh rests on a number of clearly defined and interrelated areas such as need assessment of civil servant, performance appraisal, training, development, career planning and management, promotion etc. of public personnel in government concerning their level of achieving goals. Service rules may be modified to incorporate innovation, creativity in the performance appraisal system. In addition, appropriate mechanisms have to be developed to provide the staff the feedback of the performance appraisal result. If possible, the Ministry of Public Administration may constitute an independent moderation board or any apex body for ranking the Annual Appraisal Report. The aim of this paper is to analyze and explore the contemporary practice of improving performance and quality management to civil service in Bangladesh. Qualitative research methodology has been applied. This paper has been written based on secondary materials i.e. related journals, books and reports. In this study, most of the data are qualitative in nature and the qualitative descriptive method has been applied for in depth analysis.

2. Literature Review

Quality management principles concentrate on the customer orientation in private sector organizations. In the public sector, TQM focuses not only the immediate customers of public services but also all citizens. Citizens are the ultimate determiner of the quality and quantity of public service. TQM also focuses on taxpayer's satisfaction on the delivery of public service. Improvement of quality desires continuous enhancement of input, output and process. To enhance the quality of public service, TQM highly focuses on personnel management instead of process management (Kalimullah et al 2014). The quality and effective delivery of public services depend much on the quality of civil servants. Quality concern for civil service considers both the personnel factors and system factors. Combining the social, political and economic factors, there is a critical system in public sector organizations. TQM emphasizes extrinsic motivation and individual rewards to improve the performance of civil servants. Depending on the nature of public service, indicator of quality varies (Kalimullah et al 2014).

Performance of public officials has enormous impact on government and ultimately the society. As a result ethical practices in administration have become crucial. A good number of literatures support that administrative ethics is crucial in public as well as political arenas and demand effective actions by governments. It has become more crucial in a globalized world, when states are under severe strains and the public sectors across the globe undergo changes responding to both to internal and external challenges. Administrative ethics is gaining importance in the discourse about governance today (Aucoin and Heintzman 2000). Some literatures highlighted that the principles of transparency, integrity, rule of law and accountability in administrations have around for quite some time but during three decades they have enjoyed resurgence. Public bureaucracy must be responsible, accountable and transparent for the working of a democratic polity. Armstrong (2008) notes that administrators have enormous authority in most societies as per their permanence, knowledge, organizational structure and nexus to political power. According to Lin and Lee (2011), public provider accountability entails the methods by using which a public agency or

public employees fulfills its responsibilities and responsibilities and the procedure via which that organization or the public professional is required to account for such moves.

Problems concerning neutrality and anonymity of public service, the question of merit in public service appointments, non-transparency in management of personnel functions, and public access to information, which are key components of effective public accountability are voiced in many developing nations like Bangladesh. Therefore, existence of the problems indicates that the question of administrative ethics cannot be avoided (Besterfield et al 2004). Necessary mechanisms may differ from society to society, as Haque (2012) explains that the procedure of administrative ethics in a democracy will be different from the processes in non-democratic forms of government. According to Hughes (2003), besides the formal procedures of accountability i.e. administrative, legislative and judicial, the informal accountability environment is also important. Thus aspects such as culture, education, the media, public relations consultants etc. will also have a significant impact on the actions of politicians and public officials in enhancing administrative ethics.

A good number of literatures emphasize that the approaches of enhancing performance are closely related to the approaches of ensuring accountability. According to Cardy (2003) various scholars have focused on basically two approaches of accountability i.e. accountability of conduct and conduct of accountability. The first approach looks at rationalization of errors or behavior of individuals to some other individuals or group. It is more psychological and socially oriented. The second approach on the other hand is more institutional in focus and tends to look at structures and procedures through which accountability is ensured (Beatty et al 1995). Most academicians agree that administrative ethics can be vertical- when public sector officials are reporting downward to the public; or it can be horizontal- when public sector officials report sideways to other officials and agencies. Ethical standards require accountability mechanisms for evaluating implementation. Talbot (2005) categorized accountability into administrative or organizational accountability, political accountability, legal accountability, professional accountability and moral accountability.

3. Annual Confidential Report (ACR)

Quality or performance appraisal is vitally important for properly judging the whole year's activity of an individual working in an organization. In the civil service of Bangladesh the prevailing performance quality appraisal system is known as the Annual Confidential Report (ACR). It has eight parts as follows-

Part I: Medical check- up report
Part II: Bio-data of the appraised
Part III & IV: Personal traits & task accomplishment
Part V: Pen picture
Part VI: Recommendation
Part VII: Countersigning
Part VIII: Role of the Ministry

A system of performance quality reports of the civil servants was introduced in 1834. By an order of the Governor-General in council on January 28, 1934, the system of promotion based on seniority was discouraged. In 1974, the prescribed form of ACR was printed in Bangladesh. It continued up to 1981. A new form called ACR Form 1 was appeared in 1982

with a provision for annual medical examination report. It was made in English. Provision of 'pen picture' was introduced in this form and it had to be signed by the officer reported upon. This form was printed again in 1982 and this time it was printed in Bangla which lasted till 1983. The form was slightly modified in 1986 with the exclusion of the provision for signature of the officer reported upon in the 'pen picture' portion. 'Overall assessment' element was introduced. The ACR form was finally modified in 1990 which is still in vogue. The controlling officers were asked to report on the junior officer in respect of his/her qualifications, conduct, knowledge etc. Initially this reporting system was open, but later on, it was made secret (Asiatic Society of Bangladesh 2008).

In part I, the medical report that has been made mandatory, does not clearly depict an officer's health condition. Little information may need to be incorporated there. In addition, there is no room to describe any type of bad disease that requires immediate attention. In part III and part IV, 25 parameters are set for performance measurement. These parameters have barely anything to do with measuring an officer's performance. In part V, the 'Pen Picture' can make the ACR writing officer subjective. However, there is no fixed guideline for writing pen picture. More often, ambiguous, exaggerated comments are made, and thus the very objective of the appraisal remains unfulfilled. Since the existing system is not based on perfect yardstick, most often supervisor's prejudices and biases come into play, which ultimately vitiates the whole purpose. All in all, it leaves so much to the wishes of the supervisor (KOICA et al 2009). The present ACR is given once a year. As a result, a tendency is seen among the officers to work really hard at the time of ACR. This often gives a wrong indication to the appraiser. Thus it can be done twice or thrice in a year so that an equal flow of work continues for the whole year. However, the existing ACR system may be revised and renamed as Annual Performance Report (APR).

4. Rewards for Performance in NBR (National Board of Revenue)

Reward is granted to- (a) an official/individual for successful detection of concealment of income and evasion of taxes by individuals, firms, associations, companies etc; (b) officials of tax department for their outstanding performance (extraordinary initiative and meritorious services) in collection of taxes and detection of tax evasion; (c) the officials/individuals for giving information related to seizure of smuggled goods, detection of evasion of customs duty and/or VAT etc. The Central Intelligence Cell (CIC) of NBR gets 25% of the total reward money which NBR allocates annually for all the departments working under it and the CIC distributes this amount among its officials as per the break-up time-to-time approved by the NBR. There are some rules such as- (1) the highest amount of cash reward to be given does not ordinarily exceed ones two years' salary in a single case; (2) maximum 40% of the aggregate of the value of goods and fine and penalty realized is rewarded; (3) maximum 50% of recoverable amount of VAT, Excise and penalty realized is rewarded etc. However, reward is confined to extraordinary performance in collection of taxes, detection of tax, customs duty and VAT evasion and anti-smuggling activities. It is not granted upon evaluation of overall performance and it is not related to overall activity of an official, team or unit. Compensation system does not have any link with the missions, visions and targets of NBR as a whole and its units in particular; rather it is rewarded for a particular accomplishment of a unit or a team. Although officials are rewarded for their outstanding performance, NBR does not have any system of punishment for officials who show poor performance. Performance based reward

gives some monetary benefits to the officials, but it is not at all linked with their promotion, posting and other related advantages (KOICA et al).

5. Incorporating Quality Management

The Total Quality Management (TQM) approach has been applied both in the industrial and service sector in Bangladesh. Recently TQM concept is being utilized in public sectors. In the public sector nation building departments like Education, Social Welfare, Agriculture, Local Government, Engineering, Police, Fisheries and Livestock, Forest, Health, Food, Disaster Management, Statistics, Family Planning, Ansar and Village Defense Party (VDP), BRDB (Bangladesh Rural Development Board) are implementing work improvement plans for ensuring expected quality of service delivery to the citizens. Examples of some of the projects in Tangail undertaken by different departments are (Tarik 2012)-

- Increasing of Land under HYV Mustard from 30% to 45% in Tangail Sadar (Department of Agricultural Extension)
- Ensuring Timely Attendance of Staff in the URDO Office of Tangail Sadar (Bangladesh Rural Development Board- BRDB)
- Reducing Society Registration Time of 6 Unions of Tangail Sadar (Department of Cooperatives)
- Enhancing Awareness of Primary School Students about Sanitation and Safe Water (Department of Public Health Engineering)
- Preparing Pregnant Mothers List in Gharinda Union of Tangail Sadar Ensuring Inclusion of at least 80% Pregnant Mother in the List by November 2012 (Department of Family Planning)
- Ensuring Formalin Free Fish in the Bottola Fish Market (Department of Fisheries)
- Optimization of Use of Medicine at Dharer Bari Union Health Sub Center of Tangail Sadar (Health Directorate).

6. Recommendations
6.1 Formation of Performance Standards

Formation of performance standards is very important. They must be specific and clear cut. Current parameters are so vague that the appraised can never be sure on what basis he/she would be evaluated. There must be a constructive engagement between the supervisor and the subordinate. They must sit together on periodic basis to set realistic goals. The culture of absolute loyalty must be somewhat relaxed. The appraised must be given opportunity to clarify his/her position if any goal remains unfulfilled. He/ She must not be reprimanded, nor be given poor marks unless it is found that the failure occurred out of the negligence or folly of the appraised. Performance must be measured on actual standards. Senior officers have a tendency to give officers who keep good relation with them, high marks. If measurement could be done strictly on the basis of performance, then it would have been better both for the organization and individual working there. The officer being reported upon must be given chance to correct his/her mistakes. Continuous failures, should however be severely dealt with. Finally, to ensure an efficient bureaucracy there is no alternative to evolving a pragmatic performance management system (KOICA et al 2009). It can only be done by making the appraisal system more realistic and time befitting.

6.2 Introducing Performance Based Evaluation System for Quality Improvement

For the purpose of evaluating the Government Officials, the Ministry of Public Administration has to introduce Performance Based Evaluation System (PBES) instead of existing Annual Confidential Report (ACR) system. Performance Based Evaluation System (PBES) is the momentous aspect of the civil service quality management system. The term PBES is also popularly known as Performance Assessment System or Performance Measurement System in many organizations. Performance appraisal is a periodic activity whereas civil service quality management system is a continuous process. Performance appraisals are a part of civil service quality management. It is clearly linked to training in that it identifies critical dimensions of enhancing employee quality. On the other hand, career development receives inputs from performance appraisal which in turn form the basis for training need assessment. Government must start thinking of introducing Performance Based Evaluation System (PBES) for all cadres' members of the proposed cluster of ministries. However, Bangladesh Bank has already successfully introduced the system. Performance Based Evaluation System (PBES) is a systematic process whereby a ministry/ division/ department/ agency may involve its officers both as individual and a member of group, to achieve the organizational vision, mission, strategic goals and objectives (Aminuzzaman 2013). The proposed model of PBES has mainly the following 6 steps-

> Step 1: Planning (Preparation of a Forward Job Plan);
> Step 2: Implementation Monitoring;
> Step 3: Objective Evaluation of Performance;
> Step 4: Ranking by an independent body;
> Step 5: Performance Improvement (for non-performers); and
> Step 6: Linking PBES to increment, promotion, award, reward, & sanction.

However, before introduction of the PBES, a great deal of awareness process should be undertaken by and a quick orientation programme for all stakeholders of the PBES should be organized.

6.3 To Promote Political Obligation

Performance will not succeed except it is strongly underpinned by authentic political obligation. This political pledge may be through speeches and statements, which requires demonstration through setting examples. Moreover, this commitment must be supported by allocating adequate resources for such actions. Thus, it is a precondition for success of other elements of the ethical system. Politicians may play two critical roles to promote administrative ethics in Bangladesh. Firstly, as politicians they have obligations to be accountable to voters for their political activities. Therefore, they are in a exclusive arrangement to claim that decisions should be clear and there should be effective and equitable delivery of public services. Secondly, as law makers they have powers to put into effect their necessities by asking government officials to describe what and how actions are taken and how they are being performed. Experience suggests that political obligation could also be established by an independent commission or a procedure to evaluate or examine any policy issue or public undertaking and/or make recommendations for new administrative ethics in Bangladesh.

6.4 To Strengthen Legal Structure

Legal structure is constructed by laws and regulations which set standards of behavior for government officials and implement those standards by detailed systems of analysis and

action. This legal framework acts as a control function of the ethics infrastructure framework and sets limits on public officials, behavior, by enforcing them in form of sanctions, and allowing public scrutiny (through access to information) and action through improvement of transparency of government operations. The behavior standards of public officials are to be set high, as they direct the authority and resources on behalf of the government or state. Consequently, legal framework dealing with truthfulness of public officials should clearly lay down legal obligations, expected standards and spell out consequences and punishments for failing those standards. Such frameworks could be set within the broad context of existing criminal and civil laws of the country and punishments are to be set in order to enforce administrative ethics and integrity within the public service. These could set within Public Service Acts and Code of Conduct, etc. of public sector officials in Bangladesh. These laws and standards have to be equitable, impartial and enforced effectively to enhance performance in Bangladesh Civil Service. The threat of sanctions will be only effective if they are sufficient, enforced and respected. Moreover, enforcement of administrative ethics require calculation of the motivations and discouragements to proscribed performance, which are then supported up by autonomous prosecution and investigation services of the state machinery. However, these services are required to be seen as being active to advance reliability in the public service and perceived to be so by the general public with reference to Bangladesh.

6.5 To Enhance Control Mechanisms
Control mechanisms act as strategies for directing the activity of government, by evaluating whether it has been directed in a proper manner, and for confirming achievement of results. Preferably, control instruments uphold moral behavior by creating corrupt activities in public sector difficult to perform and rather easy to perceive. Consequently, they direct public authorities in settling on ethical choices inside circumstances of contending duties and objectives. In fact, the possibility that public authorities are responsible to choose agents sets confines on their obligations and watchfulness. Nonetheless, this idea ought to not exclusively be advanced through obvious enactment and directions, yet in addition through authoritative approaches and methods or responsibility instruments, which control the everyday lead of open authorities. It needs to remembered at this point that in many countries, the public sector is being reformed by making public sector officials not only accountable to the legislature but also to the citizens and media as well. As a result, public officials are now are presently dependable for following the tenets as well as for accomplishing results and achieving them with inadequate resources. Under the circumstances, accountability mechanisms are important in describing to whom and for what public officials are answerable. Experience suggests that all these mechanisms work as protective measures, e.g. guidelines and practical procedures, in addition to performance connected evaluation mechanism controls e.g. in-house and outdoor audits and investigations, in-house and outdoor monitoring and reporting, and appeals processes. Thus, liability and control mechanisms play most important role in an ethics system through provision of a comprehensible administrative framework, upheld by examination and assessment limits required to enforce administrative ethics. To enhance such control mechanisms can be an effective strategy to improve performance in Bangladesh Civil Service.

6.6 To Maintain Codes of Conduct

In public administration, a set of accepted rules can be either an authoritative record or simply managerial articulation setting out the normal levels and nature of execution of people in general authorities. Sets of principles can apply to the whole ethical administration or can be particular to singular government offices or organizations in Bangladesh. A code generally outlines the ethical values applied to either the overall public service or to a particular department or agency. Such a set of principles may contain a mix of an announcement of its esteems, a depiction of its part in broad daylight benefit in public service, spell out responsibilities of public employees and in some cases it also specifies relationships of the public officials to the Constitution, people, government, elected officials and legislature with reference to Bangladesh. It may also contains a detailed list of a public servant's legal obligations, e.g. upholding interests of the public, declaring conflicts of interest in issues or decisions, putting certain restrictions in making open remarks, confinements on political exercises, etc. Additionally, it could likewise incorporate such different arrangements as systems for whistle-blowing (willful disclosure of information by a member of that organization on unethical or illegal practices or decisions in the organization); or minimum performance standards in public service delivery. Although codes of conduct generally play a guiding role, they also act as control function as they set up and delimit public boundaries of behavior and set up standards (Government of Bangladesh 2008). Experience suggests that most codes by and large have double disciplinary and optimistic functions as they tend to set down boundaries, based on inspirational values or goals, and spell out which sanctions may be imposed for breaching them. Nowadays however, a number of questions are raised about codes, which include codes being excessively particular or excessively broad, unworkable, unused, obscure, inaccessible, and those generally shortsighted explanations of guidelines are not the perfect medium for noting convoluted moral inquiries confronted by public officials.

6.7 To Enhance Professionalism

Professionalism means the procedure by which government officials become skilled at and instill ethos, qualities, morals and guidelines of conduct in a society. It adds to morals foundation by imparting gauges of lead and creating judgment and abilities of public authorities to fit in with those standards. It has a guiding role as it tends to show public officials how to apply practically existing legislation and how to conform administrative ethics. Experience suggests that important socialization components are education and training programmes, in addition to continuation of good role models at higher levels. To enhance professionalism in public sector can be an effective strategy to improve administrative ethics and ethical standards in Bangladesh. Pay and security issues also matter in ensuring ethics, but it cannot always be proved that better pay will lead to decrease of corruption in public sector of Bangladesh. Parliamentary committees can be mandated to oversee the ethical behavior of public officials. To activate parliamentary committees can be an effective strategy to improve performance in Bangladesh Civil Service.

7. Conclusion

Public service conditions in Bangladesh, especially personnel policies, non-transparent career path, lack of scope for recognition and punishment directly influence performance and accountability of public officers. The operational independence of the three branches of the government from each other might be favorable for maintaining performance in Bangladesh

Civil Service. This autonomy also creates an environment for a system of checks and balances, and fosters restraint against excesses or dominance by any single branch or office or service and reduces the chances of unethical activities and helps to ensure accountability. These checks and balances must be implemented without any bias and on a regular basis. Performance committee, comprised of a group of prudent people, can go a long way in resolving most important questions connecting ethical and accountability issues going up against association individuals over the span of their work. Respective officials of the committee can proactively implement or enforce the organization's code of ethical conduct. Whistle Blowing can also include diverse provisions and procedures to maintain a reasonable and desirable disclosure of official wrongdoing. It is a means to promote performance by encouraging the disclosure of information by people within the organization about misconduct and corruption in that organization. Information can be disclosed to any person within the same organization, a co-worker, a supervisor or even to the press, or a special body of investigation. For enhancing performance in Bangladesh Civil Service, the scope for whistle blowing should be created within public sector organizations and the protection of the whistle-blowers should be guaranteed. In this context, measures of guaranteeing employment; protection of confidentiality of the whistle blower; ensuring physical safety of relevant persons, and lastly provision for financial rewards for the act must be created. This will encourage a healthy environment for enforcement of ethical standards and lead to internal checks and balances. There are oversight agencies which watch the mainstream agencies of government in specific areas of concern. Public service with integrity cannot exist without high integrity public officers. At the same time without organizational support systems and ethical boundaries and frameworks, good personnel can be unable to find their bearings when faced with pressures, temptations, and heightened performance expectations.

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Relations of Computer Mediated Communications and Escalation of Organizational Conflict

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Abstract: *The commercial revolution in Technology has reconfigured communication modes into computer mediated communications (CMC). Research studies have been discussing the positive aspects of computer mediated communications socially. However, few studies have discussed the 'dark side' in the commercial revolution of technology. As a result of this gap identification, the aim of this study is to see the relationship of CMC with special focus on the emails, chat, groups and Instant text messages with escalation of conflict within the organizations specifically in context of a developing country where historically, the CMC is an emerging field and talk of this decade. This study is experimental in nature and finds positive relationship between escalation of organizational conflict and CMC. Results also show that likeness or dis-likeness, personality dimensions, moods, situation and time of receiving the messages through CMCs also has an impact on escalation of conflict in Organizations*

Introduction

Communication is relentless among human activities. Organizations place considerable time and effort on the communication strategy and techniques within and outside the organizations. One of the core values of Information Systems (IS) is the utilization of technologies to facilitate communication in the workplace (Quan-Haase et al. 2005). Accordingly, various computer-mediated-communication (CMC) technologies have been proposed and designed to enhance performance through improvements in communication. Romiszowki (1997) coined the term CMC and stated it as "as any form of organized interaction between people, utilizing computers or the computer network as mediums of communication". Genedron (2011) elaborates electronic communication as "any non-face to-face communication including but not limited to telephone conversations, email, instant text messages through mobile, web-based applications, and video or voice calls. Ou, C.X.J. *et al* (2013) in their study tested three CMC modes that were IM, email and social network at forum/groups. They found that email & instant messages used at workplace to communicate with each other have significant impact at work, while on other hand forum/groups at social media have insignificant relations, and the reason they identified is that social network focus on one to one relationship instead mass communication. They identified that social media provides forum to articulate their thoughts, emotions, feelings, rumors and unauthenticated information, publicly as a results conflict generate more frequently compared to old communication medias.

Hence, the continuous development and growth in CMCs have filled the communication gaps and provided the fastest modes to communicate with each other. As a result during literature

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searches, this study finds that the most of the research studies have been discussing the positive aspect of computer based communication such as fastest mode of communication, inexpensive, facilitating global perspective, social networking etc. Conversely, sparse studies have discussed negative aspects of this mode of communication such as a source of escalation of conflict. As a result of this gap identification, the aim of this study is to see the relationship of CMC with special focus on the emails, chat, groups and instant text messages with escalation of conflict within organizations.

In order to meet the above stated aim, this paper is organized in such a way that first section will discuss the introduction followed by literature and research studies about organizational conflict and relationship of organizational conflict and emails, chats and groups. Third section will discuss the research methodology followed by the results, conclusion and recommendations.

Conflict Escalation and Computer Mediated Communications

Organizational conflict has been a central field of analysis for conflict research (Edward 1999). Unlike conflict, the term organizational conflict has been not been given much attention and discussion in the literature. Hence, few researchers have defined this concept. It has been defined as "a state of discord caused by the actual or perceived opposition of needs, values and interests between people working together". Coser (1956) defines conflict as "a struggle over values and claims to the scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals."

Mukhtar (2011) states that "conflict has been seen as a destructive force and harmful that keeps an organization from being optimally productive, despite this phenomenon is uncontrollable and occasionally it has been viewed as most frequent. Rahim (2001) highlights the contribution of classical organization theorists (e.g., Fayol, 1949; Gulick and Urwick, 1937; Taylor, 1911; Weber, 1947) and identifies that these theorist did not seem to appreciate different impacts that conflicts have on the organization.

Pruitt.et al. (1997) in their experimental study found that "the participants in a simulation with associated stored supplies initially started request for the materials. When that did not work, they moved to demands and then complaints and angry statements. A few participants then moved to threats and harassment and so on. Thus, Pruitt et al. (1997) conclude their study that if a dispute continues and not addressed properly then more quarrelsome tactics may be used which escalates conflict. Plunkett and Raymond (1989) identify that the poor communication has been found a major escalators of conflict". Gray and Strake (1984) also identifies Communication as among the major escalator. Later on, Rahim (2001) classifies conflict in detail into five basic classes. He added different sources under each head, amongst them he identifies communication as major source of organizational conflict, Alabi (1999) in his study identifies communication gap as major escalator of conflict. Mukhtar (2011) in her dissertation identifies significant negative relationship between organizational conflict and lack of communication. An informal survey identifies that the lack of facial cues from both the sender and receiver. Ou, C.X.J. et al., (2013) in their study state that "conflict initially

escalates if a change of perceptions occurs, and the counterpart becomes disliked, then more aggressive behavior is likely to occur for several reasons".

Marti Olsen (2002) states that personality dimensions also help escalate the conflict .For example, some people who are usually extroverts trigger the sparks, on other hand introverts are conflict-hostile. They'll do anything rather than face a fight". Olsen. L.,(2002) also state that in face to face communication , some conflict negotiated strategy may be adopted but in CMCs it is not possible so chances of conflict escalation are higher through CMCs than face to face communication especially Chats, emails and Social media. In face to face communications mostly issues may be discussed directly but in CMCs, it's impossible rather cannot judge the moods or situation for example, if a person is depressed and receive email or texts then his /her response may be different compared to he/she may be communicated in relax mode. Friedman and Currall (2003) presented the "dispute-exacerbating model of e-mail (DEME) in which they argued there are four differences in the method of communication through email that can increase the likelihood of a conflict escalating that are length of email, content of message, minimal social cues and mood or time to send". Based on Friedman and Currall (2003) the propositions of this study are:

Proposition 1: Mode of communication has direct relation with escalation of conflict

Proposition 2: Content or understanding of message& length of message also escalates conflict

Proposition 3: Minimal social cues has direct relation with escalation of organizational conflict

Proposition 4: Mood or Timing of sending message also may escalate conflict in the organizations

Research Methodology
Experimental study has been conducted to identify that email and social groups or forum as CMC have relations with conflict escalation.

Data Collection and Demographic Profile
 This study conducted experiments on two groups in an engineering company in Lahore, Pakistan. The groups were (1) comprised of 20 employees of different departments; (2) unknown about the observation on them; (3) Duration of experiment was two and half months. In this period groups were indulged in different situations and then their behavior and electronic responses (e.g., emails, chats, posts and group discussion on social media) were observed. The demographic profile   of this study shows   that about 20% of the respondents were female and 80% were Male. All had their graduate level degrees i.e., Master level. Age-wise data depict that 50% of the sample lies in 25-35 years, 40% between 35-45 years and 10 % above 45 years.

Data Analysis and Discussion
First of all, it was tried to identify the modes of CMC that are linked directly to escalation of Conflict. Two modes are most common with advent of technological advancements in Asian Context that are SMS and Email. Two groups were indulged to test the relation of computer mediated communications with escalation of conflict. Two mode of communication were used in this situation. We analyzed which mode is most related to escalation of conflict:

1. Internet (Emails and social media messages)
2. Text messages

Emails were sent to both groups separately about Project completion. Same wording was used for both in Message I, however different contents were used for both group. In second message through email, Group I received clear contents and Group II received unclear contents. Messages were sent using social media to both groups. In response to messages sent through emails , About 40% of Members of Group I interpreted the message differently , 40% understood partial message of their own interest and ignored the others, 20% of the members understood the message correctly. Similarly about 60% of the members of the Group II interpreted message relevant to their own interest and 40% did not took any initiative and ignore the message.

Conversely, messages sent through social media were observed to escalate the conflict. Members of both groups reacted on the messages sent to them, started discussions unofficially as a result conflict escalates between the group members and as well with administration. Thus this result is in line with earlier study of Ou, C.X.J. et al (2013) that showed social media escalates the conflict more frequently than the other source of messaging Two groups were indulged in 4 different situations to test the above stated propositions to analyze the relations of computer mediated communications with escalation of conflict; these situations are discussed below:

Situation I (related to Proposition 1): Purpose of this situation was to analyze whether lengthy of communication mode has direct relation with the organizational conflict. Two groups were assigned tasks related to work. Duration of task to be completed assigned was 4 days. Mode of communication we preferably used emails and groups.
In light of Proposition 1 Following were situations have been observed:
> Day 1: An email consisting of 30-50 words were sent to both group and same tried to send through SMS on the mobiles
> Day 2: Task were assigned through short messages
> Day 3: A very long email of 1000 words sent to both groups

**Group Response & Situation Analysis:**
Both groups responded positively through SMS, while Group members in first group responded quickly through email. The reason we observed was that Group I had more technology equipped persons with availability of internet connection all time while Group II members had less access to internet so understandings about the content vary among the group. Short messages sent on Day 1 were well understood. However, percentage rate of understanding the lengthy email (DAY 3) was 50 % among the Group I and Group II each respectively. We observed that both group members read the message again and again to find the main points or task assigned. Some irrelevant discussion in the email and SMS raised questions among the group and they started online conversations resulted escalation of conflict among both groups. Direction of escalation of conflict was towards the manager who sent this message and later it was observed that direction of escalation of conflict was horizontal among the group members and they start blaming each other. Table 1 and Figure 1

below shows that larger the length of emails or text, higher is the probability of escalation of conflict:

Table 1: Mode of Communication and Escalation of Conflict

Days	Situation	Reaction	Conflict Escalation %
1	Email consisting of 30-50 words were sent to both group	Positive	Moderate with 40% probability
2	Task were assigned through short messages (SMS)	Positive	Minimum with 20% probability
3	long email of 1000 words sent to Group 1&2	Negative	Maximum with 75% probability

Figure 1: Mode of Communication and escalation of Conflict

So this study in light of Proposition 1 analyzed that mode of communication and the way it is used has direct relationship with organizational conflict.

Group Response and Situation Analysis: (Proposition 2) Content or understanding of message also escalates conflict. To analyze this proposition 2, messages were sent using CMC modes to both groups.
1. Short content messages of 30-40 words length were sent using CMC
2. Short content messages of 40-50 words length were sent using CMC
3. Long content messages consisted of 50-100 words were sent using CMC
4. Long content messages 100-200 words were sent using CMC
5. Long content messages of 200- 500 words were sent using CMC
6. Extra-long content messages of 500 to unlimited length were sent using CMC

It was observed that each group member responded against the above stated six messages. About 75% members were unclear about the content of messages of 30-40 words of length and what the sender wanted to say in the message. The   content of short messages of 40-50

words length was understood by about 50% of the members of the group. Long message with 100-200 was quite clear to the members of the group. Approximately 76% were observed to understand the message. On the other hand, long messages with 200-500 and unlimited words were again misunderstood and provoked the conflict among the members. Following Table 2 and Figure 2 depict that larger the content and length of CMCs, larger is the chance of escalation of conflict among the organization members:

Table 2: Level of Understanding and Escalation of Conflict

Words	Level of Misunderstanding and escalation of Conflict
20-40 Words	20%
50-100 Words	40%
100-200 Words	80%
200-500 Words	100%
500-1000 Words	100%

Hence we identified in this situation that length and content are interrelated , increase in length of the messages through CMC are misunderstood and people don't focus on the actual context of message resulting escalation of the conflict in the organizations


Figure 2: Level of Understanding and Escalation of Conflict

Situation III: Minimal social cues have direct relations with escalation of organizational conflict. To analyze this situation this study sent multiple messages with social cues and without social cue. About 50% messages were sent without social cues and 50% with social cues.

Situation Analysis:

We observed that social cue play important role in escalation/de-escalation of conflict.The hard messages with social cues did not escalate any conflict among the members; conversely, soft messages without social cue even escalate the conflict.

Table 3: Use of Social Cues and Escalation of Conflict

| Messages	Escalation of conflict
with social clues	30%
without social clues	85%

Figure 3: Use of Social Cues and Escalation of Conflict

Situation IV: Mood and Timings of sending message also may escalate conflict in the organizations. To analyze the situation, Messages through email were sent in morning, afternoon, evening and night, similarly social media was used to send messages in same timings.

Situation Analysis:

In this situation it was observed that email messages created less conflict and did not indicate the mood while messages sent on social media escalated the conflict more frequently .This study finds after situation analysis that social media messages have been geared up by the mood, understanding and interpretation of the messages. The messages sent at busy hours and at night resulted in responses in bad mood while relaxed hours and mood escalate less conflict. In depth analysis indicated that about 70% messages sent through email didn't escalate the conflict while 40% messages sent in morning through social media didn't escalate conflict, 55% sent in afternoon escalate the conflict among members and administration. While 70% messages in night escalated the conflict among the group members.

Table 4 (a): Mood and Escalation of Conflict

Moods	Escalation of Conflict
Bad	100%
Relaxed	10%

Following Figure 4(a) depict that relaxed the mood of sender and receiver, less is the escalation of conflicts.

Figure 4(a): Moods and Escalation of Conflict

Following Table 4 (b) and Figure 4(b) clearly depict that Timing of sending the message also has direct relationship with escalation of conflict among the members of the organization.

Table 4 (b): Timing of CMC and Escalation of Conflict

Timing of CMC	Escalation of Conflict
Busy Hours	100%
Nights	10%
Relaxed	2%

Following Figure 4(b) depict the interesting facts that messages related to task in night after working hours generate more conflicts.

Escalation of Conflict

Figure 4(b): Timing of CMC and Escalation of Conflict

Hence, based on the above created situations and their analysis this study finds many interesting results. This study finds that emails, SMS, chats and discussion on groups are the fastest mode of communication but also fastest mode of escalation of conflict due to misinterpretation of the messages, self-translated messages and meanings compared to face to face communication, meetings and talks. In addition, likeness and dis-likeness about some person also because CMC escalation of the conflict; however likes and dislikes is our next future discussion topic. It was also observed in all above stated situation that CMC escalated conflict also has an impact on the task completion and performance of the employees. Absence of social cue, nature of mood and timing of sending message has direct link with escalation and de-escalation of conflict in CMC. Thus, we find that computer mediated technologies escalates conflict faster than face to face communication techniques and there is positive relationship between escalation of conflict and CMCs.

Conclusion

This study conducts experiments in an engineering company and floats messages through emails, chats and group discussions to observe the frequency of conflict escalation. This Study finds positive relationship between escalation of organizational conflict and computer mediated communication techniques compared to face to face communication methods. This study also finds that CMC is the fastest mode of communication but people see and perceive messages differently, length of messages has been observed to be related to conflict escalation   Also this study find moods, situation and time of receiving the messages through CMCs also escalate conflict. Further, among the CMCs we find email as official mode compared to other emerged social media mode of communications. This study recommends that CMC is an effective and fastest mode but at organizational and administrative level, other communication mode is better like calling, talking, meetings etc. Hence, this study may help organizations in defining the communication mode effectively within and outside the organizations. Also this study recommends the limited use of CMCs within organization to be more professional rather than personal to de-escalate the conflicts generated through CMCs in the organizations, else training must be conducted.

Limitations of the Study

However, this study has some limitations that are : (1) study is experimental in nature, we analyzed situations , results may vary in surveys and CMC screenings methods of research ; and (2) Mare literature has been found to back up our study , most of the researchers take it as positive but we find it hard to build up any relevant theory of CMC and escalation of conflict (3) This study didn't consider the cultural influences/diversity, cultural settings of this study was south Asian , results may be more diversified in the technology Advanced countries.   (3) Attention has been given on literature deliberately discussing the relationship between CMCs and escalation of conflict rather discussing the CMCs in detail in Section two of this study.

Future Work

This study has formulated propositions based on experimental nature of the study, these propositions later may be tested through other research methods like field survey etc. However, during the situation analysis, possibilities of many interesting future work arise, for example likeness of person and escalation of conflict and time series study.

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Caste-Continuity and Change in a Rural Community of Bangladesh

Dr. Abu Ibrahim Mohd. Nurul Huda.[6]

Rubina Huda[7]

Abstract: *Caste as a social and religious system has been undergoing changes over time. As we know caste is nothing but a mental situation of 'Purity and Pollution' which exhibit through different behavioral patterns of the people who have ascribed their status of socio-religious distinction. If we observe their behavioral patterns with intensity and apprehend the mental state behind those patterns, we find that the system still exists in a perishable manner. As ethnography, this study intends to explore the situational context of caste system in a Bangladesh village where both Hindus (Sanatana religion) and Muslims live together in separate residential areas. The study has designed to achieve some objectives through participated observation method in a village which is situated in Badarganj sub-district of Rangpur district. The both authors stayed in the village for fourteen months with two recesses. It was found that the present situation of caste system in the village has changed with the changes of the notions and attitude; the concept of untouchability has gradually weakened, but this can be the prediction that so long Hinduism persists, the concept of untouchability will endure. But, in general, the concept has been confined to the kitchen, and women have been the custodians of the concept. Regarding the changing pattern, we can say that caste, which was prevailing in a rigid form, is turning less rigid, and more flexible and adaptive in nature. It never was open, and never will be open like the class system.*

Introduction

This article, as a part of an ethnography on 'class' and 'caste', in a rural community of Bangladesh, has taken the initiative to share and comprehend the traditional 'caste' system, and to observe the existing changing process of the system in our society. Caste is an ethnic system of this sub-continent which divides the whole Hindu society into different number of hereditary groups; these groups are distinguished from one another and connected together by different characteristics. The system is governed by the twin principles of division and hierarchy. The principles of division refer the notion of 'purity and pollution', which have placed the groups into different stratus. About the system the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences expresses, "The term "caste" has been widely used to describe ranked groups within rigid systems of social stratification and especially those which constitute the society of Hindu India" (Gerald, 1968: 333). Sarkar, a social scientist admits that "Caste in its traditional form was essentially an occupational system, as each caste or *jati* had a hereditary occupation assigned to it by religious sanctions. Since this occupation indicated the position of a caste in the ritual hierarchy and caste membership depended on birth the occupational

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status of a caste was considered to be inviolable and immutable" (Sarkar, 1994: 65). But we have observed that the traditional caste system have reached at its crossroads in course of time and has gone through several changes in the subcontinent. Simultaneously Bangladesh has experienced the same changing process of the system due to different factors, like industrialization, urbanization, westernization, *sanskritization,* education, occupations, abolition of *zamindari* system, reform in land ownership pattern, etc. Modern capitalism and western culture have influenced the process too. Besides, expansion of national politics, adult franchise, decentralization of power, personal freedom, freedom of speech, modern system of communication and transportation, commercial linkage, national and international migration, social mobility, change and reform in some lawful rights, change in hereditary occupation, electrification, giving up superstitions, role of NGOs, expansion of women educational and occupational facilities are bringing about changes in the caste system as well as in our social structure and reducing the gap between the rigid hereditary groups.

The study has observed the existence of caste system among the Hindus of the study village, Rajapur. In this village the Hindus broadly divide themselves into three distinct groups namely, the Upper Caste Hindus, the Lower Caste Hindus and the Vaishnavas. They include the Brahmans, the Kayasthas (so called Kshattriyas), and the Kaibarttas in the Upper Caste group and the Untouchables (the Chamars) in the Lower Caste group. To them the Vaishnavas are Hindus, but out of Hindu caste structure. The Vaishnavas consider themselves as a distinct religious group. They are Hindus by religion but no more the members of Hindu traditional strata. Though the rigidity of Hindu caste system is gradually reducing, nevertheless, caste hierarchy is still a reality among the Hindus of Rajapur. But pragmatically the range of this notion is becoming narrower. Though the Brahmans are at the top of caste hierarchy but we observe that they are at the bottom of class hierarchy in Rajapur. From the economic perspective they are being dominated by the wealthy Kayastha caste. One can see the presence of religious rituals relating to clothes and behavior among some of the older generation. But among the young generation the notion of purity and pollution is not present as it was in the past. Nevertheless exogamy is still prohibited. Exogamy and widow marriage attribute pollution in the context of Rajapur. We have observed that within the same caste group the Hindus residing in different *para*s are communicating and establishing relationships among themselves, but Hindus residing in each *para* have their distinct *dosh* (social de-jure group).

Objectives and Methodology of the Study

The major objective of this anthropological study is to determine the existing nature of this socio-religious hierarchy of caste in the remote villages of Bangladesh. Social stratification on the basis of caste system, which was once the dominating criteria, has gone through changes. Rigidity of caste and the notions of 'purity' and 'pollution' are declining day by day. This study has endeavored to sketch out ethnography of a village with a focus on its social inequality, social cleavages, and the changing process of the stratification. The purview of the study is three dimensional stratification system of our rural communities, namely 'class'; 'caste'; and 'power'. But as this article focuses only on the caste system and its

changing process, so here the objectives have been identified as well. Following are the specific objectives of the study:

- to grasp the existing caste situations in Rajapur;
- to determine the dominant group and their sources of power;
- to understand the relations between inter-caste intra-caste;
- to apprehend the changing process of the caste system in the study village
- to observe the situation of women regarding the caste system
- to identify the class situation within the caste situation.

This ethnography has followed the method of participant-observation. Direct participation and observation is the most important method for such a study. Though there are some limitations of this method; the native anthropologist faces some sorts of advantages and disadvantages while he studies his own society. However, indigenous knowledge system has been appreciated in spite of its disadvantages by most of the anthropologists to make an intensive study on any particular community at a time.

The authors have lived in the village, Rajapur, for more than a year. Basically the researchers have been encouraged by some ethnography of some foreign couple ethnographers written on rural Bangladesh perspective. Massive visits with friendly and cordial behavior have made them acceptable to the villagers, though not in equal proportion. However, key informants both male and female have been selected from the target people. The whole village people were the research universe. The research was conducted in three phases. The researchers stayed a period of twelve months in the village, which have been divided into three distinct phases consisting of four months each. During the recess, (within the phases) up to fifteen days each time, they have stayed at Dhaka and Rangpur for secondary sources. After twelve or fourteen months in the field, the law of diminishing returns is apt to set in. For secondary source of information libraries of home and abroad (West Bengal Central Library, Kolkata) were utilized as secondary source for analytical information and went through topic-related books, magazines and journals. Renowned scholars[8] have also shared their views with the researchers regarding the subject matter of this study. Techniques, which have been followed in this study, are: Observation and participant observation; Census; Informal interview or discussion; Genealogical method; Case Study; Key informants Interview; Audio recording and photography; Mapping; Analysis of linguistic variation; Using manuscript; Using dairies and notes; Group discussion, etc.

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[8]Renowned sociologists and institutions like Abhijit Dasgupta (Delhi); Syed Hashmi (Dhaka); Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR); Social Science Research Council, Bangladesh (SSRC,B); Program for Research on Poverty Alleviation (PRPA), Grameen Trust have extended their hands of cooperation for me for fruitful success of this study.

Review of Relevant Literature and Theoretical Perspective

All the studies reviewed here are of two categories, one is up to 1970 and the other one is after 1970. All these studies have followed participant observation method along with others to grasp the objectives of their investigation. Though most of these studies have not studied the caste system-its continuity and change, but have been reviewed here due to their pattern of anthropological studies. Basically, there are no studies on recent caste system and its segmentation. This is obviously a major limitation for generalizing any theories on caste system-its continuity and change on Bangladesh chapter nowadays.

Six Villages of Bengal of Ramkrishna Mukherjee (1971) is the foremost among the rural studies of Bangladesh. Socio-economic aspects of rural lives from six villages in the district of Bogura have been depicted in this book. In between 1942 and 1945, Ramkrishna Mukherjee stayed thrice, totaling five man-months in these villages, conducting survey and in-depth observation along with his assistants. Mukherjee clearly identified the Hindu villagers in accordance with their castes and sects; not only that, he also made a relation between caste and politics. Mukherjee analyzed the role of caste system played in social segregation, which divides people into homogeneous units of similar economic status. He rationalized this decision with the theory that the economic stratification in society is related to the caste division and communality. He divided the Hindu community residing in those villages into 'higher caste' consisting of *Brahmin*s, and *Kayastha*s with their half castes, and 'middle caste' consisting of other caste Hindus. Like this social division, he dichotomized the Muslims into 'general Muslims' and '*khulu* Muslims,' as if these are two different castes. He discussed the members belonging to different castes and social groups along with their social customs and practices.

Nazmul Karim's book '*Changing Society in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh*' (1956) is a theoretical analysis dealing with general characteristics of social stratification and its changes in the then Indo-Pak sub-continent. Karim was dependent on secondary sources for writing this book. He opined that as an integral part of greater Indian society, the base of Bangladesh society was self-sufficient rural economy. The prospective transformation of feudalistic mode of production into bourgeoistic system during the Muslim rule in India had been nipped in the bud by the latter British rule.

Peter J. Bertocci (1970), in his *Elusive Village* described the findings of his research, which was conducted in two villages in Comilla district. He combined the socio-structural insights of Karl Marx and Max Weber with some concepts and techniques of anthropology. He depicted Bangladeshi village and its social life by analyzing the social structure and community life by using anthropological method. He recognized the *Reyai*, village and society as social organizations and highlighted on the relations between these organizations and classes with social structure. He admitted that the villages in Bangladesh are 'elusive' in nature. Due to high population density and disordered habitation, no one would be able to identify the physical boundary between villages. He observed that different social organizations and the reciprocal networks between the villagers had linked them socially. The

main focal point of his research was to explain the relations between different community organizations and social structure within a *Thana*.

The Village Culture in Transition – A Study of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) *Rural Society* is one of the pioneer research works in the world of social science by S.M. Hafeez Zaidi (1970). He realized that culture is not static and unchangeable; rather, it is subject to change. Zaidi stated that as a general assumption, we may state that socio-cultural changes in tradition-oriented societies constitute situations of stress leading to disequilibrium in the culture and its social institutions. He conducted his investigation applying participant observation method partially and questionnaire and interview schedule partially. He stayed five months in two villages in Comilla district in 1967, which he named as Ramnagar which was dwelt in by Muslims and Alipur where both Hindu and Muslim communities resided. In a discussion of the village culture under stress, Zaidi states that due to socio-economic changes in East Pakistan villages, its culture was under stress and those changes had introduced the signs and symptoms of social disorganization. There occurred a shift from extended family to nuclear family in the villages, which imposed numerous adjustment difficulties on old men, women, and children.

Willem van Schendel, a Dutch anthropologist conducted his Ph.D. fieldwork in Bangladesh during August 1977--June 1978. His renowned book, *Peasant Mobility-the Odds of Life in Rural Bangladesh* (1982) is the revised copy of his Ph.D. thesis. He studied seven villages under Badarganj *upazila* of Rangpur district, Khetlal *upazila* of Bogra district and Kotwali *upazila* of Comilla   district. The position of his 'houses' within the villages provided good opportunities for *participant observation* as his main technique particularly during the early stages of research. To study the real mobility of the peasantry, he collected information on histories of different families and differentiation, land utility, irrigation, etc. He discussed the 'model of Shanin' on peasant mobility and explained the *centrifugal mobility* and *centripetal mobility* of his theory and applied these theories to his own studies (Shanin: 8). To make an overall assessment of peasant mobility in Bangladesh, Schendel opined that between 83 and 93 per cent of all existing households had experienced inter-category mobility since their formation. He observed that most peasant households had experienced mobility and downward mobility was more likely than upward mobility. To him peasant classes were, therefore, of the 'omnibus' variety: there was always some joining and leaving of peasant households. He experienced that the households were not only aware of their trends of mobility but were highly interested in those processes.

Anwarullah Chowdhury conducted an anthropological study in a village under Dhaka district where he stayed for ten and a half months in two phases. *A Bangladesh Village – a Study of Social Stratification* (1978) which is one of the pioneer books in ethnographical world, and is the revised version of his Ph.D. dissertation. He followed the anthropological method for his study. The focal point of his research was social stratification of rural areas. He was very much inspired by the theory of social stratification --'Class' 'Status' and 'Party' of Max Weber, though he admitted that his (Weber) theory fails to accommodate fully the realities of

stratification of Meherpur, the pseudonym of his research village. Chowdhury was interested to study 'Class', 'Status' and 'Power' structure of the village under study.

Researcher couple Jenneke Arens and J. Van Burden (1984) conducted a study on households and status of rural women in a village of Kushtia district. They stayed there from June 1974 to May 1975. They observed some signs of feudalism in agriculture, especially in large-scale ownership of landed property by rich farmers, which is not to be found in Comilla and Dhaka districts. They also marked a tendency of bourgeois development in the post-independent Bangladesh due to excess inflation, famine and increasing investment in agriculture. They noted decreasing tendency of sharecropping.

Helaluddin Khan Arefeen (1986) studied a village near Dhaka City where he stayed for 12 months in the year of 1977-78. He applied participant observation methodology along with a series of techniques. He aimed to study changing patterns of kinship organization, land tenure and class structure in rural Bangladesh. He was interested in changing pattern of agrarian and social structure in a village where urbanization process was sprawling out. To investigate the social organization, he used some local linguistic terms, which have upgraded his ethnography for anthropological study.

Betsy Hartmann and James K. Boyce (1990) are a couple anthropologists, who stayed in a village ('Katni'- the pseudonym of their research village) for about nine months to know the faces of the world's poorest people, the inhabitants of a Bangladesh village. It was just after our independence when they were influenced by their knowledge to study a Bangladeshi village from the anthropological perspective, applying participant observation techniques. They have visited Bangladesh in August 1974, when the country was passing through a worse period of famine and lawlessness. Through the conversation with the villagers and their observation, they investigated the causes of misrule and man-made famine. They discovered that behind the screen, the rich landowners and moneylenders, whom the villagers call *baroloke* and the politicians along with the businessmen, were controlling the lives of the commoners.

Through a long unknown span of time, 'caste,' as a system of social hierarchy, is still continuing among the Hindus of this sub-continent. But, it is facing several legitimate obstacles, including social reforms and westernized values and norms. Though the system has lost its rigidity and cruelty, still the members of the Hindu community are nourishing the notions of caste hierarchy in their socio-religious activities. Several sociologists and anthropologists have studied recent changes of the caste system and its continuity. Some have provided theoretical perspectives to grasp the changing pattern. "Indeed, on the subject of caste, one of the most distinctive of India's social institutions, anthropologists and sociologists have generally been far more confident about structural continuity than contemporary change, and analysis of the relations between them has persistently posed serious intellectual problems" (Fuller 2000:1). In this study we have discussed some views and theories of a few sociologists and anthropologists on contemporary change in and structural continuity of caste.

Continuity of Caste System

Some Indian as well as Western sociologists and anthropologists have shown enthusiasm for caste system and have listed a number of functions of caste system in their books; caste is experiencing a process of change at present. Among this group we can name Bailey (Bailey 1957) and Frykenberg 1969 (cf. Sharma 1997:11). Dumont (1970) has enthusiastically supported caste system and traditional India, which is partly an India of his own construction. Dumont was very much influenced by French anthropologist, Abbe Dubois (1917). Dubois had studied the population of Southern India, and tried to understand that society and its religion. Dubois observed traditional India with reverence, and made his remarks as follows, "Such an institution was probably the only means that the most clear-sighted prudence could devise for maintaining a state of civilization amongst a people endowed with the peculiar characteristics of the Hindus."(cf. Dumont, 1970:23). Dumont expressed the necessity of hierarchy, which forms the hereditary divisions of caste system. The structural–functional theory of social stratification dominated in the middle of the last century, structural–historical perspective has been applied by those who are interested to emphasize on the study of differentiation, evolution and change in caste and class in India. Dumont was the spokesman of structuralism. However, Hutton(1980), Ghurye (1932), Hocart (1950), Bougle(1908), Leach (1960), Srinivas (1966), Marriot (1959) and Lewis (1958) treated caste system from structural viewpoint. Kothari, (1970) Sharma (1973) and Srinivas (1966) have studied both the continuity and changing pattern of caste system. Sharma states that "Dumont approvingly quotes from Hocart, Senart and Hutton, who have advocated for continuity of caste system by emphasizing the functions of caste system for individual members …." (Sharma 1997:3-4).

Leach (1960) by defining caste in his book *Aspects of Caste in South India, Ceylon and North-west Pakistan,* as "a particular species of structural organization indissolubly linked with … Pan-Indian civilization". The Indian world to him provides the cultural syndromes in terms of which the structural aspects of the caste system may be investigated: it is in the nature of external relations between caste groupings that one can find essence of the caste system. He differs with other four ethnographers in his edited book, who generally accept the position of that the caste system is a system of social stratification; Leach takes strong exception to it (Varma 1961: 415).

Kothari thinks that caste was found as an adaptive and pragmatic system, performing as an interest group for it members. Kothari in his book *Caste in Indian Politics* stated "In dealing with the relationship between caste and politics however the doctrinaire modernizer suffers from a serious xenophobia. He begins with the question is caste disappearing? Now surely no social system disappears like that (p. 4). Politicians mobilize caste groupings and identities in order to organize their power (p. 5). … castes take on an openly secular form for new organizational purposes" (Kothari 1970: 21).Sharma is another scholar who has emphasized on studying caste from structural perspectives. Mishra while reviewing Sharma's book, stated that 'he emphasizes the understanding and explanation of the ideology, structure and process of social inequality both temporarily and contextually' (Mishra 2001). But Sharma states from Marxist and non-Marxist view, "The Marxists look at the origin or evolution of caste from the point of economic relations. Political activists like Dange (1949), Ranadive (1979) and Nambrodipad (1979) look at caste as a mechanism of exploitation in the lands of the

upper castes. However, non-Marxists consider caste not as a super structural entity, but mainly as a basic institution of division of labor and harmonic relations" (Sharma ibid: 11).

Bouglé as he is a French philosopher identifies three features essential to the notion of caste: hereditary specialization, hierarchy, and mutual repulsion. "The spirit of caste unites these three tendencies . . . and all three must be borne in mind if one wishes to give a complete definition of the caste system" (p. 9). Bouglé's concept of repulsion encompasses all those features by means of which each caste attempts to maintain its distinctiveness and separation from every other caste. Thus, commensal and connubial restrictions are simply different aspects of one thing--mutual repulsion. Bouglé insists on the systematic character of caste and focuses on those features that account for relations among castes (Tyler 1972: 1380). Srinivas has followed Bouglé and notes the pre-eminence of religious values in the caste system. According to him, Hindu religious values rest on the notion of pollution and purity (Srinivas 1952).

Ghurye (1932) is another structural sociologist who has divided the concept of caste through four periods: the Vedic period with its Vedic and Brahmanic texts; the post-Vedic period dominated by the Laws of the Aryas, the great epics, and the Buddhist writings; the period of the *Dharmasastras*, summed up in Manu at the outset and in the *Vishnu Purana* at the end; and the "modern" period, in which these various texts recombined and flowered into a more systematic tradition. A pure functionalist might argue that caste in India as of the late 19th century had little historical depth. It could be a simple rationalization of occupational specialization in the then-present, a rationalization come somewhat adrift from occupation under the pressures of colonialism. But Ghurye's mastery of Sanskrit inevitably led him to focus on much deeper historical roots (Celarent 2011: 1715-16).

Hutton in his renowned book denotes that "The caste system enables the caste to act corporately and to control the behavior of its component members. It is able in this way to raise its position in society. This may not be easy to achieve and may perhaps be accomplished only in the course of generations, but it is certainly has been can be done" (Hurtton 1980:112). Hocart (1950) is another pioneer on caste system in India. Hocart's work is entitled *Caste – A Comparative Study* and in addition to India Hocart draws upon his experience in Ceylon, in the Pacific, notably in Fiji and in Egypt. But it is permissible and desirable that we should limit our understanding on Hocart's contribution to Indian society. For him caste in India is only one variety of a widely spread genus and to offers the definition that "castes are merely families to whom various offices in the ritual are assigned by hereditary" (SAGE 1968).

Kosambi (Damodar Dharmananda Kosambi) was an Indian mathematician, statistician, philologist, historian and polymath who contributed to genetics by introducing *Kosambi map function*, deemed that the caste system has been evolved from the notions of property system by the Aryans in India, Castes did not arise out of any internal division of the Varna in the original Vedic society but from an external process altogether. He is described as "the patriarch of the Marxist school of Indian

historiography". Kosambi was a Marxist historian specializing in ancient India who employed the historical materialist approach in his work. He stated that "It may be supposed that these *dasas* were the descendants of the Indus settlers who had provided the surplus for Indus cities, being persuaded thereto by some method other than force, say religion. This was the beginning of the caste system in India. The word used here *varna* means colour, and is justified as the *Dasas* or Dasyus in general are spoken of as of dark colour; the Aryans had a colour of their own, white, or at any rate lighter" (Kosambi 1975: 98). To him, the *Dasa* people became the *Sudras* and the Aryans became the upper three castes. He added that "The *vaisya* (settler, husbandman) and the *sudra* (helots) are to be exploited for the advantage of the ruling warrior caste, the *ksatriya* with the brahmin priest's help" (ibid: 100). He saw caste as a class form dependent on the mode of productions. Irfan Habib in his article on Kosambi, wrote that Kosambi had applied Marxism to study Indian History, especially to his book *An Introduction to the Study of Indian History*, which substantiated and extended his views on both how Marxist insights needed to be used to reconstruct Indian history and how history would appear after being thus reconstructed. Kosambi had said in his 1954 ISCUS article: "Caste is class at a primitive level of production, a religious method of forming social consciousness in such a manner that the primary producer is deprived of his surplus with the minimum coercion" (Kosambi nd: 59).

In the context of the study area of Rajapur in Bangladesh, caste as system is still prevailing in spirit, but not in its rigidity. The Hindus believe in their hereditary caste status, as it is their religion, but not believe in its social cleavages which were the basis of Hindu social structure as well as stratification. The Hindus have set apart three socio-cultural aspects very delicately–these are religion, social life and occupation. As they are the followers of their distinct religion and ideology, they perform the religious rituals and worshipping of the gods like their ancestors. In Rajapur, the first generation (not less than 60 years) members of almost all but a few nourished the orthodox notions of stratification and rituals of purity and pollution. Among them, Kandura Chandra of *Dakshinpara* accused the third generation for breaking and disobeying the rituals. To him, this era itself has changed a lot due to the immoral practices of the children, they (the children) behave arrogantly, and are puffed up with pride of their wealth and young age, they are disobeying the elders, but, as the proverb goes, "pride goeth before destruction."

The Brahmin families are also forerunner of the caste system. Govinda Chakravarti of *Mothkholapara*, a Brahmin family member, whose occupation should be priesthood, is working in agricultural field as a day-laborer. To him the situation has changed. People do not revere the Brahmans; rather, they are becoming less generous to give alms to the priests. Some members of the *Kshattriya* caste, who were not ritually permitted earlier, are acting as priests. Govinda realizes that he has nothing but to seek for menial job. He is now working as a day-laborer in agriculture but not tilling the soil as he thinks that tilling the soil is strictly forbidden for Brahmans. To the Brahmin family members caste segmentation is a necessary practice and that must be preserved with prescribed honor and dignity of Brahmins, the ritually upper caste. Their expectations sound like the statements of Dumont and Able Dubois. This study has understood that these two scholars have enthusiastically supported the caste system and have acknowledged the importance and supremacy of Brahmins. To them the caste system is structurally important and needed.

The villagers in Rajapur have not given up the religion or their beliefs in caste system. Still, they tend to present themselves by caste names and titles. But, it is true that most of the villagers do not know the names of their sub-castes or sects among their respective castes. Except a very few who have some knowledge on it, they cannot say the traditional names of their own castes. Their activity or mentality proves that they don't bother for their traditional caste names or sects. They are too much busy with their occupation or to earn the bread for the survival of their families. In social interactions they don't have any bar between Brahman, so-called *Kshattriyas*, *Kaibarttas* and *Vaisnanvas* (these four are the caste identities of the villagers, and other one is *Sudra*) except for the case of two Sudra families. Inter – caste commensality (loosening of rules governing) is permitted for them. We have seen Govinda Chakravarti, the younger Brahman priest, is gossiping with the peer groups of *Kshattriyas*. His friends from *Kshattriya* were making fun with him, and were mocking at him for his manual labor in agriculture, as the villagers are not summoning him for priestly works. Males or females from different castes sit together and exchange private sorrows and happiness among themselves. They maintain friendly relations among them. Most of the villagers are not well informed or educated about this socio-religion based stratification and rituals. What they know is simply their caste name–*Brahman, Kshattriya, Kaibartta, Vaisnava or Sudra*. They are not aware of the segmentation of their respective castes or their respective sects. When we have enquired to them about the names of their own sects for *Kshattriyas*, they asked us to communicate with the *Sadhu* residing at Pukurpara. They are too much busy with their occupation. But, they don't maintain a close relation with the lower caste members of the scheduled castes, though they converse with them on various issues. The members of the lower caste are not being included in the *Dosh* run by the upper castes.

Men are more secular than women in the villages. Still, women try to keep their domestic life pure, and perform some pujas (worship) at home, especially the holy basil puja and the goddess *Lakshmi* at evening. Rituals and beliefs are being dropped or abbreviated. Women are more directly concerned with purity and impurity than men, as they are inclined to prepare food and use the kitchen, which is the heart of the notions of purity. Here one may remember Swami Vivekananda's condemnation of folk Hinduism as a religion of the kitchen. Women play the role of preparing food in the kitchen, and serve it to the members of the family; but, before that, they are expected to be ritually pure. "The rank of a caste depends on the avoidance of some impure foods (and liquor). Women are expected to know the special foods that need to be prepared for each important ritual, and women are the *de facto* custodians of tradition" (Srinivas 1997 a: X.). As the concepts of pollution and purity have been the central component of caste system, food constitutes a critical part in the ritual of purity and pollution, which begin at home. Leela Dube, both sociologist and anthropologist has observed the caste discrimination from the point of view of women.

Women play the key role in maintaining the sanctity and purity of the home. They are required to observe strict rules of purity and pollution while preparing food, to give up the consumption of foods which are tamasik– which raise passion and desire- and to forego a 'proper' meal in the evenings. Responsibility for the preservation of traditions, maintenance of the sanctity of bounded space, control over rituals, the distribution of food and the task of socialization give women a sense of power over people and situations" (Dube 1997:6-8).

Women are more religious than men in Rajapur. They are the custodians of rituals as well as religious beliefs within household affairs. Usually men are extroverts; on the contrary, women are introverts in our rural life. Women in most cases are confined within the village boundary or within their respective *para*s. They need not move out of their respective *para*s for daily needs; so, they, unlike their males, remain out of the inter-mixing danger of pollution. Their world is very much limited within their own; so, they make friendship or gossip with women from neighboring *para*s. Gossiping with inter-caste members is not a matter of becoming polluted and cooking or offering food is still done according to the rituals. Some poor women from the least poor families don't bother about their prescribed rituals sanctioned by the *Smriti* of Monu (*Monu Samhita*). Women are responsible for all the homestead religious works. Ritual care of food, household works, worshiping family god, maintaining personal and family purity are all tasks very much compulsory for womenfolk in Hinduism. Doing impure tasks of their own or other members of the family pollute women, but women from rich upper castes are less related to the process of pollution as they are not directly related to manual works of the households. But, women from poor households depend for earning their livelihood on doing impure tasks. In Rajapur, the rich households of Kshattriya caste appoint maids from their own caste, and not from lower caste. Not only that, women who are from "*Kancha'* families are not allowed to perform kitchen-works, specially cooking food for "*Pucca*" members. So, when the maids are being appointed for household works then it is strictly maintained that no maid can be appointed from impure levels or impure castes. Women from three poor Brahman families of Rajapur are surviving in poverty, but are not eager to do manual works in the households lower than their caste. Women from *Chamar* households also are not allowed to perform any works in upper caste households, nor are they (Chamar females) allowed entering in their (upper caste females) kitchen premises. Sree Binoy Chandra Sarkar, a *Kaibartta* of Kaljani para reported as follows, "The Chamars can't enter into our houses. They can come to the courtyards only. Ifthey are served with food and water, utensils used by them should be cleared properly. Not only that, the person who will clean it must have to take bath".

Brindaban Thakur, a *Brahman*, who serves at the village temple (*Baroari* Mondir) at Mothkholapara. He is a permanent priest; so he need not move for work. Once he served the obsequies ceremony of a *chamar* family, which made him degraded, and for this act of *jajmani*, he was expelled by the *Kayasthas* (economically rich families) of Mothkholapara and surrounding *paras* from the Baroari

Mandir. Later he was readmitted into the community and profession after performing penances prescribed by them for breaches of caste rules. For the interim period Jogesh Chandra Banerjee, served the Mandir. Basically, Brindabon was pressurized by the villagers to do penance according to the law.

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Women were comparatively vulnerable than men in marriage and conjugal life. According to the law she is not allowed to divorce her husband whatever may be the provocation. If she is widow, again she is not allowed to remarry; rather, she has to relinquish her happiness and auspicious symbols of her married life. She is not allowed to put on vermilion on her forehead or put on conch bangles like a married woman. She has to shave her head as early as

possible after the death of her husband. On the contrary, a widower is allowed to remarry; the dead wife's younger sister, if unmarried, is preferred for marriage first.

Men are enjoying freedom as they move in the public world and in the markets. Though markets may be the source of pollution, the males have nothing but to move there without being polluted. There they are taking food or water from the lower caste members in the restaurants, or exchanging goods, or touching them bodily. Dube has acknowledged this observations, "In situations away from home and their locality, men tend to be more relaxed about rules of commensality; in a similar context women are both chaperoned and watched over carefully and are expected to follow these rules more strictly" (Dube 1997: 7). In their hamlets, the male villagers are allowed to move hither and thither, and are allowed to interact with anybody without breaking the rules of pollution. But, women are directly concerned with the concept of purity as they are the custodians. It seems that widows are always impure. Dube as she has observed the same situations in Indian caste society, "Widows are not supposed to perform the *puja* of family deities: they do not cook the pure food offered to these deities. A man, on the other hand, is not similarly affected if he becomes a widower" (ibid.10). Srinivas also has shared the same observation, "Women are more directly concerned with purity-impurity than men, and the kitchen may be described as the heart of the purity-impurity system" (Srinivas 1997 a: IX).

Swami Vivekananda condemned Hinduism as a religion of the kitchen. The concept of purity has been confined to the kitchen, and the kitchen is not open for the females from lower castes, *katcha households* or from Muslims. Women from all these sectors can move within their own community, and gossip sitting together in the courtyards without entering into the kitchen or cooking food. Entrance is strictly limited in the kitchen of the *pucca* households, and purity is strictly maintained regularly by smearing floors with cow dung, as the live cow purifies. "The cow, when alive, is holy, like the river Ganga, and both transcend the duality of purity-impure" (Srinivas 1989: 36). Impurity emanates from two important sources–body and death. Still in Rajapur, death at any household pollutes the living members, and they have to pass a certain time to be pure by performing certain deeds. It should be mentioned here that the notion of impurity related to the body has been weakened due to the above-mentioned factors, but still it is being practiced in marriage, in preparing food, in the kitchen, and during the time of death of any household member. The concept of purity related to personal matters is also more obligatory for women than the male members of the households. "Women play the key role in maintaining the sanctity and purity of the home. ... Women tend to be more circumscribed in taking proscribed foods or accepting food from other castes. ... They are required to observe strict rules of purity and pollution while preparing food, to give up the consumption of foods which are *tamasik* – which raise passion and desire – and to forego a 'proper' meal in the evenings" (Dube ibid.: 6-7). For married women, they have to take shower in the morning before entering into the kitchen and preparing food. Bath makes them pure for pure tasks. On returning from toilet, both male and female persons purify themselves, and they try to take shower to be pure in the morning. Women are also treated polluted during the time of their menstruation.

In Rajapur, though the notions of purity have been weakened, still these are in practice in some cases of community and personal life. The concept of purity related to the community is being weakened day by day, and the members are daring to violate it. The concept of purity is strictly in force in endogamy; where exogamy is still treated as a breach. The villagers who are ritually *'kancha'* (impure by marrying widow or divorced women) are always polluted, and they or their descendants never can attain purity in their lifetime. A pure Brahman or a member of the upper caste never can accept food or water from their hands, or they cannot cook food for the *'pucca'* (pure) members of the upper castes. Among the *Kayasthas* of Rajapur, the villagers consider some of them as *kancha* (ritually impure) because of marriage with divorced women. Depending on the notions of purity and pollution, these households are *kancha* with its all-family members. Norendra NathRai of Kaljani para, one of my informants, has provided me some important information about inter-caste relations. According to him, there are 21 households, out of 86, who are *kancha*, as they have become polluted due to their or their parents' marital relations with widow or divorced women. Women with second husbands cannot use vermilion or put on bangle made of conch-shell, which are the marks of a *shadabha* (married woman whose husband is alive). If any *kancha* household invites villagers other than *kancha*, there must be a separate cooking arrangement for the *pucca* (ritually pure) villagers.

To members of the upper caste, the *Sudras* are still subject to pollution; their women never can enter into the kitchen of the upper castes, though they are allowed to visit and sit on the courtyards of the upper castes. No member of the upper castes will accept food or water from their hands. To the villagers, the *Sudras* are ritually untouchable and polluted; at earlier times, the *Sudras* were not allowed to walk through the *Kayasthapara* or have a conversation with the villagers. But, days have changed with the changes of the notions; the concept of untouchability has gradually weakened, but so long Hinduism persists, the concept of untouchability will endure. But, in general, the concept has been confined to the kitchen, and women have been and continue as the custodians of the concept.

Despite some significant changes in caste in rural as well as in urban Hindu communities, a trend of caste endogamy is still in strict practice, and this may be called the effective endogamous unit. Endogamy is one of the basic characteristics of caste system, which flows from the distinctness of caste identity. As Mayer states, "If there is one thing, which has not changed over the years, it is this notion of the endogamous caste/sub caste unit" (Mayer 2000:57). In Rajapur, the Hindu villagers arrange endogamous marriage for their offspring. They do not permit any sort of breach or do not legalize the marriage or accept the couple into their own caste, though there are a few exceptional cases of exogamy, and the couples are still residing in the village. In these cases, the villagers have accepted them partially, and the villagers have allowed them to decide by themselves in which caste, they are willing to be enlisted. Leaders from both the castes sit and declare their enlistment into the desired caste. If they do not seek the help of the community, they can live in the village in an ostracized condition. In that case, caste-status of their offspring remains undecided. If a bridegroom from a lower caste wills to be the member of the higher caste through his wife, they can be treated to be *katcha* (polluted), and if the bride from lower caste enlists herself into a higher

caste through her husband is never treated badly. But the villagers are looking for bride or bridegroom even crossing the village as well as *Upazila* or Zila boundaries.

Change of Caste System

Srinivas has a great contribution to the study of continuity and change of caste system prevailing in India. To explain some features of religious, cultural and social change in India, Srinivas has put forward three concepts – Sanskritization, Westernization and Secularization (Srinivas 2001:6). To him, Sanskritization is the process by which a "low" Hindu caste, or tribal or other group, changes its customs, ritual, ideology and way of life in the direction of a high, and, frequently, "twice-born" caste. Westernization refers to changes introduced into Indian society during the British rule and continuing in independent India. In considering the values, norms and behavior of people in a country like India, one cannot ignore the changing pattern of them under the influence of the British rule. Srinivas has also pointed out the term 'secularization' as one of the major changing components, which implied an unimaginable impact on urban caste Hindus.

Like Srinivas, Jaiswal has also highlighted the pragmatic influence of Westernization. According to him, "The situation changed in colonial times. It is held that the introduction of Western education exposed the Indian intelligentsia to the ideas of social inequality, democracy and humanism, and this made them acutely aware of the evils prevailing among themselves" (Jaiswal 1998: 231).Sociologist Andre Beteille comments as follows, "Here I must point out that a change in the orientation to caste had come about in the course of the nationalist movement itself. Indian intellectuals did not condemn caste as widely a hundred years before independence as they were ready to do when independence came" (Beteille 2000: 151-4). Adrian Mayer has studied a village of central India and has observed some continuity and changes. "… caste also provided one of the avenues through which change could occur, notably through efforts by members to improve their status or gain political power, but this was a long process with an uncertain chance of success. Anti-class legislation, as well as the introduction of new political institutions, provided further avenues for social mobility … and the national ideology which stressed the caste-free equality of its citizens provided a counter – value for those who wished to adopt it" (Mayer 2000: 32).

K. M. Panikkar has found out some special effects, which embody the gains of social changes in Indian society. **First of those** is the Indian constitution, which contains a declaration of Fundamental Rights and incorporates certain Directive Principles. *Secondly*, communism, the egalitarian movement launched a revolutionary approach to re-organize society on completely new bases not merely to change its economy and political system but to build society on new principles. *Thirdly*, the impact of industrial society was also an important factor to change the social structure of the Hindus. *Fourthly*, the impact of science on Hindu society has also been far reaching. *Fifthly*, there is the impact of thought which has the most devastating force on social institutions.

Rakhal Chandra Nath is one of the critics of Hindu movements during pre- and post-British era. According to him, "Rammohan religious reform was an instrumental for social and political reform. … Rammohan never allowed his love for the formless God of the Upanishads to get the better of his zeal for awakening his countrymen from their 'dream of error' (Nath 1982: 19-20). Sachidananda has studied the changing pattern of scheduled castes in India and remarks, "The changes came along three avenues. The first avenue was provided by the reform movements, which took place among some scheduled castes at various periods of time. The second was provided by the process through which a caste or a group of people move up in the social hierarchy by adopting the style of life associated by tradition with the upper castes. The third avenue was inspired by the process of westernization which refers to the adoption by a community of western patterns in dress, manners and customs" (Sachidananda 1974: 278).

Bose and Jalal have underscored some socio-religious movements, which weakened the powerful beliefs in casteism. Ambedkar, the most renowned reformer of caste system pointed out that the caste system has no scientific origin. It has also no reason and morality, because the *Vedas* and the *Shastras* which founded caste deny any part to reason and morality. Therefore, religion of the *Shrutis* and *Smritis* which deny reason and morality in any form should be uprooted and destroyed in the way to social reform. Ambedkar himself dreamt of an ideal society based on liberty, equality and fraternity. Such a society would have no discrimination of one by another. The development of such a notion lies in Ambedkar's dissatisfaction with the Hindu social system based on caste. For Ambedkar, Caste is evil.

Development of regional self-consciousness from the twentieth century onwards discarded Brahmanical language--Sanskrit. Printing presses, which printed Sanskrit religious books (which were forbidden for lower castes) in local languages, have played a revolutionary role among the lower caste groups as well the untouchables. Cities were the centers of both *Sanskritization* and *Westernization* processes and some reform movements.

The changes that have occurred in relation among different castes and in Indian society were due to various reasons; but obviously, it was a product of movements and mobility in which the lower castes and the scheduled castes or the depressed castes participated most. The impact of change was more striking for them, as they were depressed and deprived from authority. Not only that, they were not permitted to move or practice mobility. The traditional orthodox Brahmans who opposed the change have failed to continue their rigidity and powering status; on the contrary, the reformers whose object was to break down the system and equalize Indian citizens are not gaining success at all.

In this greater context, we will now discuss the continuity and some changing patterns of caste-system in Rajapur, as well as the changing mentality of the villagers. In Rajapur, the living members of the second (not less than 30 years) and third (less than 30 years) generations are well informed about their hierarchical order and positions in the *Varna*, but they are not willing to practice it in their practical life. They do not bother about segmental positions; rather, they tend to live a free social life. Gradually, people are being interested to

believe in the *Varna* model of the caste, instead of the *jati* model of the caste, as Marriott has pointed out that people will increasingly use the *Varna* model of the caste system (see Marriott 1955).

Rajballav Robi Das of Kaljani doesn't believe in caste system. To him, "this cannot be the religion; you will not find any sort of cleavages in the religious books or in the *Gita*. It is the Brahmans who have created and set up laws in favor of them. The God is one, and, He cannot divide his creatures. But, his creatures have divided themselves. This is not the era of Brahmans; now, we are all equal, though a few don't think so. But, days are coming when there will be no caste among the Hindus, except in someone's belief".

Parimal Sarkar, a *Kaibartta,* thinks the caste system to be a superstition. To him, during the period of gods, every person was equal in society. But, in course of centuries, the self-seekers have formed this superstition, and forced others to believe in and to do according to their will. This orthodoxy had crossed the apex of its period, and is now declining. People are now educating themselves, and know now the ins and outs of the caste system. Gradually, people are being aware and giving up all the superstitions which confined those years after years.

For example, Sree Khagendra Mohonto of Kaljani admits, "During earlier times, inter-caste marriage between the *Kshattriya* and *Kaibartta* was strictly forbidden. Norms and values were so rigid that no one even dared to think of this. But at present, society along with its norms and values is less strict. Nowadays, if some tries to do the same as before, he or she will be ostracized. This is '*kolikal*' (present age of the world)".

Considering the caste commensality, ritual behavior, untouchability and social interaction and the changing pattern of all of these notions, there are some factors, which contribute a potential role for change in the village. Actually, the villages are the integrated parts of the country, and the changes, which run through urban life necessarily, cover rural life simultaneously. Due to some varieties of economic and political factors, the 'cooperative caste system' and hereditarily ascribed occupational pattern has experienced a vital change. These are gradually disappearing from the caste-based societies. A new pattern of competitive initiative and formation of self–identity are replacing old ideas. Everyone is trying his or her utmost to get rid of the intransigence of caste-rigidity and seeking self-confidence. In support of this statement we can cite here the experiences of Jayaram as he has admitted the same experiences. He states, "This 'cooperative caste system' and 'the hierarchical organic solidarity' have been disappearing due to a variety of economic and political factors. In its place, a new system of competitive solidarity has been emerging as "fused combinations of castes compete with one another" (Jayaram 1997:73).

We have learnt that Srinivas has put forward three concepts – Sanskritization, Westernization and Secularization for contributing the changing pattern of the caste system in this sub-continent. The first positive factor, which affects both the caste system and the members to change or mobilize their own positions within the hierarchy, is the process of *Sanskritization*.

Members of the lower castes in Rajapur make an effort to change their customs, rituals, ideology and way of life according to twice-born and dominant castes. But, one thing that is exceptional is that these efforts overflow not only inter-caste boundary but the caste boundary also. However, the villagers are no more dependent on their hereditarily ascribed occupations; rather, they are reliant on occupations of their own choice. Two cobbler families are no more in cobbling business; they are rather earning their livelihood from hawking, small trading and day–laboring.

As rationalism was replacing traditional beliefs and ideas of the Catholics as observed by Max Weber, a similar instance can be found in Hinduism. Rationalism, as an essential element of secularization, involves secular beliefs and ideas instead of traditional beliefs and rituals, and it is assumed that Hinduism is more affected by secularization process than any other religions in India. Religious orthodoxy, concepts of purity and pollution, notions of untouchability, positions in the caste-hierarchy, caste-names which were once central as well as pervasive in Hinduism, are getting weakened greatly due to secularization process. Secularization is a process, which is reducing, removing and abbreviating the notions and ritualistic behavior of the villagers in Rajapur.

Srinivas, in his famous book, *Social Change in Modern India*, has analyzed some behavioral changes of the caste-members in their day-to-day life, which imply secularization notions among them. We have seen most of these behavioral changes in the study village. Different types of ritual ceremonies, which were once performed by the villagers, are beginning to be dropped. Ceremonies, such as name-giving, *annaprashon* (ceremony of putting boiled rice in a child's mouth for the first time) and wedding rituals are being abbreviated due to secular notions and economic insolvency.

Simultaneously, westernization and modernization, which stimulate secular notions, are creating fruitful effects in the village life. Westernization and two other concomitant processes--industrialization and urbanization have played radical and lasting changes in Indian society during the British rule. Modernization is more positive than westernization, as westernization is ethically neutral and modernization always conveys the sense of good and rationalization. It attempts to establish rational manner and behaviour among the beneficiaries. However, as the villagers of Rajapur are being affected by westernization, their traditional customs, costumes, and behavior are changing a lot. The villagers are shaking hands, instead of traditional salutation (with rising of joined hands towards the forehead and uttering *namaskar*). They are putting on pants, shirts, *lungis* instead of *dhoti* and *Punjabi*. They are watching television and cinemas, which teach them westernized and modern trend of social life instead of traditions. Indians ate sitting on floors as it is their tradition and ritual, but westernization has changed their lifestyle too, and, now they take food sitting on chairs and tables. In Rajapur, the rich landowner or *grihasthas*have their separate dining hall with table and bench or chairs. The middle *grihasthas* or the poor sit on the floor, and still perform some of their rituals before taking meals.

Individualism and freedom of speech are the two forms of western notions, which have awakened the villagers from predomination of orthodoxy. Not only that the villagers are openly criticizing old norms and values of caste system, they are also criticizing the Brahman communities for their past oppression. The priest Brahmans are steadily losing their prescribed honor and prestige due to the secularization and westernization process.

The *Vaisnavas*, whose occupations should have to be religious begging, are earning bread from different kinds of manual labor, trading and cultivation. The *Brahmans*, whose prescribed occupation is priesthood and teaching religious books etc., are being compelled to adopt manual labor to run their families. The *Kayasthas* (so-called Kshattriyas) are no more in scribing; they are earning livelihood from multifarious sources including agriculture. Nowadays, social honor depends on occupational as well as economic positions, which completely emanate from the members' personal or family efforts. So, castes have been completely competitive instead of cooperative integration. Even leaders of the *Dosh* (de facto arbitrator body) are being selected on the basis of economic and social positions, instead of caste positions. Andre Beteille, in an early study of a village in Tamil Nadu, has shown that caste-status of an individual no longer determines his position in the class or power hierarchy (see Beteille 2000). Panini has expressed the same experiences, as he states, "Thus caste status no longer inhibits individuals from taking to new occupations. ... Occupational diversification has occurred in all cases and it appears that the caste system has adapted itself to the needs of development" (Panini 1997:30-31). Besides urban-based works, several new occupations have opened up within the village-areas. But, the holy books or great Hindu laws by Manu did not ritually prescribe these occupations. Since agriculture is a caste based occupation, *Kaibarttas*–a caste who are traditionally agriculturist, continue in this work along with other castes whose traditional occupations have ceased to be there. Tailoring, carpentering, mechanical works, wood works are some types of works followed by the caste members of the village.

Some changes have occurred due to several non-Brahmin movements which have been acknowledged by several scholars like Ghurye (1932), Bose and Jalal (1999). Ghurye's points can be cited here as a major supporting statement: "hierarchy is attacked by non-Brahman movement (p. 193), notions concerning impurity being much weakened (p. 209) and the rules concerning food and drink considerably relaxed, especially in the towns. The freedom of the new professions means that the caste no longer prescribes occupation". Bose and Jalal have underscored some socio-religious movements, which weakened the powerful beliefs in casteism. The study village doesn't have such movements literally, but the changing notions and attitude of non-Brahmin caste members of the village can be compared with such movements against casteism.

Because of liberal economic, political, educational and religious systems, some changes have occurred among members of the Hindu community. As people are free to accept whatever occupation they like, they can accumulate money, and become rich, whatever their castes may be; as economic positions determine social honor and prestige, so, caste has been much less important. Political affiliation has inspired and empowered the villagers to practice

power in village and outside village in a greater arena. The villagers are participating in innovative programs launched by the national-level political parties. They are enjoying adult franchise, and electing their representatives to lower- and upper-level governments. Education played an important role, which has enlightened them from a state of ignorance and darkness of orthodoxy. Members of the *Sudra* families often criticize the verses ("so-called" in their words) from Vedas as described by the priest Brahmans; for, the *Sudras*have no right to study or to hear the Vedas. They think that the Vedas cannot declare like that, as god has created his creatures as equals. To them "we, the Sudras, have equal rights to study and hear the Vedas. That was a trick of the priest class, so that we remain uneducated, and remain aloof from the Holy Books. But, days have changed. We are going to schools and reading books including the holy books written in Bangla." This is due to spread of education, expansion of mental horizons, broadening of consciousness and self-formation of persons in Hindu community, which guide them to act with changes.

Varna model is not a new phenomenon; it rather experienced a substantial acceptance from the Hindus of the colonial period as well. Due to the effect of westernization, secularization, modernization and urbanization and the egalitarian notions of the British colonizers in respect to the Indian caste status, the *varna* model is gradually becoming popular. Most of the educated and young members of the Hindu communities in Rajapur are willing to acknowledge them according to the *varna* model; for, they do not like to abide by the ideas of the *jati* model of caste – especially the notions of purity and the rigid rules of its maintenance. Though they are aware of their *varna-based* segmentation, most of them are not acquainted with the names of their own sects or *jati*s. They are not concerned with their caste names and hierarchical positions in the *jati model* of caste. What they know is the name of their *varna,* and that is everything for a large number of the villagers. The *Kayasthas* are proud to be declared to be *Kshattriyas*, and the *Kaibarttas* are proud to be declared as *Vaishyas*. Even the Brahman priests are ignorant about their sects. This may be their ignorance; but, they do not bother to know it properly. Except the Brahmans, all other caste-members criticize the inhumane system of caste very often. But, one thing to be mentioned here is that still the upper caste (Brahman, Kayastha, and Kaibartta) members hold an attitude of untouchability for the members of *Chamar* households. They (only Kayasthas and Kaibartas) believe that the Brahmans, the Kshattriyas and the Vaishyas are equal according to the *varna* model, and there should not be any sort of ritualistic segmentation among them. To them, anybody, who performs the deeds assigned by God and recites the holy books, can act as priest, or can be virtuous like a Brahman.

From Panikkar, we have learnt that there are five special effects which have embodied change in the caste system. To him, these are Indian constitution; communism; industry; science and human thought. In the study village only the last one has been traced as the contributory effect which accelerates social changes. It is the human thinking spirit which can be the pivotal element for changes.

In Rajapur, we have seen class-based distinction within the caste, and class exists along with castes, and these are inseparable phenomenon. Members of the Hindu castes are simultaneously the members of the class-structure. Here we should take into account that caste within the class system is not simply a ritualistic system, but it is also a system of

power- relations and economic activities. Agrarian society is being understood in terms of its class structure. But we must also remember the structure that it is through the caste system. In rural areas, there is a complex relationship between caste and class. But the relationships between these two dimensions of social stratification are not straightforward. Normally, it is expected that higher caste are those who have large amount of land. For instance, in most areas the highest caste, the Brahmins, are not major landowners, and so they fall outside the agrarian structure although they are a part of rural society. In each region, there are usually just one or two major landowning castes, who are also numerically very important. Such groups were termed by the sociologist M.N. Srinivas as dominant castes. The dominant castes are the most powerful persons. While dominant landowning groups are usually middle or high ranked castes, most of the marginal farmers and landless belong to lower caste groups (online article-*Change and Development in Rural Society*).

From the very beginning, caste and class are found in a pronounced form, though a dialectical relationship exists between these two systems. Traditionally, dominant castes compete with one another for taking possession of land and power. This type of competition is not a new phenomenon, as we have seen this in a number of studies. Sharma has opined the same observation, "Not only families of dominant castes compete with each other to extend patronage to the lower castes for maintaining their dominance, but the lower caste families to compete to seek favours from the families of the dominant castes" (Sharma 1986: 21).

In Rajapur, the dominant caste is the *Kayastha* in four study *para*s (where the Hindu community resides); not only that, they are numerous too. There are only four rich farmers who possess land above 7.1 acres in Rajapur; all of them are members of the *Kayastha* caste. The *Kayastha* caste has the best access to the land and resources. So, here the two systems exist like two inseparable phenomenon of stratification. Following Beteille, we have also found conflict between the Brahmans and the non-Brahmans in Rajapur Hindu community. Being the members of the dominating caste, these rich landowners, *Kayasthas*, have overshadowed the caste hierarchy. They are also dominating and patronizing like the Brahman caste. The Brahmans are on the top of the chart of caste- hierarchy, and they are also superior to any other *Varna*, according to the *Varna* model. But, here in Rajapur, they have been dependent on the mercy of the *Kayasthas*, especially on this rich land-owning class. At earlier times, these dominating *Kayasthas* dared to expel a Brahman family from Mothkholapara. In fact there was *raiyatwari* system of land settlement in Rajapur. So, Kayasthas are the basic landowners in this area. There were areas that were under direct British rule had what was called the *raiyatwari* system of land settlement (raiyat means cultivator). In this system, the 'actual cultivators' (who were themselves often landlords and not cultivators) rather than the *zamindars* were responsible for paying the tax.

In fact, the *Kayasthas* are numerous not only in this village, but also in the surrounding areas. So, the three Brahman families who are landless are helpless, and do not dare to protest against the *Kayasthas*. They depend on the lower castes for ritualistic services–the *jajmani*, which support their families almost like day laborer. They have to pass some days without food, as they are unable to procure *jajmani*. They cannot till the soil, as it is tabooed for them. The rich land-owning class has extended patronage to members of other castes as well as

Muslims too. A group of sharecroppers and land laborers are dependent on them for their subsistence and patronage. From the 'class' perspective, they have extended all sorts of patronage for strengthening their dominating power over other caste-members. Land, occupation, education, political affiliation have been the criterion to measure social and economic empowerment for both the depressed and dominating castes. People are also being honored on the basis of their land ownership, occupational status and educational qualification. It may appear a little that class is encompassing caste. This may be the cause of westernization, secularization and modernization and diversification of occupations. All caste-members are enjoying freedom for accepting any type of occupation according to their will. They are also enjoying their mobilizing of status vertically. As we shall see, however, there is a considerable measure of overlap between caste and class, so that a particular conflict is often as much a conflict between Brahman and Non-Brahman as between landlord and tenant. So, we have found a considerable measure of overlap between caste and class with some extent of conflict as well as coexistence with discrepancy.

Conclusion

Although, there are also some debate over this point; but we can conclude with remarks that at present, 'caste,' as a system of ritualistic social division, seems to have lost its power to encompass economic and political authority due to the gradual decrease of importance of its core concept-- 'purity and pollution', and gradual development of the process of 'Sanskritization' and upward mobilization within the *Varna* model. But, it is true that caste as a system of ritualistic stratification will never disappear so long Hinduism exists, as caste is an indivisible part of Hinduism. Regarding the changing pattern, we can say that caste, which was prevailing in a rigid form, is turning less rigid, and becoming more flexible and adaptive in nature. It never was open, and never will be open like the class system. In the beginning, caste was a system for the division of labor, and social relations between different caste groups were regulated by the *jajmani* system. With the decline of the *jajmani* system and increasing livelihood diversification, caste identity became an instrument to mobilize people for economic and political gains. A basic shift took place in caste: from ritual hierarchy to identity politics, from ascribed and designated status to negotiated positions of power, from ritual definitions of roles and positions to civic and political definitions of the same (Kothari 1994 cited in Subedi 2013: 81-82). The caste system has eroded at the socio-religious and ritualistic level, but has transformed itself at the political and economic levels.

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Dynamics of Designing and Implementing Social Safety Net Programmes in Developing Countries

Hare Krisna Kundo[9]

Abstract: *Social Safety Net as a part of social protection programmes is now very popular in many developing countries. Political discourses have a role in prioritizing and implementing such pro-poor policy. The objective of this paper is to understand the dynamics of political discourses that influences in adopting and sustaining Social Safety Net Programmes in these countries utilizing the common assumptions proposed by Hickey (2006) and Barrientos and Pellissery (2012). The analysis of this paper identifies that the assumptions developed by Hickey, Barrientos and Pellissery are not adequate enough to capture political discourses around SSNPs in the developing countries. These assumptions mainly help us to understand such discourses from the macro/structural perspective and fail to capture the politics at the micro level. The paper, therefore, argues for more rigorous empirical based research from cross-country perspective focusing both macro and micro level politics.*

Introduction

Social Safety Net (SSN) as a part of social protection programmes is now very popular in many developing countries. These countries have introduced several safety net programmes, including cash or in-kind transfers, public works and income generation programs (Subbarao et al. 1997). There is a growing tendency to adopt safety net policies among the policy makers in these countries in order to serve purposes like reducing poverty, inequality and to enhance livelihood capabilities of vulnerable people also in the context of climate change shocks. For example, the success of conditional cash transfer programme in Latin America for reducing poverty has led to the adoption of such programmes in many African countries (Hurrell and MacAuslan 2012). Barrientos and Hulme (2008) have termed this rapid expansion of social protection programmes in developing countries as a *'quiet revolution'*. An analysis of 87 developing and transition countries during 1996-2006 shows that the mean spending on safety nets of these countries is 1.9 percent of GDP (Weigand and Grosh 2008). In thirty OECD countries, on the other hand, the share of social security is 13 percent of GDP (Townsend 2009 in Hurrell and MacAuslan 2012: 258). Though the percentage is trivial in developing countries compared to the developed countries, the share for this type of social protection is significant in terms of available resources and budget constraints faced by these

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countries. However, there are different schools of thoughts regarding its popularity in developing countries. One school claims that the Social Safety Net Programmes (SSNPs) are adopted by the incumbent governments for reducing poverty and vulnerability (Handa and Davis 2006; Rawlings and Rubio 2005; Santos et al. 2011; Soares et al. 2010). And in analyzing contribution of these programmes, most of the studies have mainly concentrated on evaluating the impact on poverty, vulnerability and targeting effectiveness. However, outcome of a development intervention is not a linear one; rather it is mediated by a variety of social, political, legal, economic and cultural issues. Among these, political dynamics might play the crucial role in prioritizing and implementing pro-poor policies. "Anti-poverty interventions are a political process in their own right" (Bastiaensen et al. 2005: 979). Therefore, the other school describes this popularity from political point of view. According to this school, there is a double-edged relationship between politics and SSNPs. On the one hand, political considerations influences in designing and implementing SSNPs and on the other hand, SSNPs also play a role in shaping national or local politics (Bebbington 2006; De La O 2013; Giovagnoli 2005; Hall 2008; Hickey 2007, 2009, 2012 & 2013; Hossain 2007; Hurrell and MacAuslan 2012; Jones 2012; Maiorano 2014; Pelham 2007; Pellissery 2005, 2008; Zucco 2008). The incumbent government might allocate resources in SSNPs in order to strengthen their political capital. Similarly, the right based relationship between the state and citizens promoted by the SSNPs may change the political landscape of a country.

However, there are very few studies that deal explicitly with political issues in Social Protection (SP) and particularly in SSN fields (Bebbington 2006; Hickey 2007 & 2012; Hossain 2007; Hurrell and MacAuslan 2012). Moreover, existing studies are context or programme specific and the analysis from cross-country perspective is really scarce. This paper is an attempt to study political aspects of SSNPs in comparative perspective by combining multi-country experiences based on analyzing relevant published secondary sources though they differ in many contextual cases. The objective is not to develop a common framework rather to understand the dynamics of political discourses that influences in adopting and sustaining SSNPs in developing countries. The political discourses are constructed differently in different cultures. Likewise, the patterns of governments (e.g. multi-party democracy, dictatorship); centralized/decentralized governance system, degree of bureaucratic autonomy, capacity of civil societies differ country to country. That is why it is difficult to generalize the political dynamics of designing and implementing SSNPs for all countries. This is also a limitation of this paper. However, we have adopted social constructionist perspective to capture different political discourses under some common assumptions developed by Hickey (2006) and Barrientos and Pellissery (2012). This paper mainly focuses on low income and developing countries and ignores developed countries. This is due to the fact that there is already a rich tradition of political analysis of social policies in developed countries (Hurrell and MacAuslan 2012). The analysis of this paper identifies that the assumptions developed by Hickey, Barrientos and Pellissery are not adequate enough to capture political discourses around SSNPs in the developing countries. These assumptions mainly help us to understand politics from the macro/structural perspective and fail to capture politics at the micro level. The paper, therefore, argues for more rigorous empirical based research from cross-country perspective focusing both macro and micro level politics.

To serve the purposes of this study, this paper uses the most frequently cited definition of safety nets: "as non-contributory transfers targeted in some manner to the poor or vulnerable" (Weigand and Grosh 2008: 1). For defining politics, we want to use the definition given by Leftwich. "Politics consists of all activities of conflict, negotiation and cooperation in decisions about the use, production and distribution of resources" (Leftwich 2006: 3).

The rest of this paper analyzes and compare findings based on the assumptions of the relationship between the politics and SSNPs advanced by Hickey (2006) and Barrientos and Pellissery (2012) in their landmark studies. In the later part, the paper identifies several micro level political discourses that influences in designing and implementing safety net programmes before drawing conclusion.

Putting Political Dynamics into Social Safety Net Analysis: General Assumptions?
As stated above, political dynamics in SSN is still an understudied topic and there is a lack of proven analytical framework. However, there is a growing tendency among academicians to uncover this important relationship. A considerable number of literatures have already established that political dynamics has an important role in designing and implementing SSNPs. In this context, Devereux has rightly maintained that "[a] safety-net programme is more than a transfer of resources from 'haves' to 'have-nots'; it is a relationship of power" (Devereux 2002: 673).

To uncover the underlying political dynamics of designing and implementing SSNPs, Hickey (2006) has developed some general assumptions about the politics of social protection programmes on the basis of his study on eight different countries namely Bangladesh, Mozambique, India, Lesotho, South Africa, Namibia, Uganda and Zambia. The assumptions are as follows:

- To understand the pro-poor politics, we need to focus on particular trends of capitalist development, state formation and citizenship development from long term perspective.
- The 'politics of crisis' might play more active role for emerging pro-poor policies than 'politics as usual'.
- The key agents for promoting pro-poor policies are mainly located in political societies. Civil societies have very limited role in promoting such policies.
- Patronage and clientelism act as a driving force for emerging social protection policies.
- Targeted programmes are politically sustainable.
- In case of design and implementation, administrative capacity, central-local relations, political culture are important.
- Donors have significant influence in policy making process of the highly indebted countries.

Barrientos and Pellissery (2012) have also offered an incremental framework based on their study in India, Brazil and South Africa which gives us several analytical hypotheses to understand the role of political dynamics in designing and implementing SSNPs in the context of developing countries. These hypotheses include (Hickey 2006: 6-11):

- Imperfect political competition leads to weaken policies addressing poverty. The policies that emerge from this process tend to serve powerful interests and elites.
- Direct democracy (policy making is based on voters' preferences) is favorable for emerging social assistance institutions.
- Identity politics is sometimes beneficial for sustaining and enlarging social assistance programmes.
- Civil society play very nominal role in promoting SSN programmes.
- The governments who are not dependent on their citizens for generating revenues from taxation enjoy higher degree of autonomy in designing and implementing pro-poor policies.

However, these assumptions as developed by Hickey (2006) and Barrientos and Pellissery (2012) about the relationships between political variables and pro-poor policies in general and SSNP in particular are not yet empirically tested and therefore it is too early to go too quickly to more specific universal hypothesis. It requires more rigorous comparative research. Hickey (2006) has also cautioned us to use these assumptions very carefully, because these may vary according to contexts and require further empirical studies.

Political Dynamics of Social Safety Nets: Experiences from Developing Countries

Rights based versus patronage based politics:
Many authors (including Giovagnoli 2005; Hickey 2009; Hossain 2007; Pelham 2007) have tried to explain the relationship between politics and SSNPs from social contract perspective. From this perspective, SSNPs are gradually being viewed as a form of social/political contract between the state and the poorest people to engage in welfare activities (Hossain 2007). It refers to non-legal contracts between the state and its citizens and emphasizes political accountability of states towards their citizens (Hickey 2009). The basic assumption of this approach is that a social contract "denotes not only more legitimate, peaceful and consensual forms of political authority, but also a stronger commitment to social justice that can help relocate public policy within the realm of rights rather than patronage" (Hickey 2012: 427). In many developing countries, poor people constitute majority of their population. These people maintain very little give and take relationship with their states and thus states suffer from legitimacy (Hickey, 2012). However, SSNPs help to establish relationship between the state and its citizens and increase legitimacy (Barrientos and Pellissery2012). In this way, this approach helps us to determine the forms of politics that is required to support SSNPs. For example, the erosion of apartheid in South Africa has broadened the scope for more citizens to be included in the social pension programme and the absence of such contract in northern Uganda tends the ruling regime to deal with chronic poverty through piecemeal patronage based social funds (Hickey 2007 & 2012). The examples in these countries indicate the nature of contract between the state and citizens, which in turn determines the possibility of inclusion or exclusion based on rights or patronage in accessing to public services. Here, rights are similar to social rights, which can be defined from normative perspective as "a stronger basis for citizens to make claims on their states and for holding states to account for their duties to enhance the access of their citizens to the realization of their rights" (Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi 2004). This approach also stresses

on duties, which may include observance of law, military service, etc. (Ulriksen and Plagerson 2014). Analysis of several SSNPs in the context of developing countries reveals that most of the programmes have been sustained for longer period due to their patron-client relationship. Ruling party politicians at the national and local levels and their relatives are the major beneficiary of these programmes.

Moreover, the analysis of several SSNPs in cross-country perspective reveals that the programmes are generally targeting in nature (which serves mainly small segments of the total population) rather than universal. For example, total population coverage in Nicaragua (3 percent), Chile (6 percent), Colombia (5 percent), Mexico (20 percent), Honduras (15 percent), and Brazil (24 percent) (Bastagli 2009). The perceived benefits of these targeted policies restrict governments of these countries to transform minimal safety nets to inclusive social policy.

'Politics as Crisis' versus 'Politics as Usual'*:*
According to Grindle and Thomas (1991), there are mainly two political contexts for pro-poor decision making: (a) 'politics as usual'-here policy makers focus on problems based on their preferences and values; and (b) 'politics as crisis'- policy reactions in response to outside actions and events (Grindle and Thomas in Hickey 2009: 476). Pelham (2007) has termed these political contexts differently, i.e. 'politics as usual' as ex-ante or supply driven and 'politics of crisis' as ex-post decisions or demand driven, both of which define the relationship between the state and citizens. Though it is presumed that the pro-poor interventions are more likely to take place in 'politics as usual' context through channeling the popular interest in the political system, it is now broadly agreed that politics of crisis also provides opportunity for the development of pro-poor policies (Hickey 2009). The introduction of Vulnerable Group Development programme after the devastating famine of 1974 in Bangladesh, Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme in India after drought, self-targeted employment programme in Chile in response to severe unemployment, cash transfer programme for the children with or affected by HIV/AIDS in Kenya, direct income support programme for families with unemployed head (*Jefes)* in Argentina are some of the examples of developing SSNPs as 'politics as crisis' (Bryant 2009; Chu & Gupta 1998; Giovagnoli 2005; Hickey 2009; Hossain 2007). Old age pensions in South Africa, on the other hand, are considered to be largely driven in the interests of the government and state (Pelham, 2007). Similarly, old age pension scheme in Bangladesh supports the political manifesto of the present government. Therefore, SSNPs can emerge both in the context of 'politics as crisis' and 'politics as usual'. However, as the developing countries suffer from adequate resources to finance development expenditures, 'politics as crisis' dominates in case of allocating resources for SSNPs.

Politics of Poverty Reduction:
In many of the developing countries, widespread poverty, unemployment, inequality have turned into one of the major political agendas in recent years. During their election campaigns, major political parties make their commitments on reducing poverty and income inequality. The best example in this case is the declaration of *Fome Zero* (zero hunger) policy by the Lula administration in Brazil immediately after his take-over into the power (Hall 2008). At the same time, it has been also observed that ruling political parties undertake several SSNPs to convince general people to cast vote for the incumbents. For example, the

introduction of conditional cash transfer programme named *Progresa* (now Oportunidades) in Mexico "led to a 7 percent increase in voter turnout and a 9 percent increase in incumbent vote share in the 2000 presidential election" (De La O 2013: 2). Similar effects on electoral behaviour have been also observed in other countries. *Bolsa Familia* (launched in October 2003), a conditional cash transfer programme in Brazil has been designed to capture votes (Hall, 2008) and the popularity of this programme among the poor has helped to establish a patronage culture in the distribution of benefits, which has helped Lula to be reelected in 2006 election (Zucco 2008). In India, some of the SSNPs have been named after with the name of politicians in order to gain political benefits. For example, central government has introduced some social assistance programmes by prefixing the name of former prime minister 'Indira Gandhi' just before the elections in 1995 (Barrientos and Pellissery 2012). This type of identity politics creates favourable conditions for emerging such pro-poor policies, which in turn helps the incumbent government to stay in office for several terms (Feng and Gizelis 2002).

Forms of Government**:** There does not seem to be particular forms of government which are more or less favorable for emerging and expanding of such pro-poor policies (Hickey 2006; Hossain 2007). These programmes may emerge under dictatorship or democracy or in any other forms of government. In this case, the best example is China. Social protection programmes targeting the poor households have increased substantially in recent years. In 2010, it has passed the China Social Security Law and this part accounts for 10.4 percent of total government expenditure, which is significantly larger than other developing countries (Needham 2013). In Vietnam, budget allocation for non-contributory programmes was more than 2 percent of GDP in 2009 (World Bank, 2010). In Bangladesh, major SSNPs like VGD and FFW had emerged during the military regime. On the contrary, authoritarian form of government in Senegal appeared to be a constraining factor in reaching out to the poorest segment of the population (Subbarao et al. 1997). Therefore, the claim 'direct democracy is favorable for emerging social assistance institutions' made by Barrientos and Pellissery (2012) may not be true in majority of the cases. Rather, in multiparty democracy, there is a tendency of the incumbent government to distribute resources to the regions where it has strong political support (Aytaç 2014).

History of State Formation and State-Citizens Relationship*:*
In terms of choosing such pro-poor policies, history of state formation and state-citizens relationships also play an important role (Hickey 2006). Many of the countries in the South were under the colonial rule and most of them are still being influenced by the existing neo-imperialist structure. The political elites of these countries are highly dependent on powerful countries and often have little option to consider the interest of their own citizens (Moore 2001). Moreover, policy processes of these countries are highly influenced by the donors. For example, the SSNPs in Uganda, Zambia, Colombia, Honduras, and Nicaragua are heavily dependent on donors funding and the governments have limited ownership in these programmes (Bastagli 2009; Hickey 2013; Ulriksen 2013). On the contrary, NGOs and other civil society members can play very nominal role in compelling governments to adopt pro-poor policies as it is expected rhetorically (Barrientos and Pellissery 2012; Hickey 2006). One of the reasons might be that many of the civil societies in developing countries are not that strong and dependent on donor funding. Existing social hierarchies in terms of education,

gender roles and power relations hinder these organizations to play their roles effectively (Patterson 1998).

State-citizens relationship has a role in mounting SSNPs. Historically, European countries have been constructed based on taxing their citizens and this has directed the governments of these countries to engage in continuous dialogue with their citizens (Moore2001; Ulriksen 2013; Williams et al. 2011). We observe a positive correlation between this relationship and the expansion of social protection expenditure as it has been indicated in the introductory section of the paper. On the contrary, there is a limited relationship between the state and citizens in developing countries. The powerful political elites of these unearned states are highly dependent on aid or natural resources and have less enticement to serve their citizens (Moore 2001; Williams et al. 2011). Therefore, there is a dearth of wider social contract in many of these countries. However, we observe a growing tendency of introducing several pro-poor policies in general and SSNPs in particular among these political elites in order to enhance their legitimacy and to restrict protest against economic liberalization (Hickey 2006).

Policy Discourse of Development Partners
Most of the developing countries have adopted this pro-poor policy as a result of policy diffusion by the international agencies, like, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Food Programme, UNESCO, and UNICEF in the name of human capital development, a new paradigm of development following the failure of a neoliberal discourse. Successful implementation of such programmes in neighboring or influential countries also influences domestic policy makers of a country to adopt and sustain such policy options (Fenwick 2013). For example, following the implementation of conditional cash transfer programme in Brazil in the year 1995, many countries in Latin America like Mexico (1997), Nicaragua (2000), Argentina (2002) Uruguay (2005) have implemented such programme to fight against poverty (Fenwick 2013).

We can explain the dynamics of such policy diffusion from inclusive neoliberal perspective. According to Devereux (2002), critics of neo-liberal reforms view SSNs as politically palatable and ways of bypassing to take real initiatives to address the structural causes of poverty and vulnerability. They claim that neoliberal proponents promote structural reform in many of the developing countries under the disguise of pro-poor policies like SSNPs as a residual approach in order to deflect resistance from poor people and to sustain the existing resource redistribution process (Hickey 2007; Ruckert 2006). This mechanism also acts as a restraining factor to turn the poor into an agency and to bring their interests into political discourse. By assisting in the Food-For-Work programme in Bangladesh, the multi-lateral donors like World Food Programme (WFP) and Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), which played the key role in designing and implementing the programme, have tried to realize their own agenda. Donors have used food aid as tool to maintain regional power balance (Brundin1979; McHenry and Bird 1977).

Now the question remains as to why do the policy makers of developing countries accept such policies which are imposed by the external agents? There are several reasons for accepting policy suggestions from development partners. First reason might be the symmetric relationship between the transnational policy ideas and the interest of domestic political

actors. According to Fenwick (2013: 144), "… if transnational policy ideas and models can draw on or build upon already established ideational and symbolic beliefs, they can actually be used to further the motivations of key political actors and societal interests Many of the developing countries in the South can be characterized as neopatrimonial states, where "real power and real decision-making lie outside formal institutions" (Cammack 2007: 600). A form of kleptocracy from national to local levels exists in these states. Different forms of aids forwarded to the political and bureaucratic elites of these states by their multi-lateral and bi-lateral donor agencies not only increases the acceptability of these governments to their people by adopting popular programmes, but also help them to stay in power (Cammack 2007). Similarly, the development partners find it interesting to perpetuate their hegemony in all aspects of state affairs through their interaction with political and administrative elites of these nations. Secondly, these countries suffer from availability of inadequate resources or capacity to design better strategies for utilizing existing resources. Therefore, we observe a growing tendency of policy dependency on donors among these states.

The above analyses based on the two sets of assumptions mainly help us to understand power relations from structural perspective, which fails to capture the local level politics of local micro level actors. These local actors play an important role in the design and especially implementation of SSNPs. Following discussion will corroborate this argument.

Influence of Vested Interests at Local/ Micro-level
Existing literature whimpers for scant studies concerning micro level political discourses surrounding safety net programmes (Maiorano 2014). In reality, the design and implementation of SSNPs (in terms of identification of projects, beneficiary selection, formation of project implementation committees, grievance handling procedure, etc.) are highly influenced by rural power structures.

There are huge debates about the use of beneficiary targeting techniques because the effectiveness of a technique is largely determined by its impact on poverty reduction. It is a complex process which needs to deal with who should be included or excluded. There are mainly three types of targeting methods: (a) means-tested targeting by individual/household assessment; (b) demographic or geographic targeting; and (c) self-targeting (Devereux 1999; Coady et al. 2004). The targeting process under these methods has been expatiated in details by Coady et al (2004) in their study.

Local/micro level interests/politics become visible in interpreting the selection provisions and inclusion/exclusion of poor people in SSNPs because of the discretionary action exercised by the local political elites and street level bureaucrats. Local political elites play the central role in identifying and designing the projects whereas the local bureaucrats approve the projects, monitor their progress and allocate resources accordingly. For some observers, there exists a patron-client relationship between the politicians and bureaucrats which help them to bypass the formal institutional requirements. Consequently, these projects turn into money making machine both for politicians and bureaucrats at the rural levels due to this elite capture (Pritchett 2005). Pellissery (2008) has observed that the poor people had to pay Rs. 10 as registration fee to be included in the public works programme and 5 percent of their daily earnings to the work gang leader to get job for the next day. He has also maintained that corruption takes place through creation of low quality assets. Lack of accountability might be

one of the reasons for this debilitated situation. **"**The problem in many developing countries is that they are still at fairly early stages of state building where institutionalized relationships and checks and balances are often weak" (Williams et al. 2011: S37). Absence of strong institutions is one of the reasons for poor accountability situation in these countries. For example, in India, there are almost 300 programmes being implemented under 13 different ministries and there is no single authority to coordinate these activities (Barrientos and Pellissery 2012). This mismanagement situation has created room for local elites to capture the programmes. On the contrary, in Brazil and South Africa, the implementations of SP programmes are being coordinated by strong autonomous institutions and by a single ministry respectively, which have been able to reduce the influence of local politics (Barrientos and Pellissery 2012). Accountability also depends on appropriate grievance mechanism. In Kenya, it has been observed that the village leaders who are responsible for managing the programmes are also responsible for hearing and redressing the grievances (Hurrell and MacAuslan 2012). Therefore, in this situation of elite captures, local people are unable to fully ensure their accountability.

Rhetorically, identification and design of the projects under SSNPs emphasizes to include multiple stakeholders including poor people. However, a plethora of empirical studies has observed that this type of participation could not empower poor people of the rural areas. In participatory development approach, the critiques argue that the discourse of participation is strongly influenced by power structures within a community. According to Uma Kothari (2001), "participatory development programmes emphasizing social inclusion draw previously marginalized individuals and groups in to the development process, but do so in ways that bind them more tightly to structures of power that they are not then able to question" (Uma Kathori cited in Williams 2004: 563). Participation at the local levels is highly influenced by several structural issues like gender, class, caste and ethnicity and it can thus be linked with more structural power struggles and transformation (Mohan and Stokke 2000; Williams 2004). For example, in one study in rural Kenya, it has been observed that though this approach has increased citizen participation through mobilization, it has failed to circumvent existing power structures (Sheely 2015). Similarly, other studies in Bangladesh, India, Malawi and Ghana do not show any evidence that the participation of poor people in project selection and implementation has enabled them to achieve political capabilities to hold political and administrative elites accountable (Chinsinga 2007; Hossain 2007; Pellissery 2008; Oduro 2015).

Local level politics of vested groups become more visible due to the lack of agency power by the poor people. In case of public works programme in Maharashtra and West Bengal, the inclusion into the programme depends on access to and connection with the local elites, political and casts identity (Das 2015; Pellissery 2005 & 2008). In Mozambique, relatives of local community leaders were selected in SSN programme (Hickey, 2006). In Argentina, access to income support programme called *Jefes* depends on political connections, rather than satisfying technical criteria (Giovagnoli 2005). However, most of the poorest people lack this agency power and find themselves excluded from the access to these programmes. For example, 65 percent of the poor are excluded in Bangladesh, 70 percent in Mexico, 59 percent in Brazil from *Bolsa Familia* (Planning Commission, 2015). In some cases, the allocations rather reaching to the poor people end up with the rich segment of the population. In Brazil, 15 percent of transfers went to the richest quintile and in Mexico, it is 4 percent

(Lomelí 2008). Here "Access is the ability to benefit from things" (Ribot and Peluso 2003: 153). Most of the vulnerable people lack this capability to derive benefit from things. This is due to the fact that most assets and capabilities derive from economic, organizational and political processes and poor people have little control over these issues (Tilly 2006). In this sense, their poverty is relational and their rights to get access appropriate mechanisms become a non-issue in political discourse as they lack agency power (Mosse 2010). This is because poor people pursue local leaders individually, rather than collectively to get benefits, which actually undermines their agency power (Hurrell and MacAuslan 2012). Moreover, those who manage to get access into the programmes through their relationship with local elites, they in turn perpetuate this system of elite capture.

Conclusion

From the above discussions, it is clear that intergroup politics play an important role in designing and implementing SSNPs. It influences from either sides. Many agents like donors, political parties, and local elites have influence in adopting several pro-poor policies in general and SSNPs in particular. There is scarcity of robust analytical frameworks for doing comparative studies in this field. However, from the above analysis, we can draw some macro or general trends about the dynamics of designing and implementing SSNPs. We find that adoption of these programmes may take place in the both contexts of 'politics as usual' and 'politics as crisis' for achieving several political capital; any particular form of government may not be favorable for emerging such programmes; donors' influence is higher in those countries which are dependent on foreign aid and similarly social contract is also weaker than those which are dependent on tax. From micro perspective: most of the programmes are captured by local elites; and inclusion by target population into the programmes depends on political connections, ethnicity, gender or caste. Most of the poorest people lack this agency power and find themselves excluded from the access to these programmes. In this context, establishing strong institutions for monitoring and coordinating implementation activities, appropriate grievance redressing mechanism might help in improving accountability and reducing corruption. However, we need further rigorous comparative studies for generalizing these trends.

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Examining Parliamentary Accountability System in Bangladesh: Theory and Practice

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Abstract: *This paper addresses the parliamentary accountability system in Bangladesh. With a view to that Bangladesh constitution (CoB) and the Rules of Procedure (RoP) of Bangladesh parliament were analyzed. The mechanisms for ensuring accountability are questions, discussion, budgetary debate, motions, ombudsman, committees and resolution. The effectiveness of these mechanisms is determined by various factors such as active parliament, expertise and interest of parliamentarians, unbiased role of the Speaker and dynamism in committee systems. Absences of such factors have made multifarious problems in ensuring accountability of the executive branch of government through parliament. The implication is to remove all the barriers to ensure accountability for better democratic governance.*

Introduction

Bangladesh is a country where a parliamentary form of democracy has been adopted and practiced. The parliamentary democracy was introduced in 1935 by the British and developed with major disruptions by military dictatorship and presidential form of government during Pakistan period. After the division of India, the constitution of 1956 was promulgated with a blend of presidential and parliamentary forms of government, which did not work because of gridlock between the chief executive and the parliament. General Ayub took the opportunity to take over power in 1959 and introduced indirect democracy known as "Basic Democracy", where basic democrats elect the parliamentarians and the president. Ayub Khan also formed Convention Muslim League as his political party, which dominated the 1965 parliamentary elections. As a result, the parliament turned into a debating club instead of supreme law making body. General Ayub was overthrown by a popular uprising in 1969. Another army General, Yahia Khan took over the power in Pakistan and election was held in 1970. In that election the Awami League from the then East Pakistan had a landslide victory. The Pakistani ruler delayed the process of transformation of power to Awami League and started genocide in East Pakistan, which resulted in the War of Independence in 1971 and subsequent independence of Bangladesh (Khan 1997). After the emergence of Bangladesh in 1972, parliamentary democracy was adopted in the Constitution. But within three years the government moved to presidential form of government in 1975 for political unrest and economic stagnation. From 1975 military or military backed government occupied state power for fifteen years and the military finally departed from power through a successful popular uprising in 1990. In 1991, parliamentary form of democracy was re-established

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through twelfth amendment of the Constitution and it has continued for the last two decades. There are some literatures which reflect the role of parliament, including accountability, e. g. Ahmed 2002; CPD 2012; Obaidullah 2001: Alamgir et al. 2006: Rahman 2008; Mahiuddin 2009). These studies are inadequate as these are limited to one/two aspects of accountability for example, some studies only emphasize on committee system/ombudsman. The effectiveness of the parliament depends on its role in all aspects to ensure accountability of government. Therefore, it is important to identify how far the parliament is working to ensure the accountability of government. The Constitution of Bangladesh and rules of procedure of Bangladesh Parliament are studied to examine the extent of political accountability. In this paper an attempt was made to identify the gaps between procedures and practice in the system of accountability and problems in this regard.

Data and Method
This paper has been written based on content analysis. Data were collected from secondary sources which include books, journals and online contents. Data were analyzed based on four themes which are *active role of the parliament, expertise and interest of parliamentarians, unbiased role of the Speaker* and *dynamism in committee systems*. Data were presented both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Parliamentary Accountability System in Bangladesh
Bangladesh is a unitary state with a parliamentary form of government and a unicameral legislature. The parliament composed of 350 seats where 300 seats are general and 50 seats are reserved exclusively for women. The members for general seats are elected through direct election and the members for reserved seats are distributed based on the proportion of general seats achieved by each party. In parliamentary democracy, the oppositions play a critical role in ensuring accountability. According to the provision of the Bangladesh Constitution, the ministers are collectively responsible to the Parliament (CoB Article 54). They are also individually responsible to parliament for their respective ministries. The ministers are political executive to whom administrative executives are responsible. In each ministry, Secretaries are administrative executives and answerable to their respective ministers.

The mechanisms of ensuring parliamentary accountability are questions, motion, discussions, budget approval, parliamentary committees and ombudsman. The parliament members can ask questions to ministers about the affairs of their concerned ministry. The first hour of every sitting is assigned for raising and answering questions. Moreover, on Wednesdays, extra thirty minutes are assigned for asking questions to the Prime Minister (RoP, 41-59). However, it has been observed that, during the question session the parliament members discuss irrelevant issues other than their questions and waste valuable time of the session. One reason may be the qualification spelled out in the Constitution to be a member of parliament which stipulates that a member must be at least twenty five years of age and be a Bangladeshi citizen. As a result, many parliamentarians do not relevant questions on important policy issues. The motion is another way to ensure accountability of the Government through the Parliament to discuss specific important public related matters. A written proposal is to be submitted by any Parliament member to the Speaker to consider whether the matter is important enough to discuss in the Parliament. The Speaker then in

consultation with leader of the House can allot a day/days/part of a day for the discussions (RoP 61, 146-157). However, in practice hardly any proposal for motion is accepted by the Speaker though many such proposals were raised by the parliament members. The reason is time constraints on the grounds of tendency of members to discuss unscheduled debates. "In most sittings the House debated issues not previously included in the order of the day, thereby leaving important issues unattended" (Ahmad and Khan 1995: 577). The Constitution also has provision to establish Ombudsman by Parliament. The Ombudsman's responsibility is to enquire maladministration by any public authority (CoB Article 77). Though an act was passed in 1980 with necessary provisions, the office is yet to be established. In some countries like Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, the United States and New Zealand Ombudsman play a vital role to make the public official answerable to citizens. As a result, absence of the office of the Ombudsman in Bangladesh has given public official opportunity to engage in maladministration. The Parliament is empowered to approve the budget of the government. Every year government prepares budget and submit it to parliament for its approval. The members of parliament can propose to reduce the expenditure demanded by government (RoP 111-127; CoB Article 81). However, they cannot propose to increase expenditure on any area. Moreover, the budget cannot be referred to any committee. Consequently, the budget is not under any scrutiny by the Parliament before it has been passed (Rahaman 2010). Considering that the budget is a very technical and complex matter, and many members may not be able to fully understand its' various aspects, as a result in practice, members of the government party praise the budget and the opposition members do not find anything good in it. There are also weakness and delays in budget execution, accounting and reporting. Consequently, opportunities may arise for misappropriation of funds (World Bank 2006). The extreme way to ensure accountability of government is motion of non-confidence. If a Parliament member proposes *motion of non-confidence* and thirty members support this proposal and the Speaker give consent, then it will be presented in the House for discussions. The Government will resign if it loses support in the Parliament due to such no-confidence motion (RoP 159). In a democratic country like India, motion of non-confidence is effectively practiced, as for example when Bajpayi government had to resign as they were defeated in a confidence vote. However, in Bangladesh, as there is a strong disciplinary measure existing in the Constitution against any member who violates party's decision, motion of non-confidence is a mechanism which enforcement is impossible.

There is also another provision to raise resolution by any member or minister. The resolution are raised to declare opinion or recommendation, or approval or disapproval of the government's policy or act by the House, or to express any message; or command, urge or request an action; or call attention to a matter or situation for consideration by the Government (RoP 130-145). The mover of the resolution may speak for 15 minutes and discussant may speak 3 minutes and then the concerned Minister in the next session sitting will inform the House on what action has been taken on that relevant resolution passed by the House. Any member can propose half an hour discussion on a matter of public importance and the Speaker can decide on the proposal for discussion in the House (RoP 60). Moreover, any member can give notice to discuss a matter of important public importance for short duration. There is a provision which allots an hour discuss such matter (RoP 68-70). Moreover, any Parliament member can give calling attention notice on any important public

matter and concerned Minister gives brief statement on the issue before the House. The Speaker may refer the subject to the relevant standing committee of Parliament to submit a report after ministers' statement, considering the importance of the matter (Rule 71). However, the discussions and calling attention rarely focus on administrative lapses, cases of corruption and other administrative malpractices (Ahmed and Khan, 1995; Siddiquee, 1999). As a consequence, these mechanisms are not effectively practiced due to inactive parliament, the passive role of Speaker and lack of efficient parliamentarians, which will be discussed later.

In a democratic polity, Parliament works as a link between government and governed. Parliament not only formulates policies but also works as watchdog to oversee actions of government. In this context, the parliamentary committees play a critical role to make government accountable for its actions (Mahiuddin 2009). These committees scrutinize bills, proposals and activities of public organizations. Moreover, the committees have power to summon any individual or organization for testimonies and give report for consideration by the Parliament. The details of committees concerning their formation and responsibilities are enclosed in the Constitution and Rules of Procedures (CoB 76; RoP 187-226). The concerned ministers cannot be chairman or member of any standing committee of their respective ministries.

Findings and Discussion
The success of ensuring accountability depends on how political parties play active role in the Parliament. Though parliamentary democracy has been continuing in Bangladesh, democratic practices have not been wholly successful due to conflict among major political parties and lack of consensus over national issues. In parliamentary democracy, oppositions work as a shadow government through its critiques and watchdog of government activities. However, in Bangladesh, as ruling parties get an enormous majority most of the time, except in the fifth and seventh parliaments (see Table 1 below) this encourage them to largely ignore the opposition. Moreover, during the elections the political parties form alliances which also stop them from raising voice against the executive when their alliances come to power. Moreover, both ruling and opposition parties engage in blame game, which limits their active role in parliament. The annual budget is an example of how the government does not give ear to opposition voice. The budget proposed by the government is usually passed without any substantial debate and consequent amendment and the proposals made by private members do not get importance. There is also a trend of continuing boycotting parliament sessions by the opposition. Consequently, the political parties never tried to make each other accountable through the Parliament, which is in vogue in most democracies. Therefore, the major problems are ineffective Parliament due to the absence of effective opposition in the Parliament, lack of presence of opposition in the Parliament during sessions and a culture mistrust between major political parties as opposed bipartisanship.

Table-1: Numerical Strength of Government, Opposition and Independents in the Parliament

Parliament	Ruling Party	Year of Elected	Number of MPs				Tenure (month)
			Government	Opposition	Independent	Total	
First	AL	1973	308 (97.78)	02 (0.63)	05 (1.59)	315 (100)	33
Second	BNP	1979	248 (75.15)	77 (23.34)	05 (1.51)	330 (100)	37
Third	JP	1986	206 (62.42)	115 (34.85)	9 (2.73)	330 (100)	19
Fourth	JP	251	251 (83.67)	24 (8.00)	25 (8.33)	300 (100)	34
Fifth	BNP	1991	168 (50.91)	159 (48.18)	03 (0.91)	330 (100)	56
Seventh	AL	1996	175 (53.03)	155 (46.97)	0 (00)	330 (100)	60
Eighth	BNP	2001	193	102	6	300	60
Ninth	AL	2008	274	74	2	350	60

Source: Ahmed 1996; Ahmed 2001; EC 2011

The lack of efficient and seasoned politicians is another problem of political accountability (Table 2). In all parliaments, most of the parliamentarians were businessmen/industrialists and lack of experience. In Bangladesh, the Prime Minister, the leader of the Parliament and the leader of the ruling party is the same person and personality cult play a significant role where the party head is all in all of political parties. There also seems to be a lack of democratic practices within parties. Consequently, a patron-client relationship develops in political parties and politicians are more interested towards party position. They neither try to make ministers accountable nor try to make administrative executive accountable. As a result, brilliant and expert politicians hardly nurtured and developed in political parties. Besides, the parliamentarians are only busy with their own constituencies and thus neglect giving attention to crucial oversight functions of the Parliament (Alamgir et. al 2006). One of the often cited problems of Parliament is quorum crisis, which indicates parliamentarians are not that interested in participating in parliament activities. Moreover, in recent times the number of businessmen is rising as parliamentarians and they tend they use memberships as a medium to enhance their business interests (Jahan 1976; Hasanuzzaman and Alam 2010; NDI 2009; CPD 2012).

Table 2: Background of Parliamentarians (%)

Indicators	CA (1970)	First	Fifth	Seventh	Eighth	Ninth
Profession						
Businessman/Industrialist	27	24	53	48	57	56
Civil/Military Bureaucrat	3	n/a	8	8	8	10
Lawyer	30	27	19	17	11	15
Professional	17	15	14	4	11	7
Politics	5	13	2	4	7	5
Others	19	21	4	14	6	7
Education						
Postgraduates	22	27	38	40	42	37
Graduates	41	42	46	45	47	45
Undergraduates	24	27	16	11	10	15
Others	3	4		4	1	3
Parliamentary Experience						
No Experience	n/a	34	68	40	29	55
Experience of One terms	n/a	57	17	27	28	16
Experience of two terms	n/a	10	7	33	27	8
Experience of three terms	n/a	n/a	4	0	11	3
Experience of four terms	n/a	n/a	4	0	4	2
Experience of five terms	n/a	n/a	0	0	1	0

Source: Jahan 1976; Hasanuzzaman and Alam 2010; NDI 2009; CPD 2012

The role of Speakers is crucial to ensure constructive discussions within Parliament. The ruling party is entrusted to elect the Speakers. However, they cannot give up their party membership when they become Speakers. Thus, they largely tend to not to take any decision violating their party's interests. Although the number of questions asked to ministers has increased gradually from 33% in 7th Parliament to 46% in the 9th Parliament (see Table 3). However, all motions of adjournments seems to be rejected in the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Parliament (Table 3) (CPD 2012; Mondal 2011). It is also evident from different findings (Table 4) that the number of notices for discussion has declined rapidly, as most of the notices were not discussed in the House. This trend is discouraging the parliamentarians to submit notices for discussions. Like the notices for discussion, the number of calling attention notices is declining day by day, since only 4% of them have been discussed in the 7th, 8th and 9th Parliament for rejection by the Speaker (Table 4).

Table 3: Questions to Ministers

Parliament	Questions Answered %	Questions Rejected %	Question Lapsed %	Questions Withdrawn %	Total
7th(Up to March 1999)	32.8	27.5	39.7	0.02	N=29537
8th	41.9	15.9	41.2	0.0	N=33956
9th (Up to December 2010)	45.8	8.1	42.5	1.0	N=24909

Source: Ahmed, 2002; CPD, 2012

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Table 4: Motions and Discussion

Parliament	Call Attention Notice	Short Discussion	Adjournment Motions	Half Hour Discussion
7th(Up to March 1999) Parliament				
Notice Submitted	15228	561	4450	21
Notice Discussed %	3.0	6.0	0.0	0.0
8th Parliament				
Notice Submitted	10407	226	2530	8
Notice Discussed %	4.0	2.0	0.0	0.0
9th (Up to December 2010) Parliament				
Notice Submitted	5183	19	338	0
Notice Discussed	3.7	0.0	0.0	0.0

Source: Ahmed, 2002; CPD, 2012

The constitutional provision is another impediment to ensure accountability within Parliament of our country. In the Article 70 of the Constitution, it is stated that if a Parliament member gives vote against his party, or if he/she keep himself/herself absent from Parliament session, ignoring his/her party decision, then the seats of that member will be declared vacant. As a result, the members of Parliament do not raise voice against his/her own party and participate in cross-voting like the Congress of the USA and many other countries.

Multiple factors work regarding dynamism of Parliamentary committees. The Parliamentary committees are entrusted to prevent corruption and to ensure transparency (Alamgir et al. 2006). As most of the committees' members come from the ruling party, they are not interested to investigate the faults. In addition, these committees can only recommend measures to the House, but the ministries are not obliged to enforce their recommendations. Moreover, the Ministries at times may not give full information on the grounds of national safety or interest. Most interestingly, the recommendations of some important committees (e.g. Public Accounts, Public Undertaking, Public Estimates, Assurance, and Standing Committees on ministries) are not discussed in the Parliament. Consequently, the Parliamentary committees, though more functional compared to the past, are not fully effective as most of their decisions are not implemented. Moreover, no mechanism exists to

screen out a member with conflict of interest on a particular issue or policy. Besides, lack of interest among MPs, limitation of resources, irregular meeting and lack of expertise and staffs are other problems of the committee system (CPD 2012; World Bank 2006). To cite examples, the Public Accounts Committee cannot work properly for poor auditing system of the state. Although the Comptroller and Auditor General's Office is a constitutional body it cannot work fully independently as it has rely on many things on the government and even its' auditing system is not up to date.

Conclusion

Parliamentary democracy has been continuing in Bangladesh for more than two decades. Therefore, a strong accountability system is essential for the success of parliamentary democracy. The political parties need to build consensus amongst them and work together to establish and ensure such accountability system. Moreover, the election system also needs to be changed so that expert, honest and dedicated persons can become the members of Parliament and can play effective role in ensuring accountability. As the Speaker plays a key role in the House, he/she needs to work independently with absolute neutrality. There are different suggestions after being elected as a Speaker he/she must resign from his/her political party to ensure neutrality like in the UK. One of the obstacles to ensure accountability in Parliament is Article 70 of the Constitution. This should be amended so that the parliamentarians can play more effective and transparent roles through more active role in Parliament and if necessary take part in cross-voting like the USA. Moreover, the proportion of the members from opposition in different Parliamentary Committees needs to be increased and these committees should publish their reports timely. As most of the recommendations by Parliamentary Committees are not being implemented by ministries, there should be provisions to make the concerned ministries responsible to report and explain to the committees on what ground the recommendations were not implemented. Last but not the least, the post of independent and powerful Ombudsman should be established without delay to oversee mal-administration and to ensure more accountability within the State.

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